The beginning of the winter war between the USSR and Finland. Soviet-Finnish War: causes, course of events, consequences

After the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Germany went to war with Poland, and relations between the USSR and Finland began to strain. One of the reasons is a secret document between the USSR and Germany on delimiting spheres of influence. According to it, the influence of the USSR extended to Finland, the Baltic states, western Ukraine and Belarus, and Bessarabia.

Realizing that a major war was inevitable, Stalin sought to protect Leningrad, which could be shelled by artillery from Finland. Therefore, the task was to move the border further north. To resolve the issue peacefully, the Soviet side offered Finland the lands of Karelia in exchange for moving the border on the Karelian Isthmus, but any attempts at dialogue were suppressed by the Finns. They didn't want to come to an agreement.

Reason for war

The reason for the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 was an incident near the village of Mainila on November 25, 1939 at 15:45. This village is located on the Karelian Isthmus, 800 meters from the Finnish border. Mainila was subjected to artillery shelling, as a result of which 4 representatives of the Red Army were killed and 8 were wounded.

On November 26, Molotov summoned the Finnish ambassador in Moscow (Irie Koskinen) and presented a note of protest, stating that the shelling was carried out from the territory of Finland, and that the only thing that saved him from starting a war was that the Soviet army had an order not to succumb to provocations.

On November 27, the Finnish government responded to the Soviet note of protest. Briefly, the main provisions of the answer were as follows:

• The shelling actually took place and lasted approximately 20 minutes.
• The shelling came from the Soviet side, approximately 1.5-2 km southeast of the village of Maynila.
• It was proposed to create a commission that would jointly study this episode and give it an adequate assessment.

What really happened near the village of Maynila? This is an important question, since it was as a result of these events that the Winter (Soviet-Finnish) War was unleashed. The only thing that can be stated unequivocally is that there really was shelling of the village of Maynila, but who carried it out is impossible to establish through documentation. Ultimately, there are 2 versions (Soviet and Finnish), and each needs to be evaluated. The first version is that Finland shelled the territory of the USSR. The second version is that it was a provocation prepared by the NKVD.

Why did Finland need this provocation? Historians talk about two reasons:

1. The Finns were a political tool in the hands of the British, who needed war. This assumption would be reasonable if we consider the winter war in isolation. But if we remember the realities of those times, then at the time of the incident a world war was already underway, and England had already declared war on Germany. England's attack on the USSR automatically created an alliance between Stalin and Hitler, and this alliance would sooner or later hit England itself with all its might. Therefore, to assume this is tantamount to assuming that England decided to commit suicide, which, of course, was not the case.
2. They wanted to expand their territories and influence. This is an absolutely stupid hypothesis. This is from the category - Liechtenstein wants to attack Germany. It's nonsense. Finland had neither the strength nor the means for war, and everyone in the Finnish command understood that their only chance of success in the war with the USSR was a long defense that would exhaust the enemy. With such situations, no one will disturb the den with the bear.

The most adequate answer to the question posed is that the shelling of the village of Mainila is a provocation of the Soviet government itself, which was looking for any excuse to justify the war with Finland. And it was this incident that was subsequently presented to Soviet society as an example of the treachery of the Finnish people, who needed help to carry out the socialist revolution.

Balance of forces and means

It is indicative how the forces were correlated during the Soviet-Finnish war. Below is a brief table that describes how the opposing countries approached the Winter War.

In all aspects except infantry, the USSR had a clear advantage. But conducting an offensive, superior to the enemy by only 1.3 times, is an extremely risky undertaking. In this case, discipline, training and organization come to the fore. The Soviet army had problems with all three aspects. These figures once again emphasize that the Soviet leadership did not perceive Finland as an enemy, expecting to destroy it in the shortest possible time.

Progress of the war

The Soviet-Finnish or Winter War can be divided into 2 stages: the first (December 39th - January 7th 40th) and the second (January 7th 40th - March 12th 40th). What happened on January 7, 1940? Timoshenko was appointed commander of the army, who immediately set about reorganizing the army and establishing order in it.

First stage

The Soviet-Finnish war began on November 30, 1939, and the Soviet army failed to carry it out briefly. The USSR army actually crossed the state border of Finland without declaring war. For its citizens, the justification was the following - to help the people of Finland in overthrowing the bourgeois government of the warmonger.

The Soviet leadership did not take Finland seriously, believing that the war would be over in a few weeks. They even mentioned a figure of 3 weeks as a deadline. More specifically, there should be no war. The Soviet command's plan was approximately as follows:

• Send in troops. We did this on November 30th.
• Creation of a working government controlled by the USSR. On December 1, the Kuusinen government was created (more on this later).
• Lightning-fast attack on all fronts. It was planned to reach Helsinki in 1.5-2 weeks.
• Declining the real government of Finland towards peace and complete surrender in favor of the Kuusinen government.

The first two points were implemented in the first days of the war, but then problems began. The blitzkrieg did not work out, and the army was stuck in the Finnish defense. Although in the initial days of the war, until approximately December 4, it seemed that everything was going according to plan - Soviet troops were moving forward. However, very soon they stumbled upon the Mannerheim line. On December 4, the armies of the eastern front (near Lake Suvantojärvi), on December 6 - the central front (Summa direction), and on December 10 - the western front (Gulf of Finland) entered it. And it was a shock. A huge number of documents indicate that the troops did not expect to encounter a well-fortified defense line. And this is a huge question for the Red Army intelligence.

In any case, December was a disastrous month that thwarted almost all the plans of the Soviet Headquarters. The troops advanced inland slowly. Every day the pace of movement only decreased. Reasons for the slow advance of Soviet troops:

1. Terrain. Almost the entire territory of Finland is forests and swamps. It is difficult to use equipment in such conditions.
2. Application of aviation. Aviation was practically not used in terms of bombing. There was no point in bombing villages adjacent to the front line, since the Finns were retreating, leaving behind scorched earth. It was difficult to bomb the retreating troops, since they were retreating with civilians.
3. Roads. While retreating, the Finns destroyed roads, caused landslides, and mined everything they could.

Formation of the Kuusinen government

On December 1, 1939, the People's Government of Finland was formed in the city of Terijoki. It was formed on territory already captured by the USSR, and with the direct participation of the Soviet leadership. The Finnish people's government included:

• Chairman and Minister of Foreign Affairs – Otto Kuusinen
• Minister of Finance – Mauri Rosenberg
• Minister of Defense - Axel Antila
• Minister of the Interior – Tuure Lehen
• Minister of Agriculture – Armas Eikia
• Minister of Education – Inkeri Lehtinen
• Minister for Karelia Affairs – Paavo Prokkonen

Outwardly it looks like a full-fledged government. The only problem is that the Finnish population did not recognize him. But already on December 1 (that is, on the day of its formation), this government concluded an agreement with the USSR on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FDR (Finnish Democratic Republic). On December 2, a new agreement is signed - on mutual assistance. From this moment on, Molotov says that the war continues because a revolution took place in Finland, and now it is necessary to support it and help the workers. In fact, it was a clever trick to justify the war in the eyes of the Soviet population.

Mannerheim Line

The Mannerheim Line is one of the few things that almost everyone knows about the Soviet-Finnish war. Soviet propaganda said about this fortification system that all the world generals recognized its impregnability. This was an exaggeration. The line of defense was, of course, strong, but not impregnable.

The Mannerheim Line (as it received this name already during the war) consisted of 101 concrete fortifications. For comparison, the Maginot Line, which Germany crossed in France, was approximately the same length. The Maginot Line consisted of 5,800 concrete structures. In fairness, it should be noted the difficult terrain conditions of the Mannerheim Line. There were swamps and numerous lakes, which made movement extremely difficult and therefore the defense line did not require a large number of fortifications.

The largest attempt to break through the Mannerheim Line at the first stage was made on December 17-21 in the central section. It was here that it was possible to occupy the roads leading to Vyborg, gaining a significant advantage. But the offensive, in which 3 divisions took part, failed. This was the first major success in the Soviet-Finnish war for the Finnish army. This success came to be called the “Miracle of Summa.” Subsequently, the line was broken on February 11, which actually predetermined the outcome of the war.

Expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations

On December 14, 1939, the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations. This decision was promoted by England and France, who spoke of Soviet aggression against Finland. Representatives of the League of Nations condemned the actions of the USSR in terms of aggressive actions and the outbreak of war.

Today, the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations is cited as an example of the limitation of Soviet power and as a loss in image. In fact, everything is a little different. In 1939, the League of Nations no longer played the role it had been assigned following the First World War. The fact is that back in 1933, Germany left it, refusing to comply with the demands of the League of Nations for disarmament and simply left the organization. It turns out that at the time of December 14, the League of Nations de facto ceased to exist. After all, what kind of European security system can we talk about when Germany and the USSR left the organization?

Second stage of the war

On January 7, 1940, the Headquarters of the Northwestern Front was headed by Marshal Timoshenko. He had to solve all the problems and organize a successful offensive of the Red Army. At this point, the Soviet-Finnish war took a break, and no active operations were carried out until February. From February 1 to 9, powerful attacks on the Mannerheim line began. It was assumed that the 7th and 13th armies were to break through the defense line with decisive flank attacks and occupy the Vuoksy-Karkhul sector. After this, it was planned to move to Vyborg, occupy the city and block the railways and highways leading to the West.

