creativity - to the psychological mechanism of creative activity, to its experimental analysis.
Here the central link of the psychological mechanism of creativity is identified and analyzed. It implements the general principle of development already mentioned earlier and discussed in detail in the first part of the book. It is discovered that this link itself is represented by a hierarchy of structural levels of its organization. In many different experiments, one and the same fact persistently emerges: the need for development arises at the highest level, the means to satisfy it are formed at the lower levels; By being included in the functioning of a higher level, they transform the way of this functioning. Psychologically, satisfying the need for novelty and development is always based on a special form of intuition. In scientific and technical creativity, the effect of an intuitive solution is also verbalized and sometimes formalized. Following the general characteristics of the central link, materials from an experimental study of psychological models of its main components - intuition, verbalization and formalization - are presented. Then other elements of the psychological mechanism of creativity are identified and analyzed, related to the general and specific abilities of people, the qualities of a creative personality, and a wide range of conditions for the effectiveness of creative work. All these elements are identified and considered as conditions conducive to the effective operation of the central link of the psychological mechanism of creativity.
The entire system of concepts of the psychology of creativity presented in the book and its internal logic are built on this same basis.

PART I
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
CHAPTER 1
THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY
Creativity as a mechanism of development
When characterizing the state of the problem of the nature of creativity, one should first of all emphasize the understanding of creativity in the broad and narrow sense, long established in the literature.
It can be found in the article “Creativity”, included in the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary, written by F. Batyushkov (the broad sense is called “direct” in it, the narrow sense - “generally accepted”): “Creativity - in the literal sense - is the creation of something new. In this meaning, this word could be applied to all processes of organic and inorganic life, for life is a series of continuous changes and everything that is renewed and everything that arises in nature is a product of creative forces. But the concept of creativity presupposes a personal beginning and the corresponding word is used primarily in relation to human activity. In this generally accepted sense, creativity is a conventional term for designating a mental act expressed in the embodiment, reproduction or combination of data from our consciousness, in a (relatively) new form, in the field of abstract thought, artistic and practical activity (T. scientific, T. poetic, musical , T. in the fine arts, T. administrator, commander, etc.” (Batyushkov, 1901).
In the early period of research, a certain amount of attention was paid to the broad meaning of creativity. However, in a later period, the view of the nature of creativity changed dramatically. The understanding of creativity, both in our country and in foreign literature, has been reduced exclusively to its narrow meaning."
In relation to this narrow meaning, modern studies of the criteria of creative activity are being conducted (especially numerous abroad (Bernstein, 1966).
1 For more details, see: Ponomarev Ya. A. Development of problems of scientific creativity in Soviet psychology. - “Problems of scientific creativity in modern psychology:”. M., 1971.
11

Most modern foreign scientists involved in issues of scientific creativity unanimously believe that a lot of work has been done in the area of ​​creativity criteria, but the desired results have not yet been obtained. For example, the authors of many studies conducted in recent decades in the United States tend to share Gieselin's point of view, according to which the definition of the difference between creative and non-creative activities remains completely subjective.
The complexity of the structure of creativity prompts researchers to think about the need for multiple criteria. However, an empirical search for such criteria leads to insignificant results. Put forward criteria such as “popularity”, “productivity” (Smith, Taylor, Ghiselin), “the degree of reconstruction of the understanding of the universe” (Ghiselin), “the breadth of influence of the scientist’s activities on various fields of scientific knowledge” (Lachlen), “the degree of novelty of ideas, approaches, solutions” (Sprecher, Stein), “social value of scientific products” (Brogden) and many others remain unconvincing2. S. M. Bernstein (1966) rightly sees this as a consequence of a completely unsatisfactory level of development of theoretical issues in the study of creativity.
It must be especially emphasized that the question of creativity criteria is far from idle. Sometimes the wrong approach to its consideration becomes a serious obstacle to the study of creativity, shifting its subject. For example, the founders of heuristic programming, Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1965), taking advantage of the uncertainty of the criteria that distinguish a creative thought process from a non-creative one, put forward the position that the theory of creative thinking is a theory of solving cognitive problems with modern electronic computing devices. They emphasize that the validity of their claims to a theory of creative thinking depends on how broadly or narrowly the term “creative” is interpreted. “If we are to view all complex problem-solving activity as creative, then, as we will show, successful programs for mechanisms that imitate a human problem solver already exist, and a number of their characteristics are known. If we reserve the term “creative” for activities like discovering a specialty,
3 It should be noted that all those particular criteria that relate to the characteristics of creativity in the narrow sense (as one of the forms of human activity) and which are now varied from different perspectives by most modern researchers, were already outlined in the works of domestic researchers of the early period (novelty, originality, departure from the template, breaking traditions, surprise, expediency, value, etc.). This indicates the stagnation of thought in this area (for more details, see: Ponomarev #. A. Development of problems of scientific creativity" in Soviet psychology).
12

tional theory of relativity or the creation of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then there are currently no examples of creative mechanisms."
The authors adopt the first version for practical guidance - hence their theory of creative thinking.
Of course, such a position raises sharp objections, for example, in the spirit of the statement of L. N. Landa (1967), who showed that modern heuristic programs are only “incomplete algorithms” and emphasized that heuristic programming does not characterize creative processes. Creativity lies not in that activity, each link of which is completely regulated in advance by given rules, but in that, the preliminary regulation of which contains a certain degree of uncertainty, in activity that brings new information, presupposing self-organization.
Other objections can be raised. For example, if we agree with the approach of Newell, Shaw and Simon, we will find ourselves in a very peculiar position: our studies of creativity will not be directed towards a pre-designated object, but this object itself will be what the work done will lead to. In some situations such assumptions are probably possible. But in this case, the settings of heuristic programming are rejected and the characteristics of creativity that appear quite sharply in many empirical studies, although still poorly disclosed, are ignored. After all, one can rightfully make another decision: the class of problems whose solutions are accessible to machine modeling is not included in the class of creative ones; the latter can only include those whose solutions are fundamentally not amenable to modern machine modeling. Moreover, the impossibility of simulating solutions to such problems using modern computers can be one of the fairly clear practical criteria for true creativity.
Newell, Shaw and Simon, of course, clearly understand and foresee the possibility of such a version. But they think it can be ignored. Such confidence is supported by a calculation of the precariousness of the existing criteria that distinguish a creative thought process from a non-creative one3; it is reinforced by the conviction that it is impossible to identify satisfactory objective criteria for creativity. All this is a direct consequence of the lack of proper support for generalized, regulating methodological principles that determine the preliminary orientation in particular research, and, moreover, the lack of
3 Newell, Shaw and Simon define creative activity as a type of activity for solving special problems that are characterized by novelty, originality, stability and difficulty in formulating the problem (“Psychology of Thinking”. Collection of translations from German and English. Edited by A. M. Matyushkin . M., 1965).

The book examines the subject and methods of the psychology of creativity, the central link in the psychological mechanism of creative activity, the abilities and qualities of a creative personality.

It contains extensive experimental material, on the basis of which a number of psychological laws of creative activity and laws of the formation of conditions favorable to it are formulated.

About the author: Ponomarev Yakov Aleksandrovich (12/25/1920, Vichuga, Ivanovo region - 02/22/1997) - a leading scientist in the field of psychology of creativity and intelligence, psychology methodology, a high-class professional, Doctor of Psychology, professor, chief researcher at the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, honored... more...

Also read with the book “Psychology of Creativity”:

Preview of the book “Psychology of Creativity”

USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF PSYCHOLOGY
Y. A. PONOMAREV
PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY
PUBLISHING HOUSE "SCIENCE> MOSCOW 1976
The book examines the subject and methods of the psychology of creativity, the central link in the psychological mechanism of creative activity, the abilities and qualities of a creative personality. It contains extensive experimental material, on the basis of which a number of psychological laws of creative activity and laws of the formation of conditions favorable to it are formulated.
The book is addressed to psychologists, philosophers and a wide range of readers interested in problems of creativity.
n 10508-069 „. ?6 042 (02)-76
© Nauka Publishing House, 1976
INTRODUCTION
RESEARCH OF CREATIVITY IN CONDITIONS OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL REVOLUTION
The psychology of creativity - a field of knowledge that studies the creation of new, original things by a person in various fields of activity, primarily in science, technology, and art - came up in the middle of the 20th century. to a new stage of its development. Particularly dramatic changes have occurred in the psychology of scientific creativity: its authority has increased, its content has become deeper. It has taken a dominant place in creativity research.
The conditions for a new stage in the development of the psychology of scientific creativity arose in the situation of the scientific and technological revolution, which significantly changed the type of social stimulation of activity research in science.
For a long time, society did not have an acute practical need for the psychology of creativity, including scientific creativity. Talented scientists appeared as if by themselves; they spontaneously made discoveries, satisfying the pace of development of society, in particular science itself. The main social incentive for improving the psychology of creativity remained curiosity, which sometimes mistook a little controlled invention, a game of fantasy, for a perfect product of scientific research.
The lightness of the criteria for assessing the quality of research in the psychology of creativity was also imposed by its historical traditions. Most of the pioneers of creativity research were idealistic thinkers. They saw in creativity the most fully expressed freedom of manifestation of the human spirit, not amenable to scientific analysis. The idea of ​​purposefully increasing the efficiency of creating new, original, socially significant values ​​was considered as empty fun. The existence of objective laws of human creativity was actually denied. The main task of creativity researchers was to describe the circumstances surrounding creative activity. Legends were collected that sparked the curiosity of gullible readers. Even the most conscientious
Well-known and valuable works did not go further than stating the facts lying on the surface of events.
All these studies have been collected over the centuries under the common banner of “creativity theory.” Since the last decades of the 19th century. they began to be referred to as the “psychology of creativity.” Psychology was then understood as the science of the soul, of ideal spiritual activity.
A rough idea of ​​the nature of the “theory and psychology of creativity” at the beginning of the 20th century. can be made, for example, based on the materials of value judgments relating to this area of ​​​​knowledge and given in the works themselves on the “theory and psychology of creativity”, in other words, based on the impression of observers who consider their science from within itself.
Some authors of that time did not dare to classify the theory of creativity and the psychology embedded in it as a scientific discipline. From their point of view, it is rather a tendentious grouping of fragmentary facts and random empirical generalizations, snatched without any method, without any system or connection from the fields of physiology of the nervous system, neuropathology, history of literature and art. These fragmentary facts and random empirical data are accompanied by a number of risky comparisons and hasty generalizations of data from aesthetics and literature, and at the same time a number of more or less subtle observations, introspections, supported by references to the autobiographical self-confession of poets, artists, and thinkers.
At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, after research into artistic and scientific-philosophical creativity, research into natural science creativity appeared, and somewhat later, into technical creativity. They delineated the subject of research more strictly. This had a beneficial effect on the productivity of creativity learning. Some circumstances common to all types of creativity have emerged. Attention began to focus on more significant phenomena.
However, the principles of creativity research have largely changed little. This happened not only because the subject of research was indeed very complex, but mainly because until the middle of our century, the study of creativity was not given significant importance.
In the middle of the 20th century. curiosity, which stimulated the development of knowledge about creativity, lost its monopoly. A clearly expressed need for rational management of creative activity has arisen - the type of social order has changed dramatically.
Emphasizing this sharp change in the type of social order, let us draw attention to the following circumstance: the new need of society was not generated by the internal development of the psychology of creativity - it was not this area of ​​knowledge that indicated to society
4
possibility and feasibility of creativity management. The shift in social stimulation was caused by the scientific and technological revolution - a qualitative leap in the development of productive forces, which turned science into a direct productive force, making the economy significantly dependent on the achievements of science.
In recent years, our scientific literature has shown conditions conducive to the intensification of research into the psychology of creativity. The complexity of the problems that science has approached to solve, the ever-increasing provision of scientific research with the latest technical means are closely related to changes in the structure of the organization of this research, the emergence of new organizational units - scientific teams, the transformation of scientific work into a mass profession, etc. The age of handicraft in science is gone to the past. Science has become a complexly organized system that requires special research to consciously manage the course of scientific progress.
Research on creativity is of particular importance. Life presents researchers in this area with a complex of practical problems. These tasks are generated by the fact that the pace of development of science cannot be constantly increased only by increasing the number of people involved in it. We must constantly increase the creative potential of scientists. To do this, it is necessary to purposefully form creative scientists, carry out rational selection of personnel, create the most favorable motivation for creative activity, find means that stimulate the successful course of the creative act, rationally use modern possibilities for automating mental work, approach the optimal organization of creative teams, etc.
The old type of knowledge, stimulated by curiosity - mainly the contemplative-explanatory type - could not, of course, satisfy the new need of society, cope with the new social order - to ensure rational management of creativity. There had to be a change in the type of knowledge, a new type had to emerge—effectively transformative. Has such a change occurred?
Let us take a look from this point of view at the modern psychology of scientific creativity in the USA, where research in this area is currently most intensive.
In 1950, one of the leading psychologists in the US-D. Guilford appealed to his colleagues in the association to expand research on the psychology of creativity in every possible way. The call met with a corresponding response. Many publications have appeared under the heading of the psychology of creativity. They covered, it would seem, all the traditional problems of this field of knowledge: questions of criteria for creative activity and its difference from non-creative activity, the nature of creativity, patterns
5
the creative process, the specific characteristics of a creative personality, the development of creative abilities, the organization and stimulation of creative activity, the formation of creative teams, etc. However, as it became clear, the scientific value of this stream of publications is small. And first of all, because the acceleration of this kind of research by US scientists occurred despite the obvious unpreparedness of the theory.
Modern psychology of scientific creativity in the United States is narrowly utilitarian. At the cost of expensive, unproductive efforts, she tries to obtain direct answers to the practical problems put forward by life. Sometimes US psychologists, relying on “common sense”, vast empirical material and its processing using modern mathematics, manage to offer solutions to certain practical problems. However, such successes are palliative. It is important to note that the vast majority of such tasks are not strictly psychological. Rather, these are “common sense” tasks. Their solutions are of a narrowly applied nature and are confined to purely specific situations. The mechanisms of the phenomena being studied are not revealed, and therefore their invariants are not revealed. Some modifications of specific conditions make previously obtained solutions no longer suitable and require new empirical research.
Excessive enthusiasm for superficial analysis is fraught with obvious danger, especially when it is associated with an appeal to social objects, the external appearance of which is easily accessible to direct observation, while their internal structure is diverse and extremely complex. Superficial work at first often achieves a certain success, successfully using some of the previously accumulated valuable knowledge. This creates a certain authority for the emerging direction. It becomes recognized and popular. Then follows an idle move, which already interferes with the development of full-fledged research, veiling its true problems and real difficulties, creating the appearance of satisfying practical needs.
An analysis of the psychology of scientific creativity in the United States shows that the scientific and technological revolution took creativity research by surprise. There was no accumulated knowledge that could be called fundamental. The ideas contained in these studies were already put forward in general terms before the 40s of our century.
There is no reason to think that the ideas and principles already known by this time correspond to the new social incentive; we do not have sufficiently convincing facts about the rational management of scientific creativity.
Therefore, as the most important characteristic of the modern situation in the field of research into problems of creativity, we must name the contradiction consisting in the inconsistency of what has been achieved
6
the level of knowledge and the social need for it, i.e., in the discrepancy between the type of social order and the type of knowledge achieved - in the lag between the type of knowledge and the type of order.
Of great importance for finding ways to overcome this contradiction is the analysis of trends in the historical development of the psychology of creativity. A general idea of ​​the genesis of the ideas of modern creativity psychology can be successfully built on the material of domestic science. The author of “The History of Soviet Psychology” A.V. Petrovsky (1967), characterizing Russian psychology at the beginning of the 20th century, emphasizes that it “represented one of the detachments of European psychological science. The research of domestic scientists devoted to individual psychological problems cannot be considered in isolation from the corresponding works of their foreign colleagues, whose ideas they developed or refuted, whose influence they experienced or which they themselves influenced.” Everything said here fully applies to the psychology of creativity. Therefore, consideration of its problems in Russian science reveals to us not only the own positions of domestic authors, but also makes it possible to get an idea of ​​​​the state of the psychology of creativity of that time abroad. In general, the same can be applied to Soviet psychological science. At the same time, after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, deep fundamental changes occurred in the development of psychological thought in the USSR: a gradual rethinking of psychological research began on the basis of dialectical-materialist methodology, which gave an extremely valuable and essential originality to our research and freed many scientists from idealistic wanderings.
The genesis of the ideas of the psychology of creativity, the features of the general approach to research, the dynamics of transformations of this approach and the trend of its strategic direction were traced by the author in the work “Development of problems of scientific creativity in Soviet psychology” (1971), which also included the pre-October period. It examines the works of the pioneers of the emerging study of the psychology of creativity in Russia - followers of the philosophical and linguistic concept of A. A. Potebnya - D. N. Ovsyaniko-Kulikovsky (1902, etc.) and his student B. A. Lezin (compiler and editor of the collections “Questions theory and psychology of creativity", the main tribune of Potebni-stov), ​​works by P. K. Engelmeyer, M. A. Bloch, I. I. Lapshin, S. O. Gruzenberg, V. M. Bekhterev, V. V. Savich, F. Yu. Levinson-Lessing, V. L. Omelyansky, I. N. Dyakov, N. V. Petrovsky and P. A. Rudik, A. P. Nechaev, P. M. Yakobson,
V. P. Polonsky, S. L. Rubinshtein, B. M. Teplov, A. N. Leontyev, I. S. Sumbaeva, B. M. Kedrova, Ya. A. Ponomarev,
S. M. Vasileisky, G. S. Altshuller, V. N. Pushkin,
7
M. S. Bernshtein, O. K. Tikhomirov, M. G. Yaroshevsky, V. P. Zinchenko and others.
The results of our earlier analysis of the development of problems of scientific creativity in Soviet psychology are used by us in many sections of this book. Here we will only point out the main trend of changes in the general approach to creativity research.
This tendency is expressed in a gradual movement from an undifferentiated, syncretic description of the phenomena of creativity, from attempts to directly embrace these phenomena in all their concrete integrity to the development of an idea of ​​​​the study of creativity as a complex problem - in movement along the line of differentiation of aspects, identifying a number of different the nature of the laws that determine creativity.
Let us also note that today such differentiation is still far from complete.
Our domestic scientists have made a very important contribution to the study of the psychology of creativity. Great and varied interest in this area of ​​knowledge is characteristic of the first days after October. It survived until the mid-30s, but then declined and almost disappeared. Currently, the curve of this interest has risen sharply again.
Despite some pause in the study of the psychology of creativity, we have significant advantages over bourgeois scientists: our psychological research, based on the most progressive Marxist-Leninist methodology in the world, has brought us significantly closer to turning the psychology of creativity into effectively transformative knowledge. In contrast to “psychological and sociological” studies of increasing the efficiency of creative work in science, conducted at the level of “common sense,” we pay main attention to the analysis of the theoretical foundation of the psychology of creativity, identifying and overcoming theoretical difficulties.
It is customary to begin the presentation of any field of knowledge with a description of its subject. But we do not have such an opportunity.
At the level of a formal scheme, in the most general terms, the subject of the psychology of creativity can be considered as a zone of intersection of two circles, one of which symbolizes knowledge about creativity, the other - psychology. However, the area of ​​reality that this scheme should reflect still does not have clearly defined, generally accepted boundaries, which is primarily due to the level of understanding of the nature of creativity, on the one hand, and the nature of the psyche, on the other.
8
The lag in the level of understanding of the nature of creativity from the requirements of modern tasks in the study of creative activity is clearly revealed even in the most elementary, as it may seem at first glance, provisions, for example, in the question of criteria for creativity, criteria for creative activity. Despite the fact that this issue has acquired enormous practical significance in recent years, the lack of sufficiently strict criteria for determining the difference between creative and non-creative human activity is now generally recognized. At the same time, it is obvious that without such criteria it is impossible to identify with sufficient certainty the subject of research itself. It is also obvious that the concepts of the criteria of creativity and its nature, essence are closely interconnected - these are two sides of the same problem.
The insufficient development of the question of the nature of the psyche follows from the fact that in our psychology there is still no generally accepted approach to understanding this nature. The psychic is usually understood as something concrete. The struggle between two mutually exclusive positions concerning its most general, fundamental characteristics continues. One of these positions considers the psychic to be ideal (immaterial), the other asserts its materiality.
All of the above shows with sufficient conviction that the current state of knowledge in the psychology of creativity categorically requires that further research be preceded by a special consideration of the main components of this science. The question of the subject of the psychology of creativity turns into a problem requiring a methodological solution. The first part of the book is devoted to this problem. Creativity in a broad sense is considered here as a mechanism of development, as an interaction leading to development; human creativity is one of the specific forms of manifestation of this mechanism. The approach to the study of this particular form is based on the principle of transforming the stages of development of a phenomenon into structural levels of its organization and functional stages of further developmental interactions. From the position of this principle, a strategy for a comprehensive - analytical-synthetic - study of creative activity is being developed. The criteria for identifying analytical complexes are the structural levels of organization of a given specific form of creativity. Analysis of the place of psychology in the system of an integrated approach leads to the idea of ​​the mental as one of the structural levels of the organization of life. With this understanding, the subject of the psychology of creativity becomes the mental structural level of the organization of creative activity.
In the second part of the book, based on the solution obtained, we turn to the internal problems of psychology itself.
creativity - to the psychological mechanism of creative activity, to its experimental analysis.
Here the central link of the psychological mechanism of creativity is identified and analyzed. It implements the general principle of development already mentioned earlier and discussed in detail in the first part of the book. It is discovered that this link itself is represented by a hierarchy of structural levels of its organization. In many different experiments, one and the same fact persistently emerges: the need for development arises at the highest level, the means to satisfy it are formed at the lower levels; By being included in the functioning of a higher level, they transform the way of this functioning. Psychologically, satisfying the need for novelty and development is always based on a special form of intuition. In scientific and technical creativity, the effect of an intuitive solution is also verbalized and sometimes formalized. Following the general characteristics of the central link, materials from an experimental study of psychological models of its main components - intuition, verbalization and formalization - are presented. Then other elements of the psychological mechanism of creativity are identified and analyzed, related to the general and specific abilities of people, the qualities of a creative personality, and a wide range of conditions for the effectiveness of creative work. All these elements are identified and considered as conditions conducive to the effective operation of the central link of the psychological mechanism of creativity.
The entire system of concepts of the psychology of creativity presented in the book and its internal logic are built on this same basis.
PART I
METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS
CHAPTER 1
THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY
Creativity as a mechanism of development
When characterizing the state of the problem of the nature of creativity, one should first of all emphasize the understanding of creativity in the broad and narrow sense, long established in the literature.
It can be found in the article “Creativity”, included in the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary, written by F. Batyushkov (the broad sense is called “direct” in it, the narrow sense - “generally accepted”): “Creativity - in the literal sense - is the creation of something new. In this meaning, this word could be applied to all processes of organic and inorganic life, for life is a series of continuous changes and everything that is renewed and everything that arises in nature is a product of creative forces. But the concept of creativity presupposes a personal beginning and the corresponding word is used primarily in relation to human activity. In this generally accepted sense, creativity is a conventional term for designating a mental act expressed in the embodiment, reproduction or combination of data from our consciousness, in a (relatively) new form, in the field of abstract thought, artistic and practical activity (T. scientific, T. poetic, musical , T. in the fine arts, T. administrator, commander, etc.” (Batyushkov, 1901).
In the early period of research, a certain amount of attention was paid to the broad meaning of creativity. However, in a later period, the view of the nature of creativity changed dramatically. The understanding of creativity, both in our country and in foreign literature, has been reduced exclusively to its narrow meaning."
In relation to this narrow meaning, modern studies of the criteria of creative activity are being conducted (especially numerous abroad (Bernstein, 1966).
1 For more details, see: Ponomarev Ya. A. Development of problems of scientific creativity in Soviet psychology. - “Problems of scientific creativity in modern psychology:”. M., 1971.
11
Most modern foreign scientists involved in issues of scientific creativity unanimously believe that a lot of work has been done in the area of ​​creativity criteria, but the desired results have not yet been obtained. For example, the authors of many studies conducted in recent decades in the United States tend to share Gieselin's point of view, according to which the definition of the difference between creative and non-creative activities remains completely subjective.
The complexity of the structure of creativity prompts researchers to think about the need for multiple criteria. However, an empirical search for such criteria leads to insignificant results. Put forward criteria such as “popularity”, “productivity” (Smith, Taylor, Ghiselin), “the degree of reconstruction of the understanding of the universe” (Ghiselin), “the breadth of influence of the scientist’s activities on various fields of scientific knowledge” (Lachlen), “the degree of novelty of ideas, approaches, solutions” (Sprecher, Stein), “social value of scientific products” (Brogden) and many others remain unconvincing2. S. M. Bernstein (1966) rightly sees this as a consequence of a completely unsatisfactory level of development of theoretical issues in the study of creativity.
It must be especially emphasized that the question of creativity criteria is far from idle. Sometimes the wrong approach to its consideration becomes a serious obstacle to the study of creativity, shifting its subject. For example, the founders of heuristic programming, Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1965), taking advantage of the uncertainty of the criteria that distinguish a creative thought process from a non-creative one, put forward the position that the theory of creative thinking is a theory of solving cognitive problems with modern electronic computing devices. They emphasize that the validity of their claims to a theory of creative thinking depends on how broadly or narrowly the term “creative” is interpreted. “If we are to view all complex problem-solving activity as creative, then, as we will show, successful programs for mechanisms that imitate a human problem solver already exist, and a number of their characteristics are known. If we reserve the term “creative” for activities such as the discovery of special3 It should be noted that all those particular criteria that relate to the characteristics of creativity in the narrow sense (as one of the forms of human activity) and which are now varied from different perspectives by most modern researchers, have already were in general terms in the works of domestic researchers of the early period (novelty, originality, departure from the template, breaking traditions, surprise, expediency, value, etc.). This indicates the stagnation of thought in this area (for more details, see: Ponomarev #. A. Development of problems of scientific creativity" in Soviet psychology).
12
tional theory of relativity or the creation of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then there are currently no examples of creative mechanisms."
The authors adopt the first version for practical guidance - hence their theory of creative thinking.
Of course, such a position raises sharp objections, for example, in the spirit of the statement of L. N. Landa (1967), who showed that modern heuristic programs are only “incomplete algorithms” and emphasized that heuristic programming does not characterize creative processes. Creativity lies not in that activity, each link of which is completely regulated in advance by given rules, but in that, the preliminary regulation of which contains a certain degree of uncertainty, in activity that brings new information, presupposing self-organization.
Other objections can be raised. For example, if we agree with the approach of Newell, Shaw and Simon, we will find ourselves in a very peculiar position: our studies of creativity will not be directed towards a pre-designated object, but this object itself will be what the work done will lead to. In some situations such assumptions are probably possible. But in this case, the settings of heuristic programming are rejected and the characteristics of creativity that appear quite sharply in many empirical studies, although still poorly disclosed, are ignored. After all, one can rightfully make another decision: the class of problems whose solutions are accessible to machine modeling is not included in the class of creative ones; the latter can only include those whose solutions are fundamentally not amenable to modern machine modeling. Moreover, the impossibility of simulating solutions to such problems using modern computers can be one of the fairly clear practical criteria for true creativity.
Newell, Shaw and Simon, of course, clearly understand and foresee the possibility of such a version. But they think it can be ignored. Such confidence is supported by a calculation of the precariousness of the existing criteria that distinguish a creative thought process from a non-creative one3; it is reinforced by the conviction that it is impossible to identify satisfactory objective criteria for creativity. All this is a direct consequence of the lack of proper support for generalized, regulating methodological principles that determine preliminary orientation in private research, and, moreover, the ignorance of 3 Newell, Shaw and Simon define creative activity as a type of activity for solving special problems that are characterized by novelty, unconventionality, stability and difficulty in formulating the problem (“Psychology of Thinking.” Collection of translations from German and English. Edited by A. M. Matyushkin. M., 1965).
13
riya into the possibility of productive development of such regulative principles.
Apparently, for the same reason, numerous attempts by modern foreign scientists to determine the essence of creativity are not very successful.
These attempts are clearly presented, for example, in the book by A. Matejko (1970), the author of which widely relies on the opinions of a large number of foreign researchers (especially American) and provides the most typical definitions. All of them are purely empirical and have little content. Creativity is traditionally associated with novelty, and the concept of novelty is not disclosed. It is characterized as the antipode of patterned, stereotypical activity, etc.
“The essence of the creative process,” writes Matejko, “lies in the reorganization of existing experience and the formation of new combinations on its basis.” Let's take this definition as an example.
It is easy to see that the reorganization of experience in this case is understood not as a process, but as a product. The essence of the creative process is that it leads to such a reorganization. However, the main disadvantage of this definition is not that it replaces the process with a product or loses sight of some details, but that by its very nature it is purely empirical - non-fundamental. No matter how much we try to give it a tolerable form with all kinds of improvements at the level of knowledge on which it is built, we still won’t succeed.
In this sense, a much more thoughtful definition coming from S. L. Rubinstein4 and most widespread in our domestic literature is also unacceptable: “Creativity is a human activity that creates new material and spiritual values ​​that have social significance” b.
Given a certain selection of creative events, such a criterion is clearly unsuitable. After all, they talk about how animals solve problems, about children’s creativity; creativity undoubtedly manifests itself when a person of any level of development independently solves all kinds of “puzzles”. But all these acts do not have direct social significance. The history of science and technology records many facts when the brilliant achievements of people's creative thought did not acquire social significance for a long time. One cannot think that during the period
* According to Rubinstein, creativity is an activity “creating something new, original, which, moreover, is included not only in the history of the development of the creator himself, but also in the history of the development of science, art, etc.> (Rubinstein S.L. Fundamentals of General Psychology. M ., 1940, p. 482).
* TSB, ed. 2nd, t, 42, p. 54.
M
silencing, the activities of their creators were not generally creative, but became so only from the moment of recognition.
At the same time, the criterion of social significance in a number of cases is indeed decisive in creative acts. It cannot simply be discarded. For example, in unrecognized inventions and discoveries, on the one hand, the act of creativity is evident, but on the other, it is not. Consequently, in addition to psychological reasons in social relationships, there are some additional reasons that determine the possibility of a creative act in this area.
It is necessary, apparently, to believe that there are different spheres of creativity. Creativity in one area is sometimes just an opportunity for creativity in another area.
The same idea, but in connection with the approval of an integrated approach to the study of creativity, in particular scientific discovery, was expressed by B. M. Kedrov (1969), according to whose views the theory of scientific discovery faces a complex of problems. Their solutions should be sought by methods and means of the appropriate complex of sciences. Firstly, a historical and socio-economic analysis of the practice, the “social order” of discovery, is necessary. Secondly, a historical and logical analysis is needed that identifies the specific needs of science that stimulate this or that discovery. All this corresponds to the phylogenetic section of the development of science. An ontogenetic perspective is also necessary, revealing the scope of scientific activity and scientific creativity of the author of the discovery. Here, according to B. M. Kedrov, psychological analysis comes to the fore. The identification and development of the described set of problems creates the necessary ground for a fruitful study of the internal mechanism of the relationship between the phylo- and ontogenesis of science.
Therefore, it is necessary to question the legitimacy of the direct search for a universal criterion of creativity in the field of science: first a set of criteria must be developed that correspond to different spheres of creativity (social, mental, etc.). The success of developing each of these special criteria is directly dependent on the degree of understanding of the question of the essence of creativity, taken in the most general form - in the form of a generalization of all its manifestations at the levels of different spheres. Reducing creativity to one of the forms of human mental activity prevents the depth of such a generalization. It snatches creativity from the general process of development of the world, makes the origins and prerequisites of human creativity incomprehensible, closes the possibility of analyzing the genesis of the act of creativity, and thereby prevents the identification of its main characteristics, the discovery of various forms, and the identification of general and specific mechanisms.
At the same time, creativity is an extremely diverse concept. Even its everyday meaning, its everyday use
15
is not limited to the specific meaning in which it reflects individual events from a person’s life. In poetic speech, Ryroda is often called a tireless creator. Is this an echo of anthropomorphism, just a metaphor, a poetic analogy? Or do what occurs in nature and what is created by man really have something essentially in common?
Apparently, the understanding of creativity in a broad sense, characteristic of the early period of research, is not without content. If we leave aside the Machian formulations of some ideas characteristic of the early works of the Potebnists, we will see that their understanding of the nature of creativity is associated with the involvement of broad ideas about the laws governing the Universe, ideas about the general evolution of nature, etc. Such ideas are clearly expressed by B . A. Lezin (1907). P. K. Engelmeyer (1910) sees in human creativity one of the phases in the development of life. This phase continues the creativity of nature: both one and the other constitute one series, not interrupted anywhere and never: “Creativity is life, and life is creativity.” If Engelmeyer limits the sphere of creativity to living nature, then his follower M. A. Bloch extends this sphere to inanimate nature. He places creativity at the basis of the evolution of the world, which, in his opinion, begins with chemical elements and ends in the soul of a genius.
Are we making a mistake by refusing to understand creativity in a broad sense? The pre-scientific, fantastic worldview of people sharply separated the causes of what occurs in nature and what is artificially created by people. The scientific worldview, conditioned by a materialistic understanding of the world, indicated the true reasons for both. These reasons are generally identical. In both cases, the results of creativity are consequences of the interaction of material realities. Do we therefore have the right to reduce creativity only to human activity? The expression “creativity of nature” is not without meaning. The creativity of nature and the creativity of man are just different spheres of creativity, undoubtedly having common genetic roots.
Apparently, therefore, it is more appropriate to base the initial definition of creativity on its broadest understanding.
In this case, it should be recognized that creativity is characteristic of both inanimate and living nature - before the emergence of man, both to man and to society. Creativity is a necessary condition for the development of matter, the formation of its new forms, along with the emergence of which the forms of creativity themselves change. Human creativity is only one of these forms.
Thus, even a brief consideration of the current state of the problem of nature and the criteria of creative activity persistently pushes to the idea that for us16
To advance this problem on foot, a decisive breakthrough from the particular to the universal and regulation of the process of further identifying the particular from the position of the universal are necessary.
Here we will pay attention to only one of the possible approaches to such a breakthrough - to the hypothesis formulated by us in a number of works (Ponomarev, 1969, 1970), according to which creativity in the broadest sense acts as a mechanism of development, as an interaction leading to development.
The idea of ​​the creative function of interaction was clearly expressed by F. Engels in “Dialectics of Nature”: “Interaction is the first thing that appears to us when we consider moving matter as a whole from the point of view of modern natural science”6.
In interaction, Engels saw the basis of the universal connection and interdependence of phenomena, the final cause of movement and development: “All nature accessible to us forms a certain system, a certain collective connection of bodies, and here we understand by the word body all material realities, starting from a star and ending with an atom and even a particle of ether, since the reality of the latter is recognized. The fact that these bodies are in mutual connection already implies that they influence each other, and this mutual influence on each other is precisely movement.”7
Further, F. Engels writes: “We observe a number of forms of movement: mechanical movement, heat, light, electricity, magnetism, chemical combination and decomposition, transitions of states of aggregation, organic life, which all - if we exclude organic life for now - transform into each other. .. are a cause here, an effect there, and the total sum of motion, with all changes in form, remains the same (Spinoz’s: substance is causa sui (the cause of itself. Ed.) - perfectly expresses interaction). Mechanical motion turns into heat, electricity, magnetism, light, etc., and vice versa (on the contrary. Ed.). Thus, natural science confirms what Hegel said... - that interaction is the true causa finais (ultimate cause. Ed.) of things. We cannot go further than the knowledge of this interaction precisely because there is nothing more to know behind us. Once we have cognized the forms of motion of matter (for which, however, we still lack a lot due to the short-lived existence of natural science), then we have cognized matter itself, and this exhausts knowledge.”8
This hypothesis implies a refusal to reduce the concept of “creativity” to its narrow meaning - to human activity,
8 Marx K. and Engels F. Soch., vol. 20, p. 546.
7 Ibid., p. 392.
8 Ibid., p. 546.
17
More precisely - to one of the forms of such activity, and a return to the broad meaning of this concept.
A broad understanding of creativity, considering it in general terms as a mechanism of development, as an interaction leading to development, is very promising. Such consideration includes the question of the nature of creativity in an already fairly explored area of ​​knowledge and thereby facilitates subsequent orientation in its particular forms. The analysis of creativity is included in the analysis of developmental phenomena. Creativity as a mechanism of development acts as an attribute of matter, its integral property. The dialectic of creativity is included in the dialectic of development, which has been fairly well studied by Marxist philosophy9. The universal criterion of creativity acts as a criterion of development. Human creativity thus acts as one of the specific forms of manifestation of the development mechanism.
Development and interaction
Thus, creativity - in the broadest sense - is an interaction leading to development. Studying any particular form of creativity, we also encounter its general laws. However, the general nature of creativity is still clearly insufficiently analyzed, although the need for such an analysis is becoming increasingly acute, especially with modern attempts to coordinate various aspects of the study of human creative activity. Attempts to carry out such coordination, guided only by “common sense”, do not achieve the goal - this is evidenced by practice. It is necessary to develop initial principles for the study of creativity.
In this direction, the scheme of the relationship between interaction and development, presented by us in a number of works (Ponomarev, 1959, 1960, 1967, 1967a), is of particular interest. This scheme was developed, reused, refined and enriched during the implementation of the principles of dialectical materialism in experimental studies of psychology
In this work we do not consider the problem of development itself in its general form. Let us only note that in order to reveal the content of the hypothesis we have put forward, along with the philosophical analysis of development, all areas of knowledge in which the genetic approach is used are of great interest. These are some aspects of the study of the microworld in physics, and the study of the evolution of matter in chemistry, and cosmogony, and geology, and the study of problems of the origin of life, biological evolution, anthropogenesis, the history of the development of society, etc. There are many reasons to assume that the richest material in this regard is contained today in historical materialism.
We will present our material, concretizing the hypothesis put forward, in subsequent sections when analyzing the psychological mechanism of creativity.
18
creative thinking and intellectual development. Let's consider its main elements and principles.
The main elements of this diagram are: system and component, process and product.
System and component. Considering the categories of whole and part, simple and composite, F. Engels emphasized their limitations, directly pointing out that such categories become insufficient in organic nature. “Neither the mechanical combination of bones, blood, cartilage, muscles, tissues, etc., nor the chemical combination of elements constitutes an animal... An organism is neither simple nor composite, no matter how complex it is.” An animal organism cannot have parts - “only a corpse has parts”10.
Apparently, the selection of a part in the sense of the word that is included in this category is associated with the destruction of the whole, that is, with the destruction of that single interacting system of components, for the analysis of which neither the categories of whole and part, nor simple and composite are sufficient. In an interacting system, one can therefore consider not one or another part of it, but one or the other side, one or another component. Moreover, the point, of course, is not in the words, not in the names, but in the meaning that is invested in these concepts. In order not to violate the integrity of the system, it is necessary to consider each side, each component in the relationships by which they are connected with other parties, other components of the system.
From here it becomes clear that it is not enough to study any isolated object. Only an interacting system can be the true subject of scientific analysis. If we do not fulfill this requirement, then, having arbitrarily snatched a component from its corresponding system of interaction and thereby turning it into an isolated “part,” we will then, one way or another, include this part in some other system of relations and thereby impose on this component qualities that are unusual for him in reality. “Interaction,” wrote F. Engels, “excludes everything absolutely primary and absolutely secondary; but at the same time it is a two-way process that, by its nature, can be viewed from two different points of view; to be understood as a whole, it even needs to be examined separately, first from one and then from another point of view, before the total result can be summed up. If we unilaterally adhere to one point of view as absolute in contrast to another, or if we arbitrarily jump from one point of view to another depending on what our reasoning at the moment requires, then
10 Marx K. and Engels F. Soch., t, 20, p. 528, 529,
1%
we remain captive to the one-sidedness of metaphysical thinking; The connection of the whole eludes us, and we become entangled in one contradiction after another.”11
Process and product. Giving the most general description of labor, K. Marx writes: “Labor is, first of all, a process taking place between man and nature, a process in which man, through his own activity, mediates, regulates and controls the exchange of substances between himself and nature. ...In the process of labor, human activity with the help of a means of labor causes a predetermined change in the subject of labor. The process fades into the product. The product of the labor process is use value, the substance of nature adapted to human needs through changes in form. Labor connected with the subject of labor. Labor is embodied in an object, and the object is processed. ...The same use value, being a product of one labor, serves as a means of production for another labor. Therefore, products represent not only the result, but at the same time the condition of the labor process” 12.
Analyzing any interacting system in a functional sense and abstracting from its specific features, we thus identify two more general categories of our scheme - product and process. The first reflects the static, simultaneous, spatial side of the system. The second reveals a different side of her; a process is a dynamic, successive, temporary characteristic of interaction.
This scheme implements the following principles.
The concept of a system and its components is relative. Their identification is always abstract, since any reality is a system only in relation to its constituent components. At the same time, any reality considered as a system is always part of another, more complexly organized system, in relation to which it itself is a component (Fig. ,a).
Thus, in each specific case we can only talk about the system selected for analysis, taking into account that it itself is a component (pole) of a more complexly organized system. The reverse course of consideration is equally applicable - the decomposition of the original system into forming poles, which themselves constitute complexly organized systems (Fig. 1.6).
This is the static structure of interacting systems.
11 Marx K. and Engels F. Soch., vol. 20, p. 483-484.
12 Marx K. n Engels F. Soch., vol. 23, p. 188, 191-192.
20
Organizing systems of interaction (communication) have approximately the same structure, i.e. the dynamic structure of interacting systems is approximately the same. Here we can distinguish intercomponent and intracomponent interaction (Fig. 2).
Intercomponent (external with respect to these poles) connection involves reorganization (change of shape) of the structures of components through special internal (relative to
Rice. 1