On February 11, 1940, a general offensive of Soviet troops began on the Karelian Isthmus. This was a turning point in the Winter War, as units of the Red Army managed to break through the Mannerheim Line and begin advancing deeper into the country. We advanced slowly due to the specifics of the terrain, the resistance of the Finnish army and severe frosts, but the main thing was that we advanced. At the beginning of March, the Soviet army was already on the western coast of the Vyborg Bay.

This effectively ended the war, since it was obvious that Finland did not have much strength and means to contain the Red Army. From that time on, peace negotiations began, in which the USSR dictated its terms, and Molotov constantly emphasized that the conditions would be harsh, because the Finns forced them to start a war, during which the blood of Soviet soldiers was shed.

Why did the war last so long

According to the Bolsheviks, the Soviet-Finnish war was supposed to end in 2-3 weeks, and the decisive advantage was to be given by the troops of the Leningrad district alone. In practice, the war dragged on for almost 4 months, and divisions were assembled throughout the country to suppress the Finns. There are several reasons for this:

• Poor organization of troops. This concerns the poor performance of the command staff, but the bigger problem is coherence between the branches of the military. She was practically absent. If you study archival documents, there are a lot of reports according to which some troops fired at others.
• Poor security. The army was in need of almost everything. The war was fought in winter and in the north, where the air temperature dropped below -30 by the end of December. And at the same time, the army was not provided with winter clothing.
• Underestimating the enemy. The USSR did not prepare for war. The plan was to quickly suppress the Finns and solve the problem without war, attributing everything to the border incident of November 24, 1939.
• Support for Finland by other countries. England, Italy, Hungary, Sweden (primarily) - provided assistance to Finland in everything: weapons, supplies, food, airplanes, and so on. The greatest efforts were made by Sweden, which itself actively helped and facilitated the transfer of assistance from other countries. In general, during the Winter War of 1939-1940, only Germany supported the Soviet side.

Stalin was very nervous because the war was dragging on. He repeated - The whole world is watching us. And he was right. Therefore, Stalin demanded a solution to all problems, restoration of order in the army and a speedy resolution of the conflict. To some extent this was achieved. And quite quickly. The Soviet offensive in February-March 1940 forced Finland to peace.

The Red Army fought extremely undisciplinedly, and its management does not stand up to criticism. Almost all reports and memos about the situation at the front were accompanied by a postscript - “an explanation of the reasons for the failures.” I will give some quotes from Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5518/B dated December 14, 1939:

• During the landing on the island of Sayskari, a Soviet plane dropped 5 bombs, which landed on the destroyer "Lenin".
• On December 1, the Ladoga flotilla was fired upon twice by its own aircraft.
• When occupying the island of Gogland, during the advance of the landing forces, 6 Soviet aircraft appeared, one of which fired several shots in bursts. As a result, 10 people were injured.

And there are hundreds of such examples. But if the situations above are examples of the exposure of soldiers and troops, then next I want to give examples of how the equipment of the Soviet army took place. To do this, let us turn to Beria’s memo to Stalin No. 5516/B dated December 14, 1939:

• In the Tulivara area, the 529th Rifle Corps needed 200 pairs of skis to bypass enemy fortifications. This could not be done, since the Headquarters received 3,000 pairs of skis with broken points.
• The new arrivals from the 363rd Signal Battalion include 30 vehicles in need of repair, and 500 people are wearing summer uniforms.
• The 51st Corps Artillery Regiment arrived to replenish the 9th Army. Missing: 72 tractors, 65 trailers. Of the 37 tractors that arrived, only 9 are in good condition, out of 150 machines - 90. 80% of the personnel are not provided with winter uniforms.

It is not surprising that against the backdrop of such events there was desertion in the Red Army. For example, on December 14, 430 people deserted from the 64th Infantry Division.

Help for Finland from other countries

In the Soviet-Finnish war, many countries provided assistance to Finland. To demonstrate, I will cite Beria’s report to Stalin and Molotov No. 5455/B.

Finland is helped by:

• Sweden – 8 thousand people. Mainly reserve personnel. They are commanded by career officers who are on “vacation.”
• Italy - number unknown.
• Hungary – 150 people. Italy demands an increase in numbers.
• England - 20 fighter aircraft are known, although the actual number is higher.

The best proof that the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 took place with the support of the Western countries of Finland was the speech of Finnish Minister Greensberg on December 27, 1939 at 07:15 to the English agency Havas. Below I quote the literal translation from English.

The Finnish people thank the English, French and other nations for the assistance they provide.

Greensberg, Minister of Finland

It is obvious that Western countries opposed the USSR aggression against Finland. This was expressed, among other things, by the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations.

I would also like to show a photo of Beria’s report on the intervention of France and England in the Soviet-Finnish war.

Conclusion of peace

On February 28, the USSR handed over to Finland its terms for concluding peace. The negotiations themselves took place in Moscow on March 8-12. After these negotiations, the Soviet-Finnish war ended on March 12, 1940. The peace terms were as follows:

1. The USSR received the Karelian Isthmus along with Vyborg (Viipuri), the bay and islands.
2. The western and northern coasts of Lake Ladoga, together with the cities of Kexgolm, Suoyarvi and Sortavala.
3. Islands in the Gulf of Finland.
4. Hanko Island with its maritime territory and base was leased to the USSR for 50 years. The USSR paid 8 million German marks for rent annually.
5. The agreement between Finland and the USSR of 1920 has lost its force.
6. On March 13, 1940, hostilities ceased.

Below is a map showing the territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the signing of the peace treaty.

USSR losses

The question of the number of USSR soldiers killed during the Soviet-Finnish War is still open. The official history does not answer the question, speaking in veiled terms about “minimal” losses and focusing on the fact that the objectives were achieved. There was no talk about the scale of the Red Army's losses in those days. The figure was deliberately underestimated, demonstrating the success of the army. In fact, the losses were huge. To do this, just look at report No. 174 of December 21, which provides figures on the losses of the 139th Infantry Division over 2 weeks of fighting (November 30 - December 13). The losses are as follows:

• Commanders - 240.
• Privates - 3536.
• Rifles - 3575.
• Light machine guns – 160.
• Heavy machine guns – 150.
• Tanks – 5.
• Armored vehicles – 2.
• Tractors – 10.
• Trucks – 14.
• Horse train - 357.

Belyanov's memo No. 2170 dated December 27 talks about the losses of the 75th Infantry Division. Total losses: senior commanders - 141, junior commanders - 293, rank and file - 3668, tanks - 20, machine guns - 150, rifles - 1326, armored vehicles - 3.

This is data for 2 divisions (much more fought) for 2 weeks of fighting, when the first week was a “warm-up” - the Soviet army advanced relatively without losses until it reached the Mannerheim Line. And during these 2 weeks, of which only the last was actually combative, the OFFICIAL figures are losses of more than 8 thousand people! A huge number of people suffered frostbite.

On March 26, 1940, at the 6th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, data on USSR losses in the war with Finland were announced - 48,745 people killed and 158,863 people wounded and frostbitten. These are official figures and therefore greatly underestimated. Today, historians give different figures for the losses of the Soviet army. It is said that between 150 and 500 thousand people died. For example, the Book of Combat Losses of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army states that in the war with the White Finns, 131,476 people died, went missing, or died from wounds. At the same time, the data of that time did not take into account the losses of the Navy, and for a long time people who died in hospitals after wounds and frostbite were not taken into account as losses. Today, most historians agree that about 150 thousand Red Army soldiers died during the war, excluding the losses of the Navy and border troops.

Finnish losses are listed as follows: 23 thousand dead and missing, 45 thousand wounded, 62 aircraft, 50 tanks, 500 guns.

Results and consequences of the war

The Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, even with a brief study, points to both absolutely negative and absolutely positive aspects. The negative is the nightmare of the first months of the war and the huge number of victims. By and large, it was December 1939 and early January 1940 that demonstrated to the whole world that the Soviet army was weak. That's how it really was. But there was also a positive aspect: the Soviet leadership saw the real strength of its army. We have been told since childhood that the Red Army has been the strongest in the world almost since 1917, but this is extremely far from reality. The only major test of this army was the Civil War. We will not analyze the reasons for the victory of the Reds over the Whites now (after all, we are now talking about the Winter War), but the reasons for the victory of the Bolsheviks do not lie in the army. To demonstrate this, it is enough to just quote one quote from Frunze, which he voiced at the end of the Civil War.

All this army rabble needs to be disbanded as soon as possible.

Frunze

Before the war with Finland, the leadership of the USSR had its head in the clouds, believing that it had a strong army. But December 1939 showed that this was not the case. The army was extremely weak. But starting in January 1940, changes were made (personnel and organizational) that changed the course of the war, and which largely prepared a combat-ready army for the Patriotic War. This is very easy to prove. Almost the entire December of the 39th Red Army stormed the Mannerheim line - there was no result. On February 11, 1940, the Mannerheim line was broken through in 1 day. This breakthrough was possible because it was carried out by another army, more disciplined, organized, and trained. And the Finns did not have a single chance against such an army, so Mannerheim, who served as Minister of Defense, even then began to talk about the need for peace.

Prisoners of war and their fate

The number of prisoners of war during the Soviet-Finnish war was impressive. At the time of the war, there were 5,393 captured Red Army soldiers and 806 captured White Finns. Captured Red Army soldiers were divided into the following groups:

• Political leadership. It was political affiliation that was important, without singling out rank.
• Officers. This group included persons equated to officers.
• Junior officers.
• Privates.
• National minorities
• Defectors.