data components) connections. These second type of interactions are qualitatively different in form from the first, which gives the right to specially highlight them.
The concepts of external and internal interactions are relative; they are determined by the choice of the initial system. Internal connections become external when we, abstracting from the system in which the component is included, consider it as an independent system. It follows that the definition

Fig.2
The concepts of “external” and “internal” are acceptable only within the framework of the system selected for analysis, without going beyond its boundaries.
The functioning of the interacting system is carried out through transitions of process into product and vice versa - product into process (the detail of such transitions is inexhaustible). What on the process side appears dynamically and can be recorded in time, on the product side is found in the form of a property at rest. Products of interaction21
events, arising as a consequence of a process, turn into the conditions of a new process, thus exerting a reverse influence on the further course of interaction and at the same time becoming, in a number of cases, stages of development 13.
Depending on the properties inherent in the components (formed as products of corresponding processes) and the conditions for their manifestation during a given interaction, a method of interaction is formed (which in turn serves as the basis for classifying a given system as one form or another).
Noting that the method of communication is determined by the properties of the components, it is also necessary to point out the inverse dependence of these properties on the method. Previously, we said that each of the components, being a side of the analyzed system, itself represents some interacting system that has its own internal structure. This latter determines the properties that the component discovers when interacting with an adjacent component. However, given that the internal structure of the component itself is formed in the course of external, intercomponent interaction, it should be considered that the method of communication has the opposite effect on the formation of its defining properties. Cause and effect here dialectically change places.
Let's consider this situation in a little more detail. It is known that the condition for any interaction process is a certain imbalance in the system of components that has developed at a certain moment. This imbalance can be caused not only by influences external to a given system, as well as by influences external to any individual component, but also by those phenomena that occur within the component itself (in the final case, a “split of the one”, for example, in nonliving conditions, interaction and development constitute an inextricable unity: development in all cases is mediated by interaction, since the product of development is always a product of interaction;
interaction itself is closely dependent on development; if development cannot be understood without knowing the laws of interaction, then interaction outside of development remains incomprehensible, since the specific forms of manifestation of the laws of interaction are directly dependent on at what stage of development we trace them, since these stages of development become conditions of interaction.
Emphasizing the real unity of interaction and development, we are together
At the same time, we affirm that both have certain specificity and qualitatively unique laws, the study of which requires mental dissection. Abstracting from development data, it is first necessary to trace the features of interaction; based on these research data

USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

INSTITUTE OF PSYCHOLOGY

Y. A. PONOMAREV

PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVITY

PUBLISHING HOUSE "SCIENCE> MOSCOW 1976

The book examines the subject and methods of the psychology of creativity, the central link in the psychological mechanism of creative activity, the abilities and qualities of a creative personality. It contains extensive experimental material, on the basis of which a number of psychological laws of creative activity and laws of the formation of conditions favorable to it are formulated.

The book is addressed to psychologists, philosophers and a wide range of readers interested in problems of creativity.

n 10508-069 „. ?6 042 (02)-76

© Nauka Publishing House, 1976

INTRODUCTION

RESEARCH OF CREATIVITY IN CONDITIONS OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL REVOLUTION

The psychology of creativity - a field of knowledge that studies the creation of new, original things by a person in various fields of activity, primarily in science, technology, and art - came up in the middle of the 20th century. to a new stage of its development. Particularly dramatic changes have occurred in the psychology of scientific creativity: its authority has increased, its content has become deeper. It has taken a dominant place in creativity research.

The conditions for a new stage in the development of the psychology of scientific creativity arose in the situation of the scientific and technological revolution, which significantly changed the type of social stimulation of activity research in science.

For a long time, society did not have an acute practical need for the psychology of creativity, including scientific creativity. Talented scientists appeared as if by themselves; they spontaneously made discoveries, satisfying the pace of development of society, in particular science itself. The main social incentive for improving the psychology of creativity remained curiosity, which sometimes mistook a little controlled invention, a game of fantasy, for a perfect product of scientific research.

The lightness of the criteria for assessing the quality of research in the psychology of creativity was also imposed by its historical traditions. Most of the pioneers of creativity research were idealistic thinkers. They saw in creativity the most fully expressed freedom of manifestation of the human spirit, not amenable to scientific analysis. The idea of ​​purposefully increasing the efficiency of creating new, original, socially significant values ​​was considered as empty fun. The existence of objective laws of human creativity was actually denied. The main task of creativity researchers was to describe the circumstances surrounding creative activity. Legends were collected that sparked the curiosity of gullible readers. Even the most kind

All these studies have been collected over the centuries under the common banner of “creativity theory.” Since the last decades of the 19th century. they began to be referred to as the “psychology of creativity.” Psychology was then understood as the science of the soul, of ideal spiritual activity.

A rough idea of ​​the nature of the “theory and psychology of creativity” at the beginning of the 20th century. can be made, for example, based on the materials of value judgments relating to this area of ​​​​knowledge and given in the works themselves on the “theory and psychology of creativity”, in other words, based on the impression of observers who consider their science from within itself.

Some authors of that time did not dare to classify the theory of creativity and the psychology embedded in it as a scientific discipline. From their point of view, it is rather a tendentious grouping of fragmentary facts and random empirical generalizations, snatched without any method, without any system or connection from the fields of physiology of the nervous system, neuropathology, history of literature and art. These fragmentary facts and random empirical data are accompanied by a number of risky comparisons and hasty generalizations of data from aesthetics and literature, and at the same time a number of more or less subtle observations, introspections, supported by references to the autobiographical self-confession of poets, artists, and thinkers.

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, after research into artistic and scientific-philosophical creativity, research into natural science creativity appeared, and somewhat later, into technical creativity. They delineated the subject of research more strictly. This had a beneficial effect on the productivity of creativity learning. Some circumstances common to all types of creativity have emerged. Attention began to focus on more significant phenomena.

However, the principles of creativity research have largely changed little. This happened not only because the subject of research was indeed very complex, but mainly because until the middle of our century, the study of creativity was not given significant importance.

In the middle of the 20th century. curiosity, which stimulated the development of knowledge about creativity, lost its monopoly. A clearly expressed need for rational management of creative activity has arisen - the type of social order has changed dramatically.

Emphasizing this sharp change in the type of social order, let us draw attention to the following circumstance: the new need of society was not generated by the internal development of the psychology of creativity - it was not this area of ​​knowledge that indicated to society

possibility and feasibility of creativity management. The shift in social stimulation was caused by the scientific and technological revolution - a qualitative leap in the development of productive forces, which turned science into a direct productive force, making the economy significantly dependent on the achievements of science.

In recent years, our scientific literature has shown conditions conducive to the intensification of research into the psychology of creativity. The complexity of the problems that science has approached to solve, the ever-increasing provision of scientific research with the latest technical means are closely related to changes in the structure of the organization of this research, the emergence of new organizational units - scientific teams, the transformation of scientific work into a mass profession, etc. The age of handicraft in science is gone to the past. Science has become a complexly organized system that requires special research to consciously manage the course of scientific progress.

Research on creativity is of particular importance. Life presents researchers in this area with a complex of practical problems. These tasks are generated by the fact that the pace of development of science cannot be constantly increased only by increasing the number of people involved in it. We must constantly increase the creative potential of scientists. To do this, it is necessary to purposefully form creative scientists, carry out rational selection of personnel, create the most favorable motivation for creative activity, find means that stimulate the successful course of the creative act, rationally use modern possibilities for automating mental work, approach the optimal organization of creative teams, etc.

The old type of knowledge, stimulated by curiosity - mainly the contemplative-explanatory type - could not, of course, satisfy the new need of society, cope with the new social order - to ensure rational management of creativity. There had to be a change in the type of knowledge, a new type had to emerge—effectively transformative. Has such a change occurred?

Let us take a look from this point of view at the modern psychology of scientific creativity in the USA, where research in this area is currently most intensive.

In 1950, one of the leading psychologists in the US-D. Guilford appealed to his colleagues in the association to expand research on the psychology of creativity in every possible way. The call met with a corresponding response. Many publications have appeared under the heading of the psychology of creativity. They covered, it would seem, all the traditional problems of this field of knowledge: questions of criteria for creative activity and its difference from non-creative activity, the nature of creativity, patterns

the creative process, the specific characteristics of a creative personality, the development of creative abilities, the organization and stimulation of creative activity, the formation of creative teams, etc. However, as it became clear, the scientific value of this stream of publications is small. And first of all, because the acceleration of this kind of research by US scientists occurred despite the obvious unpreparedness of the theory.

Modern psychology of scientific creativity in the United States is narrowly utilitarian. At the cost of expensive, unproductive efforts, she tries to obtain direct answers to the practical problems put forward by life. Sometimes US psychologists, relying on “common sense”, vast empirical material and its processing using modern mathematics, manage to offer solutions to certain practical problems. However, such successes are palliative. It is important to note that the vast majority of such tasks are not strictly psychological. Rather, these are “common sense” tasks. Their solutions are of a narrowly applied nature and are confined to purely specific situations. The mechanisms of the phenomena being studied are not revealed, and therefore their invariants are not revealed. Some modifications of specific conditions make previously obtained solutions no longer suitable and require new empirical research.

Excessive enthusiasm for superficial analysis is fraught with obvious danger, especially when it is associated with an appeal to social objects, the external appearance of which is easily accessible to direct observation, while their internal structure is diverse and extremely complex. Superficial work at first often achieves a certain success, successfully using some of the previously accumulated valuable knowledge. This creates a certain authority for the emerging direction. It becomes recognized and popular. Then follows an idle move, which already interferes with the development of full-fledged research, veiling its true problems and real difficulties, creating the appearance of satisfying practical needs.

An analysis of the psychology of scientific creativity in the United States shows that the scientific and technological revolution took creativity research by surprise. There was no accumulated knowledge that could be called fundamental. The ideas contained in these studies were already put forward in general terms before the 40s of our century.

There is no reason to think that the ideas and principles already known by this time correspond to the new social incentive; we do not have sufficiently convincing facts about the rational management of scientific creativity.

Therefore, as the most important characteristic of the modern situation in the field of research into problems of creativity, we must name the contradiction consisting in the inconsistency of what has been achieved

the level of knowledge and the social need for it, i.e., in the discrepancy between the type of social order and the type of knowledge achieved - in the lag between the type of knowledge and the type of order.

Of great importance for finding ways to overcome this contradiction is the analysis of trends in the historical development of the psychology of creativity. A general idea of ​​the genesis of the ideas of modern creativity psychology can be successfully built on the material of domestic science. The author of “The History of Soviet Psychology” A.V. Petrovsky (1967), characterizing Russian psychology at the beginning of the 20th century, emphasizes that it “represented one of the detachments of European psychological science. The research of domestic scientists devoted to individual psychological problems cannot be considered in isolation from the corresponding works of their foreign colleagues, whose ideas they developed or refuted, whose influence they experienced or which they themselves influenced.” Everything said here fully applies to the psychology of creativity. Therefore, consideration of its problems in Russian science reveals to us not only the own positions of domestic authors, but also makes it possible to get an idea of ​​​​the state of the psychology of creativity of that time abroad. In general, the same can be applied to Soviet psychological science. At the same time, after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, deep fundamental changes occurred in the development of psychological thought in the USSR: a gradual rethinking of psychological research began on the basis of dialectical-materialist methodology, which gave an extremely valuable and essential originality to our research and freed many scientists from idealistic wanderings.

The genesis of the ideas of the psychology of creativity, the features of the general approach to research, the dynamics of transformations of this approach and the trend of its strategic direction were traced by the author in the work “Development of problems of scientific creativity in Soviet psychology” (1971), which also included the pre-October period. It examines the works of the pioneers of the emerging study of the psychology of creativity in Russia - followers of the philosophical and linguistic concept of A. A. Potebnya - D. N. Ovsyaniko-Kulikovsky (1902, etc.) and his student B. A. Lezin (compiler and editor of the collections “Questions theory and psychology of creativity", the main tribune of Potebni-stov), ​​works by P. K. Engelmeyer, M. A. Bloch, I. I. Lapshin, S. O. Gruzenberg, V. M. Bekhterev, V. V. Savich, F. Yu. Levinson-Lessing, V. L. Omelyansky, I. N. Dyakov, N. V. Petrovsky and P. A. Rudik, A. P. Nechaev, P. M. Yakobson,

V. P. Polonsky, S. L. Rubinshtein, B. M. Teplov, A. N. Leontyev, I. S. Sumbaeva, B. M. Kedrova, Ya. A. Ponomarev,

S. M. Vasileisky, G. S. Altshuller, V. N. Pushkin,

M. S. Bernshtein, O. K. Tikhomirov, M. G. Yaroshevsky, V. P. Zinchenko and others.

The results of our earlier analysis of the development of problems of scientific creativity in Soviet psychology are used by us in many sections of this book. Here we will only point out the main trend of changes in the general approach to creativity research.

This tendency is expressed in a gradual movement from an undifferentiated, syncretic description of the phenomena of creativity, from attempts to directly embrace these phenomena in all their concrete integrity to the development of an idea of ​​​​the study of creativity as a complex problem - in movement along the line of differentiation of aspects, identifying a number of different the nature of the laws that determine creativity.

Let us also note that today such differentiation is still far from complete.

Our domestic scientists have made a very important contribution to the study of the psychology of creativity. Great and varied interest in this area of ​​knowledge is characteristic of the first days after October. It survived until the mid-30s, but then declined and almost disappeared. Currently, the curve of this interest has risen sharply again.

Despite some pause in the study of the psychology of creativity, we have significant advantages over bourgeois scientists: our psychological research, based on the most progressive Marxist-Leninist methodology in the world, has brought us significantly closer to turning the psychology of creativity into effectively transformative knowledge. In contrast to “psychological and sociological” studies of increasing the efficiency of creative work in science, conducted at the level of “common sense,” we pay main attention to the analysis of the theoretical foundation of the psychology of creativity, identifying and overcoming theoretical difficulties.

It is customary to begin the presentation of any field of knowledge with a description of its subject. But we do not have such an opportunity.

At the level of a formal scheme, in the most general terms, the subject of the psychology of creativity can be considered as a zone of intersection of two circles, one of which symbolizes knowledge about creativity, the other - psychology. However, the area of ​​reality that this scheme should reflect still does not have clearly defined, generally accepted boundaries, which is primarily due to the level of understanding of the nature of creativity, on the one hand, and the nature of the psyche, on the other.

The lag in the level of understanding of the nature of creativity from the requirements of modern tasks in the study of creative activity is clearly revealed even in the most elementary, as it may seem at first glance, provisions, for example, in the question of criteria for creativity, criteria for creative activity. Despite the fact that this issue has acquired enormous practical significance in recent years, the lack of sufficiently strict criteria for determining the difference between creative and non-creative human activity is now generally recognized. At the same time, it is obvious that without such criteria it is impossible to identify with sufficient certainty the subject of research itself. It is also obvious that the concepts of the criteria of creativity and its nature, essence are closely interconnected - these are two sides of the same problem.

The insufficient development of the question of the nature of the psyche follows from the fact that in our psychology there is still no generally accepted approach to understanding this nature. The psychic is usually understood as something concrete. The struggle between two mutually exclusive positions concerning its most general, fundamental characteristics continues. One of these positions considers the psychic to be ideal (immaterial), the other asserts its materiality.

All of the above shows with sufficient conviction that the current state of knowledge in the psychology of creativity categorically requires that further research be preceded by a special consideration of the main components of this science. The question of the subject of the psychology of creativity turns into a problem requiring a methodological solution. The first part of the book is devoted to this problem. Creativity in a broad sense is considered here as a mechanism of development, as an interaction leading to development; human creativity is one of the specific forms of manifestation of this mechanism. The approach to the study of this particular form is based on the principle of transforming the stages of development of a phenomenon into structural levels of its organization and functional stages of further developmental interactions. From the position of this principle, a strategy for a comprehensive - analytical-synthetic - study of creative activity is being developed. The criteria for identifying analytical complexes are the structural levels of organization of a given specific form of creativity. Analysis of the place of psychology in the system of an integrated approach leads to the idea of ​​the mental as one of the structural levels of the organization of life. With this understanding, the subject of the psychology of creativity becomes the mental structural level of the organization of creative activity.

In the second part of the book, based on the solution obtained, we turn to the internal problems of the psychological

creativity - to the psychological mechanism of creative activity, to its experimental analysis.

Here the central link of the psychological mechanism of creativity is identified and analyzed. It implements the general principle of development already mentioned earlier and discussed in detail in the first part of the book. It is discovered that this link itself is represented by a hierarchy of structural levels of its organization. In many different experiments, one and the same fact persistently emerges: the need for development arises at the highest level, the means to satisfy it are formed at the lower levels; By being included in the functioning of a higher level, they transform the way of this functioning. Psychologically, satisfying the need for novelty and development is always based on a special form of intuition. In scientific and technical creativity, the effect of an intuitive solution is also verbalized and sometimes formalized. Following the general characteristics of the central link, materials from an experimental study of psychological models of its main components - intuition, verbalization and formalization - are presented. Then other elements of the psychological mechanism of creativity are identified and analyzed, related to the general and specific abilities of people, the qualities of a creative personality, and a wide range of conditions for the effectiveness of creative work. All these elements are identified and considered as conditions conducive to the effective operation of the central link of the psychological mechanism of creativity.

The entire system of concepts of the psychology of creativity presented in the book and its internal logic are built on this same basis.

Part I

METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Chapter 1

THE NATURE OF CREATIVITY

Creativity as a mechanism of development

When characterizing the state of the problem of the nature of creativity, one should first of all emphasize the understanding of creativity in the broad and narrow sense, long established in the literature.

It can be found in the article “Creativity”, included in the Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary, written by F. Batyushkov (the broad sense is called “direct” in it, the narrow sense - “generally accepted”): “Creativity - in the literal sense - is the creation of something new. In this meaning, this word could be applied to all processes of organic and inorganic life, for life is a series of continuous changes and everything that is renewed and everything that arises in nature is a product of creative forces. But the concept of creativity presupposes a personal beginning and the corresponding word is used primarily in relation to human activity. In this generally accepted sense, creativity is a conventional term for designating a mental act expressed in the embodiment, reproduction or combination of data from our consciousness, in a (relatively) new form, in the field of abstract thought, artistic and practical activity (T. scientific, T. poetic, musical , T. in the fine arts, T. administrator, commander, etc.” (Batyushkov, 1901).

In the early period of research, a certain amount of attention was paid to the broad meaning of creativity. However, in a later period, the view of the nature of creativity changed dramatically. The understanding of creativity, both in our country and in foreign literature, has been reduced exclusively to its narrow meaning."

In relation to this narrow meaning, modern studies of the criteria of creative activity are being conducted (especially numerous abroad (Bernstein, 1966).

1 For more information about this, see: Ponomarev Ya. A. Development of problems of scientific creativity in Soviet psychology. - “Problems of scientific creativity in modern psychology:”. M., 1971.

Most modern foreign scientists involved in issues of scientific creativity unanimously believe that a lot of work has been done in the area of ​​creativity criteria, but the desired results have not yet been obtained. For example, the authors of many studies conducted in recent decades in the United States tend to share Gieselin's point of view, according to which the definition of the difference between creative and non-creative activities remains completely subjective.