Particular attention was paid to national minorities. The attitude towards them in Finnish captivity was more loyal than towards representatives of the Russian people. The privileges were minor, but they were there. At the end of the war, a mutual exchange of all prisoners was carried out, regardless of their belonging to one group or another.

On April 19, 1940, Stalin orders everyone who was in Finnish captivity to be sent to the Southern Camp of the NKVD. Below is a quote from the Politburo resolution.

All those returned by the Finnish authorities should be sent to the Southern camp. Within three months, ensure all necessary measures are taken to identify persons processed by foreign intelligence services. Pay attention to dubious and alien elements, as well as those who voluntarily surrendered. In all cases, refer cases to court.

Stalin

The southern camp, located in the Ivanovo region, began work on April 25. Already on May 3, Beria sent a letter to Stalin, Molotov and Timoschenko, informing that 5277 people had arrived at the Camp. On June 28, Beria sends a new report. According to it, the Southern camp “receives” 5,157 Red Army soldiers and 293 officers. Of these, 414 people were convicted of treason and treason.

The myth of war - Finnish “cuckoos”

“Cuckoos” is what Soviet soldiers called snipers who continuously fired at the Red Army. It was said that these are professional Finnish snipers who sit in trees and shoot almost without missing. The reason for such attention to snipers is their high efficiency and the inability to determine the point of the shot. But the problem in determining the point of the shot was not that the shooter was in a tree, but that the terrain created an echo. It disoriented the soldiers.

Stories about “cuckoos” are one of the myths that the Soviet-Finnish war gave rise to in large numbers. It’s hard to imagine in 1939 a sniper who, at air temperatures below -30 degrees, was able to sit on a tree for days, while firing accurate shots.

75 years ago, on November 30, 1939, the Winter War (Soviet-Finnish War) began. The Winter War was almost unknown to the people of Russia for quite a long time. In the 1980-1990s, when it was possible to blaspheme the history of Russia-USSR with impunity, the dominant point of view was that “bloody Stalin” wanted to seize “innocent” Finland, but the small but proud northern people fought back the northern “evil empire”. Thus, Stalin was blamed not only for the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, but also for the fact that Finland was “forced” to enter into an alliance with Hitler’s Germany in order to resist the “aggression” of the Soviet Union.

Many books and articles denounced Soviet Mordor, which attacked little Finland. They cited absolutely fantastic figures for Soviet losses, reported on heroic Finnish machine gunners and snipers, the stupidity of Soviet generals, and much more. Any reasonable reasons for the Kremlin's actions were completely denied. They say that everything is to blame for the irrational anger of the “bloody dictator.”

In order to understand why Moscow went to this war, it is necessary to remember the history of Finland. Finnish tribes have long been on the periphery of the Russian state and the Swedish kingdom. Some of them became part of Rus' and became “Russians”. The fragmentation and weakening of Rus' led to the fact that the Finnish tribes were conquered and subjugated by Sweden. The Swedes pursued a colonization policy in the traditions of the West. Finland did not have administrative or even cultural autonomy. The official language was Swedish, spoken by the nobles and the entire educated segment of the population.

Russia , having taken Finland from Sweden in 1809, essentially gave the Finns statehood, allowed them to create basic state institutions and form a national economy. Finland received its own authorities, currency and even an army as part of Russia. At the same time, the Finns did not pay general taxes and did not fight for Russia. The Finnish language, while maintaining the status of the Swedish language, received the status of the state language. The authorities of the Russian Empire practically did not interfere in the affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland. The policy of Russification was not carried out in Finland for a long time (some elements appeared only in a later period, but it was already too late). The resettlement of Russians to Finland was actually prohibited. Moreover, the Russians living in the Grand Duchy were in an unequal position in relation to the local residents. In addition, in 1811, the Vyborg province was transferred to the Grand Duchy, which included lands that Russia had captured from Sweden in the 18th century. Moreover, Vyborg had great military-strategic importance in relation to the capital of the Russian Empire - St. Petersburg. Thus, the Finns in the Russian “prison of nations” lived better than the Russians themselves, who bore all the hardships of building an empire and its defense from numerous enemies.

The collapse of the Russian Empire gave Finland independence. Finland thanked Russia by first entering into an alliance with the Kaiser’s Germany, and then with the Entente powers ( more details in a series of articles - How Russia created Finnish statehood; Part 2; Finland allied with the Kaiser's Germany against Russia; Part 2; Finland is in alliance with the Entente against Russia. First Soviet-Finnish War; Part 2 ). On the eve of World War II, Finland occupied a hostile position towards Russia, leaning toward an alliance with the Third Reich.

Most Russian citizens associate Finland with a “small, cozy European country”, with peaceful and cultural inhabitants. This was facilitated by a kind of “political correctness” towards Finland, which reigned in late Soviet propaganda. Finland, after defeat in the war of 1941-1944, learned a good lesson and extracted maximum benefits from its proximity to the huge Soviet Union. Therefore, the USSR did not remember that the Finns attacked the USSR three times in 1918, 1921 and 1941. They preferred to forget about this for the sake of good relations.

Finland was not a peaceful neighbor of Soviet Russia.Finland's separation from Russia was not peaceful. The Civil War began between the White and Red Finns. The Whites were supported by Germany. The Soviet government refrained from large-scale support for the Reds. Therefore, with the help of the Germans, the White Finns gained the upper hand. The winners created a network of concentration camps and unleashed the White Terror, during which tens of thousands of people died (during the fighting itself, only a few thousand people died on both sides).In addition to the Reds and their supporters, the Finns “purged” the Russian community of Finland.Moreover, the majority of Russians in Finland, including refugees from Russia who fled from the Bolsheviks, did not support the Reds and Soviet power. Former officers of the tsarist army, their families, representatives of the bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, numerous students, the entire Russian population indiscriminately, women, old people and children . Significant material assets belonging to the Russians were confiscated.

The Finns were going to place a German king on the throne of Finland. However, Germany's defeat in the war led to Finland becoming a republic. After this, Finland began to focus on the Entente powers. Finland was not satisfied with independence, the Finnish elite wanted more, laying claim to Russian Karelia, the Kola Peninsula, and the most radical figures made plans to build a “Greater Finland” with the inclusion of Arkhangelsk, and Russian lands up to the Northern Urals, Ob and Yenisei (the Urals and Western Siberia are considered ancestral home of the Finno-Ugric language family).

The leadership of Finland, like Poland, was not satisfied with the existing borders and was preparing for war. Poland had territorial claims to almost all its neighbors - Lithuania, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Germany, the Polish lords dreamed of restoring a great power “from sea to sea.” People in Russia more or less know about this. But few people know that the Finnish elite was delirious with a similar idea, the creation of a “Greater Finland.” The ruling elite also set the goal of creating a Greater Finland. The Finns did not want to get involved with the Swedes, but they laid claim to Soviet lands, which were larger than Finland itself. The radicals had unlimited appetites, stretching all the way to the Urals and further to the Ob and Yenisei.

And first they wanted to capture Karelia. Soviet Russia was torn apart by the Civil War, and the Finns wanted to take advantage of this. Thus, in February 1918, General K. Mannerheim stated that “he will not sheathe his sword until Eastern Karelia is liberated from the Bolsheviks.” Mannerheim planned to seize Russian lands along the line White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga, which was supposed to facilitate the defense of new lands. It was also planned to include the Pechenga region (Petsamo) and the Kola Peninsula into Greater Finland. They wanted to separate Petrograd from Soviet Russia and make it a “free city”, like Danzig. On May 15, 1918, Finland declared war on Russia. Even before the official declaration of war, Finnish volunteer detachments began to conquer Eastern Karelia.

Soviet Russia was busy fighting on other fronts, so it did not have the strength to defeat its insolent neighbor. However, the Finnish offensive on Petrozavodsk and Olonets and the campaign against Petrograd across the Karelian Isthmus failed. And after the defeat of Yudenich’s white army, the Finns had to make peace. From July 10 to July 14, 1920, peace negotiations took place in Tartu. The Finns demanded that Karelia be transferred to them, but the Soviet side refused. In the summer, the Red Army drove the last Finnish troops out of Karelian territory. The Finns held only two volosts - Rebola and Porosozero. This made them more accommodating. There was no hope for help from the West; the Entente powers had already realized that the intervention in Soviet Russia had failed. On October 14, 1920, the Tartu Peace Treaty was signed between the RSFSR and Finland. The Finns were able to obtain the Pechenga volost, the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula, and most of the Sredny Peninsula and the islands, west of the limit line in the Barents Sea. Rebola and Porosozero were returned to Russia.

This did not satisfy Helsinki. Plans for the construction of “Greater Finland” were not abandoned, they were only postponed. In 1921, Finland again tried to resolve the Karelian issue by force. Finnish volunteer detachments, without declaring war, invaded Soviet territory, and the Second Soviet-Finnish War began. Soviet forces in February 1922 fully liberated the territory of Karelia from invaders. In March, an agreement was signed to take measures to ensure the inviolability of the Soviet-Finnish border.

But even after this failure the Finns did not cool down. The situation on the Finnish border was constantly tense. Many, remembering the USSR, imagine a huge powerful power that defeated the Third Reich, took Berlin, sent the first man into space and made the entire Western world tremble. Like, how could little Finland threaten the huge northern “evil empire”. However, the USSR 1920-1930s. was a great power only in terms of territory and potential. Moscow's real policy at that time was extremely cautious. In fact, for quite a long time, Moscow, until it became stronger, pursued an extremely flexible policy, most often giving in and not getting into trouble.