The complexity of the structure of creativity prompts researchers to think about the need for multiple criteria. However, an empirical search for such criteria leads to insignificant results. Put forward criteria such as “popularity”, “productivity” (Smith, Taylor, Ghiselin), “the degree of reconstruction of the understanding of the universe” (Ghiselin), “the breadth of influence of the scientist’s activities on various fields of scientific knowledge” (Lachlen), “the degree of novelty of ideas, approaches, solutions" (Sprecher, Stein), "the social value of scientific products" (Brogden) and many others remain unconvincing 2. S. M. Bernstein (1966) rightly sees this as a consequence of a completely unsatisfactory level of development of theoretical issues in the study of creativity.

It must be especially emphasized that the question of creativity criteria is far from idle. Sometimes the wrong approach to its consideration becomes a serious obstacle to the study of creativity, shifting its subject. For example, the founders of heuristic programming, Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1965), taking advantage of the uncertainty of the criteria that distinguish a creative thought process from a non-creative one, put forward the position that the theory of creative thinking is a theory of solving cognitive problems with modern electronic computing devices. They emphasize that the validity of their claims to a theory of creative thinking depends on how broadly or narrowly the term “creative” is interpreted. “If we are to view all complex problem-solving activity as creative, then, as we will show, successful programs for mechanisms that imitate a human problem solver already exist, and a number of their characteristics are known. If we reserve the term “creative” for activities like discovering a specialty,

3 It should be noted that all those particular criteria that relate to the characteristics of creativity in the narrow sense (as one of the forms of human activity) and which are now varied from different perspectives by most modern researchers, were already outlined in the works of domestic researchers of the early period (novelty, originality , departure from the pattern, breaking traditions, surprise, expediency, value, etc.). This indicates stagnation of thought in this area (for more details, see: Ponomarev#. A. Development of problems of scientific creativity" in Soviet psychology).

tional theory of relativity or the creation of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony, then there are currently no examples of creative mechanisms."

Of course, such a position raises sharp objections, for example, in the spirit of the statement of L. N. Landa (1967), who showed that modern heuristic programs are only “incomplete algorithms” and emphasized that heuristic programming does not characterize creative processes. Creativity lies not in that activity, each link of which is completely regulated in advance by given rules, but in that, the preliminary regulation of which contains a certain degree of uncertainty, in activity that brings new information, presupposing self-organization.

Other objections can be raised. For example, if we agree with the approach of Newell, Shaw and Simon, we will find ourselves in a very peculiar position: our studies of creativity will not be directed towards a pre-designated object, but this object itself will be what the work done will lead to. In some situations such assumptions are probably possible. But in this case, the settings of heuristic programming are rejected and the characteristics of creativity that appear quite sharply in many empirical studies, although still poorly disclosed, are ignored. After all, one can rightfully make another decision: the class of problems whose solutions are accessible to machine modeling is not included in the class of creative ones; the latter can only include those whose solutions are fundamentally not amenable to modern machine modeling. Moreover, the impossibility of simulating solutions to such problems using modern computers can be one of the fairly clear practical criteria for true creativity.

Newell, Shaw and Simon, of course, clearly understand and foresee the possibility of such a version. But they think it can be ignored. Such confidence is supported by a calculation of the precariousness of the existing criteria that distinguish a creative thought process from a non-creative one; it is reinforced by the conviction that it is impossible to identify satisfactory objective criteria for creativity. All this is a direct consequence of the lack of proper support for generalized, regulating methodological principles that determine the preliminary orientation in particular research, and, moreover, the lack of

3 Newell, Shaw and Simon define creative activity as a type of activity for solving special problems that are characterized by novelty, originality, stability and difficulty in formulating the problem (“Psychology of Thinking”. Collection of translations from German and English. Edited by A. M. Matyushkin . M., 1965).

riya into the possibility of productive development of such regulative principles.

Apparently, for the same reason, numerous attempts by modern foreign scientists to determine the essence of creativity are not very successful.

These attempts are clearly presented, for example, in the book by A. Matejko (1970), the author of which widely relies on the opinions of a large number of foreign researchers (especially American) and provides the most typical definitions. All of them are purely empirical and have little content. Creativity is traditionally associated with novelty, and the concept of novelty is not disclosed. It is characterized as the antipode of patterned, stereotypical activity, etc.

“The essence of the creative process,” writes Matejko, “lies in the reorganization of existing experience and the formation of new combinations on its basis.” Let's take this definition as an example.

It is easy to see that the reorganization of experience in this case is understood not as a process, but as a product. The essence of the creative process is that it leads to such a reorganization. However, the main disadvantage of this definition is not that it replaces the process with a product or loses sight of some details, but that by its very nature it is purely empirical - non-fundamental. No matter how much we try to give it a tolerable form with all kinds of improvements at the level of knowledge on which it is built, we still won’t succeed.

In this sense, a much more thoughtful definition coming from S. L. Rubinstein 4 and most widespread in our domestic literature is also unacceptable: “Creativity is a human activity that creates new material and spiritual values ​​that have social significance” b.

Given a certain selection of creative events, such a criterion is clearly unsuitable. After all, they talk about how animals solve problems, about children’s creativity; creativity undoubtedly manifests itself when a person of any level of development independently solves all kinds of “puzzles”. But all these acts do not have direct social significance. The history of science and technology records many facts when the brilliant achievements of people's creative thought did not acquire social significance for a long time. One cannot think that during the period

* According to Rubinstein, creativity is an activity “creating something new, original, which, moreover, is included not only in the history of the development of the creator himself, but also in the history of the development of science, art, etc.> (Rubinshtein S.L. Fundamentals of general psychology. M., 1940, p. 482).

* TSB, ed. 2nd, t, 42, p. 54.

hushing up the activities of their creators is not in general creative, but became so only from the moment of recognition.

At the same time, the criterion of social significance in a number of cases is indeed decisive in creative acts. It cannot simply be discarded. For example, in unrecognized inventions and discoveries, on the one hand, the act of creativity is evident, but on the other, it is not. Consequently, in addition to psychological reasons in social relationships, there are some additional reasons that determine the possibility of a creative act in this area.

It is necessary, apparently, to believe that there are different spheres of creativity. Creativity in one area is sometimes just an opportunity for creativity in another area.

The same idea, but in connection with the approval of an integrated approach to the study of creativity, in particular scientific discovery, was expressed by B. M. Kedrov (1969), according to whose views the theory of scientific discovery faces a complex of problems. Their solutions should be sought by methods and means of the appropriate complex of sciences. Firstly, a historical and socio-economic analysis of the practice, the “social order” of discovery, is necessary. Secondly, a historical and logical analysis is needed that identifies the specific needs of science that stimulate this or that discovery. All this corresponds to the phylogenetic section of the development of science. An ontogenetic perspective is also necessary, revealing the scope of scientific activity and scientific creativity of the author of the discovery. Here, according to B. M. Kedrov, psychological analysis comes to the fore. The identification and development of the described set of problems creates the necessary ground for a fruitful study of the internal mechanism of the relationship between the phylo- and ontogenesis of science.

Therefore, it is necessary to question the legitimacy of the direct search for a universal criterion of creativity in the field of science: first a set of criteria must be developed that correspond to different spheres of creativity (social, mental, etc.). The success of developing each of these special criteria is directly dependent on the degree of understanding of the question of the essence of creativity, taken in the most general form - in the form of a generalization of all its manifestations at the levels of different spheres. Reducing creativity to one of the forms of human mental activity prevents the depth of such a generalization. It snatches creativity from the general process of development of the world, makes the origins and prerequisites of human creativity incomprehensible, closes the possibility of analyzing the genesis of the act of creativity, and thereby prevents the identification of its main characteristics, the discovery of various forms, and the identification of general and specific mechanisms.

At the same time, creativity is an extremely diverse concept. Even its everyday meaning, its everyday use

is not limited to the specific meaning in which it reflects individual events from a person’s life. In poetic speech, Ryroda is often called a tireless creator. Is this an echo of anthropomorphism, just a metaphor, a poetic analogy? Or do what occurs in nature and what is created by man really have something essentially in common?

Apparently, the understanding of creativity in a broad sense, characteristic of the early period of research, is not without content. If we leave aside the Machian formulations of some ideas characteristic of the early works of the Potebnists, we will see that their understanding of the nature of creativity is associated with the involvement of broad ideas about the laws governing the Universe, ideas about the general evolution of nature, etc. Such ideas are clearly expressed by B . A. Lezin (1907). P. K. Engelmeyer (1910) sees in human creativity one of the phases in the development of life. This phase continues the creativity of nature: both one and the other constitute one series, not interrupted anywhere and never: “Creativity is life, and life is creativity.” If Engelmeyer limits the sphere of creativity to living nature, then his follower M. A. Bloch extends this sphere to inanimate nature. He places creativity at the basis of the evolution of the world, which, in his opinion, begins with chemical elements and ends in the soul of a genius.

Are we making a mistake by refusing to understand creativity in a broad sense? The pre-scientific, fantastic worldview of people sharply separated the causes of what occurs in nature and what is artificially created by people. The scientific worldview, conditioned by a materialistic understanding of the world, indicated the true reasons for both. These reasons are generally identical. In both cases, the results of creativity are consequences of the interaction of material realities. Do we therefore have the right to reduce creativity only to human activity? The expression “creativity of nature” is not without meaning. The creativity of nature and the creativity of man are just different spheres of creativity, undoubtedly having common genetic roots.

Apparently, therefore, it is more appropriate to base the initial definition of creativity on its broadest understanding.

In this case, it should be recognized that creativity is characteristic of both inanimate and living nature - before the emergence of man, both to man and to society. Creativity is a necessary condition for the development of matter, the formation of its new forms, along with the emergence of which the forms of creativity themselves change. Human creativity is only one of these forms.

Thus, even a brief consideration of the current state of the problem of nature and the criteria of creative activity persistently pushes to the idea that in order to

To advance this problem on foot, a decisive breakthrough from the particular to the universal and regulation of the process of further identifying the particular from the position of the universal are necessary.

Here we will pay attention to only one of the possible approaches to such a breakthrough - to the hypothesis formulated by us in a number of works (Ponomarev, 1969, 1970), according to which creativity in the broadest sense acts as a mechanism of development, as an interaction leading to development.