For example, the Japanese plundered our waters off the Kamchatka Peninsula for quite a long time. Under the protection of their warships, Japanese fishermen not only completely caught all the living creatures from our waters worth millions of gold rubles, but also freely landed on our shores for repairs, fish processing, obtaining fresh water, etc. Before Khasan and Khalkin Gol, when The USSR grew stronger thanks to successful industrialization, received a powerful military-industrial complex and strong armed forces, the Red commanders had strict orders to restrain Japanese troops only on their territory, without crossing the border. A similar situation occurred in the Russian North, where Norwegian fishermen fished in the internal waters of the USSR. And when the Soviet border guards tried to protest, Norway took warships into the White Sea.

Of course, Finland no longer wanted to fight the USSR alone. Finland has become a friend of any power hostile to Russia. As the first Finnish Prime Minister Per Evind Svinhuvud noted: “Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.” Against this background, Finland even became friends with Japan. Japanese officers began to come to Finland for internships. In Finland, as in Poland, they were afraid of any strengthening of the USSR, since their leadership based their calculations on the fact that a war between some great Western power and Russia was inevitable (or a war between Japan and the USSR), and they would be able to profit from Russian lands . Inside Finland, the press was constantly hostile to the USSR, conducting almost open propaganda for an attack on Russia and the seizure of its territories. All kinds of provocations constantly took place on the Soviet-Finnish border on land, at sea and in the air.

After hopes for an imminent conflict between Japan and the USSR did not materialize, the Finnish leadership headed for a close alliance with Germany. The two countries are linked by close military-technical cooperation. With the consent of Finland, a German intelligence and counterintelligence center (“Bureau Cellarius”) was created in the country. His main task was to conduct intelligence work against the USSR. First of all, the Germans were interested in data about the Baltic Fleet, formations of the Leningrad Military District and industry in the northwestern part of the USSR. By the beginning of 1939, Finland, with the help of German specialists, had built a network of military airfields that was capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than the Finnish Air Force. It is also very significant that even before the start of the war of 1939-1940. The Finnish swastika was the identifying mark of the Finnish Air Force and armored forces.

Thus, by the beginning of the great war in Europe, we had on the north-western borders a clearly hostile, aggressive state, whose elite dreamed of building a “Greater Finland at the expense of Russian (Soviet) lands and was ready to be friends with any potential enemy of the USSR. Helsinki was ready to fight the USSR both in alliance with Germany and Japan, and with the help of England and France.

The Soviet leadership understood everything perfectly and, seeing the approach of a new world war, sought to secure the northwestern borders. Leningrad was of particular importance - the second capital of the USSR, a powerful industrial, scientific and cultural center, as well as the main base of the Baltic Fleet. Finnish long-range artillery could fire at the city from its border, and ground forces could reach Leningrad in one burst. The fleet of a potential enemy (Germany or England and France) could easily break through to Kronstadt, and then Leningrad. To protect the city, it was necessary to push back the land border on land, as well as restore the distant line of defense at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, gaining space for fortifications on the northern and southern shores. The largest fleet of the Soviet Union, the Baltic, was actually blocked in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. The Baltic Fleet had a single base - Kronstadt. Kronstadt and Soviet ships could be hit by long-range guns of the Finnish coastal defense. This situation could not satisfy the Soviet leadership.

The issue with Estonia was resolved peacefully. In September 1939, a mutual assistance agreement was concluded between the USSR and Estonia. A Soviet military contingent was introduced into Estonia. The USSR received the rights to create military bases on the islands of Ezel and Dago, Paldiski and Haapsalu.

It was not possible to come to an amicable agreement with Finland. Although negotiations began back in 1938. Moscow has tried literally everything. She proposed concluding a mutual assistance agreement and jointly defending the Gulf of Finland zone, giving the USSR the opportunity to create a base on the coast of Finland (Hanko Peninsula), sell or lease several islands in the Gulf of Finland. It was also proposed to move the border near Leningrad. As compensation, the Soviet Union offered much larger territories of Eastern Karelia, preferential loans, economic benefits, etc. However, all proposals were met with a categorical refusal from the Finnish side. It is impossible not to note the inciting role of London. The British told the Finns that it was necessary to take a firm position and not give in to pressure from Moscow. This gave Helsinki hope.

In Finland, general mobilization and evacuation of the civilian population from border areas began. At the same time, arrests of left-wing figures were carried out. Incidents at the border have become more frequent. So, on November 26, 1939, a border incident occurred near the village of Maynila. According to Soviet data, Finnish artillery shelled Soviet territory. The Finnish side declared the USSR to be the culprit of the provocation. On November 28, the Soviet government announced the denunciation of the Non-Aggression Treaty with Finland. On November 30, the war began. Its results are known. Moscow solved the problem of ensuring the security of Leningrad and the Baltic Fleet. We can say that it was only thanks to the Winter War that the enemy was unable to capture the second capital of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

Currently, Finland is again drifting towards the West, NATO, so it is worth keeping a close eye on it. The “cozy and cultural” country can again recall the plans for “Great Finland” right up to the Northern Urals. Finland and Sweden are thinking about joining NATO, and the Baltic states and Poland are literally turning into NATO’s advanced springboards for aggression against Russia before our very eyes. And Ukraine becomes an instrument for war with Russia in the southwestern direction.

For many countries, it is quite common to evaluate the past through the prism of what happened, without even considering other options for the possible development of events - that is, history turned out the way it turned out

Photo: SA-kuva

Soviet-Finnish War 1939-1940 or, as they say in Finland, the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union is one of the most significant episodes of the Second World War. Timo Vihavainen, a professor of Russian studies at the University of Helsinki, shares his point of view on this issue.

The battles of the Soviet-Finnish War, which lasted 105 days, were very bloody and intense. The Soviet side lost more than 126,000 people killed and missing, 246,000 wounded and shell-shocked. If we add Finnish losses to these figures, 26,000 and 43,000, respectively, then we can safely say that in terms of its scale, the Winter War became one of the most large battlefields of World War II.

For many countries, it is quite common to evaluate the past through the prism of what happened, without even considering other options for the possible development of events - that is, history turned out the way it did. As for the Winter War, its course and the peace treaty that ended the fighting were unexpected results of a process that initially, as all parties believed, would lead to completely different consequences.

Background of events

In the fall of 1939, Finland and the Soviet Union held high-level negotiations on territorial issues, in which Finland was to transfer to the Soviet Union some areas on the Karelian Isthmus and islands in the Gulf of Finland, as well as lease the city of Hanko. In return, Finland would receive twice the size but less valuable territory in Soviet Karelia.

Negotiations in the fall of 1939 did not lead to results as acceptable to the Soviet Union as happened in the case of the Baltic countries, despite the fact that Finland was ready to make some concessions. For example, the lease of Hanko was considered a violation of Finnish sovereignty and neutrality.

Finland did not agree to territorial concessions, maintaining its neutrality along with Sweden

Earlier, in 1938 and later in the spring of 1939, the Soviet Union had already unofficially recognized the possibility of transferring the islands in the Gulf of Finland, or leasing them. In a democratic country, such as Finland, these concessions were unlikely to be feasible in practice. The transfer of territories would mean the loss of homes for thousands of Finns. No party would probably want to take on political responsibility. There was also fear and antipathy towards the Soviet Union, caused, among other things, by the repressions of 1937-38, during which thousands of Finns were executed. In addition, by the end of 1937, the use of the Finnish language was completely stopped in the Soviet Union. Finnish-language schools and newspapers were closed.

The Soviet Union also hinted that Finland would be unable, or perhaps unwilling, to remain neutral if Germany, now an international troublemaker, violated the Soviet border. Such hints were not understood or accepted in Finland. To ensure neutrality, Finland and Sweden planned to jointly build fortifications on the Åland Islands, which would quite effectively protect the neutrality of the countries from a possible German or Soviet attack. Due to a protest filed by the Soviet Union, Sweden abandoned these plans.

Kuusinen's "People's Government"

After negotiations with the official Finnish government, Risto Ryti, stalled, the Soviet Union formed the so-called "people's government" of Finland. The “People's Government” was headed by the communist Otto Ville Kuusinen, who fled to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union announced its recognition of this government, which provided an excuse not to negotiate with the official government.

The government asked the Soviet Union for “help” in creating the Republic of Finland. During the war, the government's task was to prove that Finland and the Soviet Union were not at war.

Apart from the Soviet Union, no other country recognized the people's government of Kuusinen

The Soviet Union concluded an agreement on territorial concessions with the self-formed “people's government”

Finnish communist Otto Ville Kuusinen fled to Soviet Russia after the civil war of 1918. His government was said to represent the broad masses of the Finnish people and the rebellious military units that had already formed the Finnish “people's army.” The Finnish Communist Party stated in its appeal that a revolution was underway in Finland, which, at the request of the “people's government,” should be helped by the Red Army. Thus, this is not a war and certainly not an aggression of the Soviet Union against Finland. According to the official position of the Soviet Union, this proves that the Red Army entered Finland not to take away Finnish territories, but to expand them.

On December 2, 1939, Moscow announced to the whole world that it had concluded an agreement on territorial concessions with the “people's government.” Under the terms of the agreement, Finland received huge areas in Eastern Karelia, 70,000 square kilometers of old Russian land that never belonged to Finland. For its part, Finland transferred to Russia a small area in the southern part of the Karelian Isthmus, which reaches Koivisto in the west. In addition to this, Finland will transfer some islands in the Gulf of Finland to the Soviet Union and lease the city of Hanko for a very decent amount.

It was not about propaganda, but about a state treaty that was announced and put into effect. They planned to exchange documents on ratification of the treaty in Helsinki.

The cause of the war was the struggle between Germany and the USSR for spheres of influence

After the official Finnish government did not agree to territorial concessions, the Soviet Union began the war by attacking Finland on November 30, 1939, without declaring war, and without any other ultimatums to Finland.

The reason for the attack was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact concluded in 1939, in which Finland was recognized as a territory within the zone of influence of the Soviet Union. The purpose of the attack was to implement the pact on this part.

Finland and Germany in 1939

Finnish foreign policy was cool towards Germany. Relations between the countries were rather unfriendly, which was confirmed by Hitler during the Winter War. In addition, the division of spheres of influence between the Soviet Union and Germany suggests that Germany was not interested in supporting Finland.

Finland sought to remain neutral until the outbreak of the Winter War and for as long after it as possible.

Official Finland did not follow friendly German policies

Finland in 1939 in no way pursued a policy friendly to Germany. The Finnish parliament and government were dominated by a coalition of farmers and social democrats, which relied on an overwhelming majority. The only radical and pro-German party, the IKL, suffered a crushing defeat in the summer elections of 1939. Its representation was reduced from 18 to 8 seats in the 200-seat parliament.

German sympathies in Finland were an old tradition, which was primarily supported by academic circles. At the political level, these sympathies began to melt in the 30s, when Hitler's policy towards small states was widely condemned.

Sure victory?

With a high degree of confidence we can say that in December 1939 the Red Army was the largest and best equipped army in the world. Moscow, confident in the fighting ability of its army, had no reason to expect that Finnish resistance, if any, would last many days.

In addition, it was assumed that the powerful leftist movement in Finland would not want to resist the Red Army, which would enter the country not as an invader, but as an assistant and give Finland additional territories.

In turn, for the Finnish bourgeoisie, the war, from all sides, was extremely undesirable. There was a clear understanding that no help should be expected, at least not from Germany, and the desire and ability of the Western allies to conduct military operations far from their borders raised great doubts.

How did it happen that Finland decided to repel the advance of the Red Army?

How is it possible that Finland dared to repel the Red Army and was able to resist for more than three months? Moreover, the Finnish army did not capitulate at any stage and remained in combat capability until the last day of the war. The fighting ended only because the peace treaty came into force.

Moscow, confident in the strength of its army, had no reason to expect that Finnish resistance would last many days. Not to mention that the agreement with the “people's government” of Finland will have to be canceled. Just in case, strike units were concentrated near the borders with Finland, which, after an acceptable waiting period, could quickly defeat the Finns, who were armed primarily with only infantry weapons and light artillery. The Finns had very few tanks and aircraft, and actually had anti-tank weapons only on paper. The Red Army had a numerical superiority and almost a tenfold advantage in technical equipment, including artillery, aviation and armored vehicles.

Therefore, there was no doubt about the final result of the war. Moscow no longer negotiated with the Helsinki government, which was said to have lost support and disappeared in an unknown direction.

For the leaders in Moscow, the planned outcome was finally decided: the larger Finnish Democratic Republic was an ally of the Soviet Union. They even managed to publish an article on this topic in the “Concise Political Dictionary” of 1940.

Brave Defense

Why did Finland resort to armed defense, which, soberly assessing the situation, had no chance of success? One explanation is that there were no other options other than surrender. The Soviet Union recognized the puppet government of Kuusinen and ignored the Helsinki government, which was not even presented with any ultimatum demands. In addition, the Finns relied on their military skills and the advantages that the local nature provided for defensive actions.

The successful defense of the Finns is explained both by the high fighting spirit of the Finnish army and by the great shortcomings of the Red Army, in whose ranks, in particular, major purges were carried out in 1937-38. The command of the Red Army troops was carried out unqualified. On top of everything else, military equipment performed poorly. The Finnish landscape and defensive fortifications turned out to be difficult to pass, and the Finns learned to effectively disable enemy tanks using Molotov cocktails and throwing explosives. This, of course, added even more courage and bravery.

Spirit of the Winter War

In Finland, the concept of the “spirit of the Winter War” has been established, which is understood as unanimity and willingness to sacrifice oneself for the defense of the Motherland.

Research supports claims that already in Finland on the eve of the Winter War there was a prevailing consensus that the country must be defended in the event of aggression. Despite heavy losses, this spirit remained until the end of the war. Almost everyone, including the communists, was imbued with the “spirit of the Winter War.” The question arises as to how this became possible when the country went through a bloody civil war in 1918 - just two decades ago - in which the right fought against the left. People were executed en masse even after the main battles had ended. Then at the head of the victorious White Guard was Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim, a native of Finland, a former lieutenant general of the Russian army, who was now leading Finnish soldiers against the Red Army.

The fact that Finland decided on armed resistance at all, purposefully and with the support of the broad masses, quite likely came as a surprise to Moscow. And for Helsinki too. The “Spirit of the Winter War” is not a myth at all, and its origins require explanation.

An important reason for the emergence of the “Spirit of the Winter War” was deceitful Soviet propaganda. In Finland, they treated Soviet newspapers with irony, which wrote that the Finnish border was “threateningly” close to Leningrad. Just as absolutely incredible were the allegations that the Finns were staging provocations on the border, shelling the territory of the Soviet Union and thereby starting a war. Well, when, after such a provocation, the Soviet Union broke the non-aggression treaty, which Moscow did not have the right to do under the treaty, distrust grew more than before.

According to some estimates of the time, confidence in the Soviet Union was largely undermined by the formation of the Kuusinen government and the vast territories it received as a gift. Although they assured that Finland would remain independent, Finland itself had no special illusions about the veracity of such assurances. Trust in the Soviet Union fell further after urban bombings that destroyed hundreds of buildings and killed hundreds of people. The Soviet Union categorically denied the bombings, although the people of Finland witnessed them with their own eyes.

The repressions of the 1930s in the Soviet Union were fresh in my memory. For the Finnish communists, the most offensive thing was to observe the development of close cooperation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, which began after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

World

The result of the Winter War is well known. According to the peace treaty concluded in Moscow on March 12, Finland's eastern border moved to where it remains today. 430,000 Finns lost their homes. For the Soviet Union, the increase in territory was insignificant. For Finland, the territorial losses were enormous.

The prolongation of the war became the primary prerequisite for the peace agreement concluded in Moscow on March 12, 1940 between the Soviet Union and the bourgeois government of Finland. The Finnish army put up desperate resistance, which made it possible to stop the enemy advance in all 14 directions. Further prolongation of the conflict threatened the Soviet Union with severe international consequences. The League of Nations on December 16 deprived the Soviet Union of membership, and England and France began negotiating with Finland on the provision of military assistance, which was supposed to arrive in Finland through Norway and Sweden. This could lead to a full-scale war between the Soviet Union and the Western allies, who, among other things, were preparing to bomb oil fields in Baku from Turkey.

Difficult truce conditions were accepted due to despair

It was not easy for the Soviet government, which had entered into an agreement with the Kuusinen government, to re-recognize the Helsinki government and conclude a peace treaty with it. Peace, however, was concluded and conditions for Finland were very difficult. Finland's territorial concessions were many times greater than those negotiated in 1939. The signing of the peace agreement was a bitter ordeal. When the terms of peace were made public, people cried in the streets and flags were lowered in mourning over their houses. The Finnish government, however, agreed to sign a difficult and intolerable “dictated peace” because the situation militarily was very dangerous. The amount of assistance promised by Western countries was insignificant, and it was clear that from a military point of view it could not play a decisive role.

The Winter War and the difficult peace that followed are among the most tragic periods in Finnish history. These events leave their mark on the interpretation of Finnish history in a broader perspective. The fact that this was an unprovoked aggression, which was carried out vilely and without a declaration of war by its eastern neighbor, and which led to the rejection of the historical Finnish province, remained a heavy burden in the Finnish consciousness.

Having put up military resistance, the Finns lost a large territory and tens of thousands of people, but retained their independence. This is the difficult image of the Winter War, which resonates with pain in the Finnish consciousness. Another option was to submit to Kuusinen's government and expand the territories. For the Finns, however, this was tantamount to submission to the Stalinist dictatorship. It is obvious that, despite all the officiality of the territorial gift, it was not taken seriously at any level in Finland. In today's Finland, if they remember that state treaty, it is only that it was one of the insidious, lying plans that the Stalinist leadership was in the habit of proposing.

The Winter War gave birth to the Continuation War (1941-1945)

As a direct consequence of the Winter War, Finland joined Germany in attacking the Soviet Union in 1941. Before the Winter War, Finland adhered to the Northern European policy of neutrality, which it tried to continue after the end of the war. However, after the Soviet Union prevented this, there were two options left: an alliance with Germany, or with the Soviet Union. The latter option enjoyed very little support in Finland.

Text: Timo Vihavainen, Professor of Russian Studies, University of Helsinki

The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, known in Finland as the Winter War, was an armed conflict between the USSR and Finland from November 30, 1939 to March 12, 1940. According to some historians of the Western school, the USSR’s offensive operation against Finland during the Second World War. In Soviet and Russian historiography, this war is viewed as a separate bilateral local conflict, not part of a world war, just like the undeclared war on Khalkhin Gol.

The war ended with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, which recorded the separation from Finland of a significant part of its territory, captured by it during the Civil War in Russia.

Goals of war

Officially, the Soviet Union pursued the goal of achieving by military means what could not be done peacefully: to obtain the Karelian Isthmus, part of the coast of the Arctic Ocean, bases on the islands and the northern shore of the Gulf of Finland.

At the very beginning of the war, a puppet Terijoki government was created on the territory of the USSR, headed by the Finnish communist Otto Kuusinen. On December 2, the Soviet government signed a mutual assistance agreement with the Kuusinen government and refused any contacts with the legitimate government of Finland led by R. Ryti.

There is an opinion that Stalin planned to include Finland into the USSR as a result of a victorious war.

The plan for the war with Finland provided for the deployment of military operations in two main directions - on the Karelian Isthmus, where it was planned to conduct a direct breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line in the direction of Vyborg, and north of Lake Ladoga, in order to prevent counterattacks and a possible landing of troops by Finland’s Western allies from the Barents Sea. The plan was based on what turned out to be an incorrect idea about the weakness of the Finnish army and its inability to resist for a long time. It was assumed that the war would be carried out on the model of the campaign in Poland in September 1939. The main hostilities were to be completed within two weeks.

Cause of War

The official reason for the war was the “Maynila Incident”: on November 26, 1939, the Soviet government addressed the Finnish government with an official note, which reported that as a result of artillery shelling allegedly carried out from the territory of Finland, four Soviet soldiers were killed and nine were wounded. Finnish border guards actually recorded cannon shots from several observation points that day - as is necessary in this case, the fact of the shots and the direction from which they were heard were recorded, a comparison of the records showed that the shots were fired from Soviet territory. The Finnish government proposed creating an intergovernmental commission of inquiry to investigate the incident. The Soviet side refused, and soon announced that it no longer considered itself bound by the terms of the Soviet-Finnish agreement on mutual non-aggression. On November 29, the USSR broke off diplomatic relations with Finland, and on the 30th at 8:00 am, Soviet troops received orders to cross the Soviet-Finnish border and begin hostilities. War was never officially declared.

On February 11, 1940, after ten days of artillery preparation, a new offensive of the Red Army began. The main forces were concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus. In this offensive, ships of the Baltic Fleet and the Ladoga Military Flotilla, created in October 1939, acted together with the ground units of the North-Western Front.

During three days of intense battles, the troops of the 7th Army broke through the first line of defense of the Mannerheim Line, introduced tank formations into the breakthrough, which began to develop their success. By February 17, units of the Finnish army were withdrawn to the second line of defense, as there was a threat of encirclement.

By February 21, the 7th Army reached the second defense line, and the 13th Army reached the main defense line north of Muolaa. By February 24, units of the 7th Army, interacting with coastal detachments of sailors of the Baltic Fleet, captured several coastal islands. On February 28, both armies of the Northwestern Front began an offensive in the zone from Lake Vuoksa to the Vyborg Bay. Seeing the impossibility of stopping the offensive, the Finnish troops retreated.

The Finns put up fierce resistance, but were forced to retreat. Trying to stop the advance on Vyborg, they opened the floodgates of the Saimaa Canal, flooding the area northeast of the city, but this also did not help. On March 13, troops of the 7th Army entered Vyborg.

The end of the war and the conclusion of peace

By March 1940, the Finnish government realized that, despite demands for continued resistance, Finland would not receive any military assistance other than volunteers and weapons from the allies. After breaking through the Mannerheim Line, Finland was obviously unable to hold back the advance of the Red Army. There was a real threat of a complete takeover of the country, which would be followed by either joining the USSR or a change of government to a pro-Soviet one.

Therefore, the Finnish government turned to the USSR with a proposal to begin peace negotiations. On March 7, a Finnish delegation arrived in Moscow, and already on March 12, a peace treaty was concluded, according to which hostilities ceased at 12 o'clock on March 13, 1940. Despite the fact that Vyborg, according to the agreement, was transferred to the USSR, Soviet troops launched an assault on the city on the morning of March 13.

The terms of the peace treaty were as follows:

The Karelian Isthmus, Vyborg, Sortavala, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, part of the Finnish territory with the city of Kuolajärvi, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas went to the USSR. Lake Ladoga was completely within the borders of the USSR.

The Petsamo (Pechenga) region was returned to Finland.

The USSR leased part of the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula for a period of 30 years to equip a naval base there.

The border that was established under this agreement basically repeated the border of 1791 (before Finland joined the Russian Empire).

It should be noted that during this period, USSR intelligence worked extremely poorly: the Soviet command had no information about the combat reserves (in particular, the amount of ammunition) of the Finnish side. They were practically at zero, but without this information, the Soviet government concluded a peace treaty.

Results of the war

Karelian Isthmus. Borders between the USSR and Finland before and after the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. "Mannerheim Line"

USSR acquisitions

The border from Leningrad has been moved from 32 to 150 km.

Karelian Isthmus, islands of the Gulf of Finland, part of the coast of the Arctic Ocean, lease of the Hanko (Gangut) Peninsula.

Full control of Lake Ladoga.

Murmansk, which was located near Finnish territory (Rybachy Peninsula), was safe.

The Soviet Union gained experience in waging war in winter. If we take the officially declared goals of the war, the USSR completed all its tasks.

The USSR occupied these territories before the start of the Great Patriotic War. In the first two months of the Great Patriotic War, Finland reoccupied these territories; they were released in 1944.

The negative result for the USSR was the increased confidence in Germany that militarily the USSR was much weaker than it previously seemed. This strengthened the position of supporters of the war against the USSR.

The results of the Soviet-Finnish war became one (although far from the only) of the factors that determined the subsequent rapprochement between Finland and Germany. For the Finns, it became a means of containing the growing pressure from the USSR. The Finns themselves call participation in the Great Patriotic War on the side of the Axis countries the “Continuation War,” meaning that they continued to fight the war of 1939-1940.

We will briefly talk about this war, already because Finland was the country with which the Nazi leadership then connected its plans for further advancement to the east. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Germany, according to the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 23, 1939, maintained neutrality. It all started with the fact that the Soviet leadership, taking into account the situation in Europe after the Nazis came to power in Germany, decided to increase the security of its northwestern borders. The border with Finland then passed only 32 kilometers from Leningrad, that is, within range of a long-range artillery gun.

The Finnish government pursued an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union (Ryti was then prime minister). The country's president in 1931-1937, P. Svinhufvud, stated: “Any enemy of Russia must always be a friend of Finland.”

In the summer of 1939, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, Colonel General Halder, visited Finland. He showed particular interest in the Leningrad and Murmansk strategic directions. In Hitler's plans, the territory of Finland was given an important place in the future war. With the help of German specialists, airfields were built in the southern regions of Finland in 1939, designed to receive a number of aircraft that was many times greater than what the Finnish air force had at its disposal. In the border areas and mainly on the Karelian Isthmus, with the participation of German, English, French and Belgian specialists and financial assistance from Great Britain, France, Sweden, Germany and the USA, a powerful long-term fortification system, the “Mannerheim Line”, was built. It was a powerful system of three lines of fortifications up to 90 km deep. The width of the fortifications stretched from the Gulf of Finland to the western shore of Lake Ladoga. Of the total number of defensive structures, 350 were reinforced concrete, 2,400 were made of wood and earth, well camouflaged. The sections of wire fences consisted of an average of thirty (!) rows of barbed wire. In the supposed areas of the breakthrough, giant “wolf pits” were dug with a depth of 7-10 meters and a diameter of 10-15 meters. 200 minutes were set for each kilometer.

Marshal Mannerheim was responsible for creating a system of defensive structures along the Soviet border in southern Finland, hence the unofficial name - “Mannerheim Line”. Carl Gustav Mannerheim (1867-1951) - Finnish statesman and military leader, President of Finland in 1944-1946. During the Russo-Japanese War and World War I, he served in the Russian army. During the Finnish Civil War (January - May 1918) he led the white movement against the Finnish Bolsheviks. After the defeat of the Bolsheviks, Mannerheim became commander-in-chief and regent of Finland (December 1918 – July 1919). He was defeated in the presidential elections in 1919 and resigned. In 1931-1939. headed the State Defense Council. During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commanded the actions of the Finnish army. In 1941, Finland entered the war on the side of Nazi Germany. Having become president, Mannerheim concluded a peace treaty with the USSR (1944) and opposed Nazi Germany.

The clearly defensive nature of the powerful fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line” near the border with the Soviet Union indicated that the Finnish leadership then seriously believed that its powerful southern neighbor would certainly attack small Finland with a population of three million. In fact, this is what happened, but this might not have happened if the Finnish leadership had shown more statesmanship. The outstanding statesman of Finland, Urho-Kaleva Kekkonen, who was elected president of this country for four terms (1956-1981), subsequently wrote: “The shadow of Hitler in the late 30s spread over us, and Finnish society as a whole cannot renounce the fact that it treated it quite favorably.”

The situation that had developed by 1939 required that the Soviet northwestern border be moved away from Leningrad. The time for solving this problem was chosen by the Soviet leadership quite well: the Western powers were busy with the outbreak of war, and the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with Germany. The Soviet government initially hoped to resolve the issue of the border with Finland peacefully, without leading to a military conflict. In October–November 1939, negotiations were held between the USSR and Finland on issues of mutual security. The Soviet leadership explained to the Finns that the need to move the border was not caused by the possibility of Finnish aggression, but by the fear that their territory could be used in that situation by other powers to attack the USSR. The Soviet Union invited Finland to enter into a bilateral defense alliance. The Finnish government, hoping for help promised by Germany, rejected the Soviet offer. German representatives even guaranteed Finland that in the event of a war with the USSR, Germany would subsequently help Finland compensate for possible territorial losses. England, France and even America also promised their support to the Finns. The Soviet Union did not claim to include the entire territory of Finland into the USSR. The claims of the Soviet leadership mainly extended to the lands of the former Vyborg province of Russia. It must be said that these claims had serious historical justification. Even in the Livonian War, Ivan the Terrible sought to break through to the Baltic shores. Tsar Ivan the Terrible, not without reason, considered Livonia an ancient Russian fiefdom, illegally seized by the crusaders. The Livonian War lasted for 25 years (1558-1583), but Tsar Ivan the Terrible was unable to achieve Russia’s access to the Baltic. The work begun by Tsar Ivan the Terrible was continued and brilliantly completed by Tsar Peter I as a result of the Northern War (1700-1721). Russia gained access to the Baltic Sea from Riga to Vyborg. Peter I personally took part in the battle for the fortified city of Vyborg. A well-organized siege of the fortress, which included a blockade from the sea and a five-day artillery bombardment, forced the six thousand-strong Swedish garrison of Vyborg to capitulate on June 13, 1710. The capture of Vyborg allowed the Russians to control the entire Karelian Isthmus. As a result, according to Tsar Peter I, “a strong cushion was built for St. Petersburg.” Petersburg was now reliably protected from Swedish attacks from the north. The capture of Vyborg created the conditions for subsequent offensive actions by Russian troops in Finland.

In the fall of 1712, Peter decided to independently, without allies, take control of Finland, which was then one of the provinces of Sweden. This is the task Peter set for Admiral Apraksin, who was to lead the operation: “To go not for ruin, but to take possession, although we don’t need it (Finland) at all, to hold it, for two main reasons: first, there would be something to give up in peace, which the Swedes are clearly starting to talk about; another thing is that this province is the womb of Sweden, as you yourself know: not only meat and so on, but also firewood, and if God allows it to reach Abov in the summer, then the Swedish neck will bend more softly.” The operation to capture Finland was successfully carried out by Russian troops in 1713-1714. The final wonderful chord of the victorious Finnish campaign was the famous naval battle off Cape Gangut in July 1714. For the first time in its history, the young Russian fleet won a battle with one of the strongest fleets in the world, which was then the Swedish fleet. The Russian fleet in this major battle was commanded by Peter I under the name of Rear Admiral Peter Mikhailov. For this victory, the king received the rank of vice admiral. Peter equated the Battle of Gangut in importance to the Battle of Poltava.

According to the Treaty of Nystad in 1721, the Vyborg province became part of Russia. In 1809, by agreement between the Emperor of France Napoleon and the Emperor of Russia Alexander I, the territory of Finland was annexed to Russia. It was a kind of “friendly gift” from Napoleon to Alexander. Readers with at least some knowledge of 19th-century European history will likely be aware of this event. Thus, the Grand Duchy of Finland arose within the Russian Empire. In 1811, Emperor Alexander I annexed the Russian Vyborg province to the Grand Duchy of Finland. This made it easier to manage this territory. This state of affairs did not cause any problems for more than a hundred years. But in 1917, the government of V.I. Lenin granted Finland state independence and since then the Russian Vyborg province remained part of the neighboring state - the Republic of Finland. This is the background to the question.

The Soviet leadership tried to resolve the issue peacefully. On October 14, 1939, the Soviet side proposed to the Finnish side to transfer to the Soviet Union part of the territory of the Karelian Isthmus, part of the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas, and also to lease the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula. All this area was 2761 sq. km. in exchange, Finland was offered a part of the territory of Eastern Karelia measuring 5528 sq. km. however, such an exchange would be unequal: the lands of the Karelian Isthmus were economically developed and strategically important - there were powerful fortifications of the “Mannerheim Line”, providing cover for the border. The lands offered to the Finns in return were poorly developed and had neither economic nor military value. The Finnish government refused such an exchange. Hoping for help from the Western powers, Finland hoped to work with them to seize Eastern Karelia and the Kola Peninsula from the Soviet Union by military means. But these plans were not destined to come true. Stalin decided to start a war with Finland.

The military action plan was developed under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff B.M. Shaposhnikova.

The General Staff's plan took into account the real difficulties of the upcoming breakthrough of the fortifications of the Mannerheim Line and provided for the necessary forces and means for this. But Stalin criticized the plan and ordered it to be remade. The fact is that K.E. Voroshilov convinced Stalin that the Red Army would deal with the Finns in 2-3 weeks, and victory would be won with little blood, as they say, throw in our hats. The General Staff's plan was rejected. The development of a new, “correct” plan was entrusted to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District. The plan, designed for an easy victory, which did not even provide for the concentration of even minimal reserves, was developed and approved by Stalin. The belief in the ease of the upcoming victory was so great that they did not even consider it necessary to inform the Chief of the General Staff B.M. about the start of the war with Finland. Shaposhnikov, who was on vacation at that time.

They do not always, but often find, or rather create, some reason to start a war. It is known, for example, that before the attack on Poland, the German fascists staged an attack by the Poles on a German border radio station, dressing German soldiers in the uniform of Polish soldiers, and so on. The reason for war with Finland, invented by Soviet artillerymen, was somewhat less imaginative. On November 26, 1939, they shelled Finnish territory for 20 minutes from the border village of Mainila and announced that they had come under artillery fire from the Finnish side. This was followed by an exchange of notes between the governments of the USSR and Finland. In the Soviet note, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov pointed out the great danger of provocation committed by the Finnish side and even reported on the victims it allegedly led to. The Finnish side was asked to withdraw troops from the border on the Karelian Isthmus 20-25 kilometers and thereby prevent the possibility of repeated provocations.

In a response note received on November 29, the Finnish government invited the Soviet side to come to the site and, based on the location of the shell craters, make sure that it was the territory of Finland that was fired upon. The note further stated that the Finnish side agreed to the withdrawal of troops from the border, but only from both sides. This ended the diplomatic preparations, and on November 30, 1939, at 8 a.m., units of the Red Army went on the offensive. An “unfamous” war began, which the USSR did not want to not only talk about, but even mention. The war with Finland of 1939-1940 was a severe test of the Soviet armed forces. It showed the Red Army’s almost complete unpreparedness for waging a big war in general and a war in the harsh climatic conditions of the North in particular. It is not our task to give any complete account of this war. We will limit ourselves to only describing the most important events of the war and its lessons. This is necessary because 1 year and 3 months after the end of the Finnish war, the Soviet armed forces were to experience a powerful blow from the German Wehrmacht.

The balance of forces on the eve of the Soviet-Finnish war is shown in the table:

The USSR sent four armies into battle against Finland. These troops were located along the entire length of its border. In the main direction, on the Karelian Isthmus, the 7th Army was advancing, consisting of nine rifle divisions, one tank corps, three tank brigades and with a large amount of artillery and aviation attached. The number of personnel of the 7th Army was at least 200 thousand people. The 7th Army was still supported by the Baltic Fleet. Instead of competently disposing of this strong group in operational and tactical terms, the Soviet command did not find anything more reasonable than to strike head-on at the most powerful defensive structures in the world at that time, which made up the “Mannerheim Line.” During the twelve days of the offensive, drowning in snow, freezing in 40-degree frost, suffering huge losses, the troops of the 7th Army were only able to overcome the supply line and stopped in front of the first of the three main fortification lines of the Mannerheim Line. The army was drained of blood and could not advance further. But the Soviet command planned to victoriously end the war with Finland within 12 days.

After being replenished with personnel and equipment, the 7th Army continued the fighting, which was fierce and looked like a slow gnawing of fortified Finnish positions, with heavy losses in people and equipment. The 7th Army was first commanded by Army Commander 2nd Rank V.F. Yakovlev, and from December 9 - Army Commander 2nd Rank K.A. Meretskov. (After the introduction of general ranks in the Red Army on May 7, 1940, the rank of “commander of the 2nd rank” began to correspond to the rank of “lieutenant general”). At the beginning of the war with the Finns, there was no question of creating fronts. Despite powerful artillery and air strikes, the Finnish fortifications held out. On January 7, 1940, the Leningrad Military District was transformed into the Northwestern Front, which was headed by Army Commander 1st Rank S.K. Tymoshenko. On the Karelian Isthmus, the 13th Army (corps commander V.D. Grendal) was added to the 7th Army. The number of Soviet troops on the Karelian Isthmus exceeded 400 thousand people. The Mannerheim Line was defended by the Finnish Karelian Army led by General H.V. Esterman (135 thousand people).

Before the outbreak of hostilities, the Finnish defense system was studied superficially by the Soviet command. The troops had little idea of ​​the peculiarities of fighting in conditions of deep snow, in forests, and in severe frost. Before the start of the battles, senior commanders had little understanding of how tank units would operate in deep snow, how soldiers without skis would attack waist-deep in snow, how to organize the interaction of infantry, artillery and tanks, how to fight against reinforced concrete pillboxes with walls up to 2 meters and so on. Only with the formation of the North-Western Front, as they say, did they come to their senses: reconnaissance of the fortification system began, daily training began in techniques for storming defensive structures; uniforms unsuitable for winter frosts were replaced: instead of boots, soldiers and officers were given felt boots, instead of overcoats - short fur coats, and so on. There were many attempts to take at least one enemy line of defense on the move, many people died during the assaults, many were blown up by Finnish anti-personnel mines. The soldiers were afraid of mines and did not go on the attack; the “fear of mines” that arose quickly turned into “fear of forests.” By the way, at the beginning of the war with the Finns there were no mine detectors in the Soviet troops; the production of mine detectors began when the war was nearing the end.

The first breach in the Finnish defense on the Karelian Isthmus was made by February 14. Its length along the front was 4 km and in depth – 8-10 km. The Finnish command, in order to avoid the Red Army from entering the rear of the defending troops, took them to the second line of defense. Soviet troops failed to break through it immediately. The front here has temporarily stabilized. On February 26, Finnish troops tried to launch a counteroffensive, but suffered significant losses and stopped attacks. On February 28, Soviet troops resumed their offensive and broke through a significant part of the second line of Finnish defense. Several Soviet divisions crossed the ice of the Vyborg Bay and on March 5 surrounded Vyborg, the second most important political, economic and military center of Finland. Until March 13, there were battles for Vyborg, and on March 12, in Moscow, representatives of the USSR and Finland signed a peace treaty. The difficult and shameful war for the USSR is over.

The strategic goals of this war were, of course, not only to capture the Karelian Isthmus. In addition to the two armies operating in the main direction, that is, on the Karelian Isthmus (7th and 13th), four more armies took part in the war: 14th (divisional commander Frolov), 9th (corps commander M.P. Dukhanov, then V.I. Chuikov), 8th (divisional commander Khabarov, then G.M. Stern) and 15th (2nd rank commander M.P. Kovalev). These armies operated on almost the entire eastern border of Finland and in its north on a front from Lake Ladoga to the Barents Sea, stretching over a thousand kilometers. According to the plan of the high command, these armies were supposed to pull back part of the Finnish forces from the Karelian Isthmus region. If successful, Soviet troops on the southern section of this front line could break through north of Lake Ladoga and go to the rear of the Finnish troops defending the Mannerheim Line. Soviet troops in the central sector (Ukhta area), also if successful, could reach the Gulf of Bothnia area and cut the territory of Finland in half.

However, in both sectors, Soviet troops were defeated. How was it possible, in harsh winter conditions, in dense coniferous forests covered with deep snow, without a developed network of roads, without reconnaissance of the terrain of the upcoming military operations, to attack and defeat Finnish troops, adapted to life and combat activity in these conditions, moving quickly on skis, well equipped and armed with automatic weapons? It does not require marshal wisdom or greater combat experience to understand that it is impossible to defeat such an enemy under these conditions, and you can lose your people.

In the relatively short-lived Soviet-Finnish war, many tragedies occurred with Soviet troops and there were almost no victories. During the battles north of Ladoga in December-February 1939-1940. Mobile Finnish units, small in number, using the element of surprise, defeated several Soviet divisions, some of which disappeared forever in the snow-covered coniferous forests. Overloaded with heavy equipment, Soviet divisions stretched along the main roads, having open flanks, deprived of the ability to maneuver, and became victims of small units of the Finnish army, losing 50-70% of their personnel, and sometimes even more, if you count prisoners. Here's a concrete example. The 18th Division (56th Corps of the 15th Army) was surrounded by Finns along the road from Uom to Lemetti in the 1st half of February 1940. It was transferred from the Ukrainian steppes. There was no training for soldiers to operate in winter conditions in Finland. Units of this division were blocked in 13 garrisons, completely cut off from each other. Their supply was carried out by air, but it was organized unsatisfactorily. The soldiers suffered from cold and malnutrition. By the second half of February, the surrounded garrisons were partially destroyed, the rest suffered heavy losses. The surviving soldiers were exhausted and demoralized. On the night of February 28-29, 1940, the remnants of the 18th Division, with the permission of Headquarters, began to leave the encirclement. To break through the front line, they had to abandon equipment and seriously wounded people. With heavy losses, the fighters escaped from the encirclement. The soldiers carried out the seriously wounded division commander Kondrashev in their arms. The banner of the 18th division went to the Finns. As required by law, this division, which had lost its banner, was disbanded. The division commander, already in the hospital, was arrested and soon executed by court verdict; the commander of the 56th Corps, Cherepanov, shot himself on March 8. The losses of the 18th division amounted to 14 thousand people, that is, more than 90%. The total losses of the 15th Army amounted to about 50 thousand people, which is almost 43% of the initial strength of 117 thousand people. There are many similar examples from that “unfamous” war.

Under the terms of the Moscow Peace Treaty, the entire Karelian Isthmus with Vyborg, the area north of Lake Ladoga, the territory in the Kuolajärvi region, as well as the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula went to the Soviet Union. In addition, the USSR acquired a 30-year lease on the Hanko (Gangut) peninsula at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. The distance from Leningrad to the new state border is now about 150 kilometers. But territorial acquisitions did not improve the security of the northwestern borders of the USSR. The loss of territories pushed the Finnish leadership into an alliance with Nazi Germany. As soon as Germany attacked the USSR, the Finns in 1941 pushed back Soviet troops to pre-war lines and captured part of Soviet Karelia.

before and after the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.

The Soviet-Finnish war became a bitter, difficult, but to some extent useful lesson for the Soviet armed forces. At the cost of great blood, the troops gained some experience in modern warfare, especially the skills of breaking through fortified areas, as well as conducting combat operations in winter conditions. The highest state and military leadership became convinced in practice that the combat training of the Red Army was very weak. Therefore, specific measures began to be taken to improve discipline in the troops and to supply the army with modern weapons and military equipment. After the Soviet-Finnish war, there was a slight decline in the rate of repression against the command staff of the army and navy. Perhaps, analyzing the results of this war, Stalin saw the disastrous consequences of the repressions he unleashed against the army and navy.

One of the first useful organizational events immediately after the Soviet-Finnish war was the dismissal from the post of People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR of a famous political figure, Stalin's closest ally, “the people's favorite” Klim Voroshilov. Stalin became convinced of Voroshilov's complete incompetence in military affairs. He was transferred to the prestigious position of deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, that is, the government. The position was invented specifically for Voroshilov, so he could well consider this a promotion. Stalin appointed S.K. to the post of People's Commissar of Defense. Timoshenko, who was the commander of the Northwestern Front in the war with the Finns. In this war, Tymoshenko did not show any special leadership talents; rather, on the contrary, he showed weakness as a leader. However, for the bloodiest operation for the Soviet troops to break through the Mannerheim Line, which was carried out illiterately in operational and tactical terms and cost incredibly large casualties, Semyon Konstantinovich Timoshenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. We do not think that such a high assessment of Tymoshenko’s activities during the Soviet-Finnish war found understanding among Soviet military personnel, especially among the participants in this war.

Official data on the losses of the Red Army in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, subsequently published in the press, are as follows:

total losses amounted to 333,084 people, of which:
killed and died from wounds – 65384
missing - 19,690 (of which over 5.5 thousand were captured)
wounded, shell-shocked – 186584
frostbitten – 9614
sick – 51892

The losses of Soviet troops during the breakthrough of the Mannerheim Line amounted to 190 thousand people killed, wounded, and prisoners, which is 60% of all losses in the war with the Finns. And for such shameful and tragic results, Stalin gave the front commander the Golden Star of a Hero...

The Finns lost about 70 thousand people, of which about 23 thousand were killed.

Now briefly about the situation around the Soviet-Finnish war. During the war, England and France provided assistance to Finland with weapons and materials, and also repeatedly offered to its neighbors - Norway and Sweden - to allow Anglo-French troops to pass through their territory to help Finland. However, Norway and Sweden firmly took a position of neutrality, fearing being drawn into a global conflict. Then England and France promised to send an expeditionary force of 150 thousand people to Finland by sea. Some people from the Finnish leadership proposed continuing the war with the USSR and waiting for the arrival of the expeditionary force in Finland. But the commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, soberly assessing the situation, decided to end the war, which led his country to relatively large casualties and weakened the economy. Finland was forced to conclude the Moscow Peace Treaty on March 12, 1940.

Relations between the USSR and England and France deteriorated sharply because of these countries' help to Finland and not only because of this. During the Soviet-Finnish War, England and France planned to bomb the oil fields of Soviet Transcaucasia. Several squadrons of the British and French Air Forces from airfields in Syria and Iraq were to bomb oil fields in Baku and Grozny, as well as oil piers in Batumi. They only managed to take aerial photographs of targets in Baku, after which they headed to the Batumi area to photograph oil piers, but were met by fire from Soviet anti-aircraft gunners. This happened at the end of March - beginning of April 1940. In the context of the expected invasion of France by German troops, plans for the bombing of the Soviet Union by Anglo-French aircraft were revised and ultimately were not implemented.

One of the unpleasant results of the Soviet-Finnish war was the exclusion of the USSR from the League of Nations, which lowered the authority of the Soviet country in the eyes of the world community.

© A.I. Kalanov, V.A. Kalanov,
"Knowledge is power"