The idea of ​​the creative function of interaction was clearly expressed by F. Engels in “Dialectics of Nature”: "Interaction- this is the first thing that appears to us when we consider moving matter as a whole from the point of view of modern natural science” 6.

In interaction, Engels saw the basis of the universal connection and interdependence of phenomena, the final cause of movement and development: “All nature accessible to us forms a certain system, a certain collective connection of bodies, and here we understand by the word body all material realities, starting from a star and ending with an atom and even a particle of ether, since the reality of the latter is recognized. The fact that these bodies are in mutual connection already implies that they influence each other, and this mutual influence on each other is precisely movement” 7 .

Further, F. Engels writes: “We observe a number of forms of movement: mechanical movement, heat, light, electricity, magnetism, chemical combination and decomposition, transitions of states of aggregation, organic life, all of which - if we exclude Bye organic life - pass into each other... are here a cause, there an effect, and the total sum of movement, with all changes in form, remains the same (Spinoz: there is substancecausa sui(reason for herself. Ed.)-perfectly expresses interaction). Mechanical motion turns into heat, electricity, magnetism, light, etc., and vice versa. Ed.). Thus, natural science confirms what Hegel said... - that interaction is the true causa finalis (final cause. Ed.) of things. We cannot go further than the knowledge of this interaction precisely because there is nothing more to know behind us. Once we have cognized the forms of motion of matter (for which, however, we still lack a lot due to the short-lived existence of natural science), then we have cognized matter itself, and this exhausts knowledge” 8 .

This hypothesis implies a refusal to reduce the concept of “creativity” to its narrow meaning - to human activity,

8 Marks K. And Engels F. Soch., vol. 20, p. 546.

7 Ibid., p. 392.

8 Ibid., p. 546.

More precisely - to one of the forms of such activity, and a return to the broad meaning of this concept.

A broad understanding of creativity, considering it in general terms as a mechanism of development, as an interaction leading to development, is very promising. Such consideration includes the question of the nature of creativity in an already fairly explored area of ​​knowledge and thereby facilitates subsequent orientation in its particular forms. The analysis of creativity is included in the analysis of developmental phenomena. Creativity as a mechanism of development acts as an attribute of matter, its integral property. The dialectic of creativity is included in the dialectic of development, which has been fairly well studied by Marxist philosophy 9 . The universal criterion of creativity acts as a criterion of development. Human creativity thus acts as one of the specific forms of manifestation of the development mechanism.

Development and interaction

Thus, creativity - in the broadest sense - is an interaction leading to development. Studying any particular form of creativity, we also encounter its general laws. However, the general nature of creativity is still clearly insufficiently analyzed, although the need for such an analysis is becoming increasingly acute, especially with modern attempts to coordinate various aspects of the study of human creative activity. Attempts to carry out such coordination, guided only by “common sense”, do not achieve the goal - this is evidenced by practice. It is necessary to develop initial principles for the study of creativity.

In this direction, the scheme of the relationship between interaction and development, presented by us in a number of works (Ponomarev, 1959, 1960, 1967, 1967a), is of particular interest. This scheme was developed, reused, refined and enriched during the implementation of the principles of dialectical materialism in experimental studies of psychology

In this work we do not consider the problem of development itself in its general form. Let us only note that in order to reveal the content of the hypothesis we have put forward, along with the philosophical analysis of development, all areas of knowledge in which the genetic approach is used are of great interest. These are some aspects of the study of the microworld in physics, and the study of the evolution of matter in chemistry, and cosmogony, and geology, and the study of problems of the origin of life, biological evolution, anthropogenesis, the history of the development of society, etc. There are many reasons to assume that the richest material in this regard is contained today in historical materialism.

We will present our material, concretizing the hypothesis put forward, in subsequent sections when analyzing the psychological mechanism of creativity.

creative thinking and intellectual development. Let's consider its main elements and principles.

The main elements of this diagram are: system and component, process and product.

System and component. Considering the categories of whole and part, simple and composite, F. Engels emphasized their limitations, directly pointing out that such categories become insufficient in organic nature. “Neither the mechanical combination of bones, blood, cartilage, muscles, tissues, etc., nor the chemical combination of elements constitutes an animal... An organism is not neither simple, neither composite, no matter how complex it may be.” An animal organism cannot have parts - “only a corpse has parts” 10.

Apparently, the selection of a part in the sense of the word that is included in this category is associated with the destruction of the whole, that is, with the destruction of that single interacting system of components, for the analysis of which neither the categories of whole and part, nor simple and composite are sufficient. In an interacting system, one can therefore consider not one or another part of it, but one or the other side, one or another component. Moreover, the point, of course, is not in the words, not in the names, but in the meaning that is invested in these concepts. In order not to violate the integrity of the system, it is necessary to consider each side, each component in the relationships by which they are connected with other parties, other components of the system.

From here it becomes clear that it is not enough to study any isolated object. Only an interacting system can be the true subject of scientific analysis. If we do not fulfill this requirement, then, having arbitrarily snatched a component from its corresponding system of interaction and thereby turning it into an isolated “part,” we will then, one way or another, include this part in some other system of relations and thereby impose on this component qualities that are unusual for him in reality. “Interaction,” wrote F. Engels, “excludes everything absolutely primary and absolutely secondary; but at the same time it is a two-way process that, by its nature, can be viewed from two different points of view; to be understood as a whole, it even needs to be examined separately, first from one and then from another point of view, before the total result can be summed up. If we unilaterally adhere to one point of view as absolute in contrast to another, or if we arbitrarily jump from one point of view to another depending on what our reasoning at the moment requires, then

10 Marks K. And Engels F. Soch., t, 20, p. 528, 529,

we remain captive to the one-sidedness of metaphysical thinking; The connection of the whole eludes us, and we become entangled in one contradiction after another” 11.

Process and product. Giving the most general description of labor, K. Marx writes: “Labor is, first of all, a process taking place between man and nature, a process in which man, through his own activity, mediates, regulates and controls the exchange of substances between himself and nature. ...In the process of labor, human activity with the help of a means of labor causes a predetermined change in the subject of labor. The process fades into the product. The product of the labor process is use value, the substance of nature adapted to human needs through changes in form. Labor connected with the subject of labor. Labor is embodied in an object, and the object is processed. ...The same use value, being a product of one labor, serves as a means of production for another labor. Therefore, products represent not only the result, but at the same time the condition of the labor process” 12.

Analyzing any interacting system in a functional sense and abstracting from its specific features, we thus identify two more general categories of our scheme - product and process. The first reflects the static, simultaneous, spatial side of the system. The second reveals a different side of her; a process is a dynamic, successive, temporary characteristic of interaction.

This scheme implements the following principles.

The concept of a system and its components is relative. Their identification is always abstract, since any reality is a system only in relation to its constituent components. At the same time, any reality considered as a system is always part of another, more complexly organized system, in relation to which it itself is a component (Fig. \,A).

Thus, in each specific case we can only talk about the system selected for analysis, taking into account that it itself is a component (pole) of a more complexly organized system. The reverse course of consideration is equally applicable - the decomposition of the original system into forming poles, which themselves constitute complexly organized systems (Fig. 1,6).

This is the static structure of interacting systems.

11 Marks K. And Engels F. Soch., vol. 20, p. 483-484.

12 Marks K. n Engels F. Soch., vol. 23, p. 188, 191-192.

Organizing systems of interaction (communication) have approximately the same structure, i.e. the dynamic structure of interacting systems is approximately the same. Here we can distinguish intercomponent and intracomponent interaction (Fig. 2).

Intercomponent (external with respect to these poles) connection involves reorganization (change of shape) of the structures of components through special internal (relative to

Rice. 1

data components) connections. These second type of interactions are qualitatively different in form from the first, which gives the right to specially highlight them.

The concepts of external and internal interactions are relative; they are determined by the choice of the initial system. Internal connections become external when we, abstracting from the system in which the component is included, consider it as an independent system. It follows that the definition

Fig.2

The concepts of “external” and “internal” are acceptable only within the framework of the system selected for analysis, without going beyond its boundaries.

The functioning of the interacting system is carried out through transitions of process into product and vice versa - product into process (the detail of such transitions is inexhaustible). What on the process side appears dynamically and can be recorded in time, on the product side is found in the form of a property at rest. Products of interaction

21

events, arising as a consequence of a process, turn into the conditions of a new process, thus exerting a reverse influence on the further course of interaction and at the same time becoming, in a number of cases, stages of development 13 .

Depending on the properties inherent in the components (formed as products of corresponding processes) and the conditions for their manifestation during a given interaction, a method of interaction is formed (which in turn serves as the basis for classifying a given system as one form or another).

Noting that the method of communication is determined by the properties of the components, it is also necessary to point out the inverse dependence of these properties on the method. Previously, we said that each of the components, being a side of the analyzed system, itself represents some interacting system that has its own internal structure. This latter determines the properties that the component discovers when interacting with an adjacent component. However, given that the internal structure of the component itself is formed in the course of external, intercomponent interaction, it should be considered that the method of communication has the opposite effect on the formation of its defining properties. Cause and effect here dialectically change places.

Let's consider this situation in a little more detail. It is known that the condition for any interaction process is a certain imbalance in the system of components that has developed at a certain moment. This imbalance can be caused not only by influences external to a given system, as well as by influences external to any individual component, but also by those phenomena that occur within the component itself (in the final case, a “split of the one”, for example, in inanimate

In reality, interaction and development constitute an inextricable unity: development in all cases is mediated by interaction, since the product of development is always a product of interaction; however

interaction itself is closely dependent on development; if development cannot be understood without knowing the laws of interaction, then interaction outside of development remains incomprehensible, since the specific forms of manifestation of the laws of interaction are directly dependent on at what stage of development we trace them, since these stages of development become conditions of interaction.

Emphasizing the real unity of interaction and development, we are together

At the same time, we affirm that both have certain specificity and qualitatively unique laws, the study of which requires mental dissection. Abstracting from development data, it is first necessary to trace the features of interaction; Based on these data from the study of interaction, we acquire immeasurably greater opportunities in studying the problem of development. Interaction processes in their nature and structure differ sharply from development processes. Development is extended over time - in principle, ad infinitum; interaction is compressed in time - in principle to the limit (it represents natural units of time).

kind - radioactive decay, in living things - metabolism, etc.). Any change in the internal state of one of the components inevitably leads to a change in the relationships between the components, thereby being the reason for their interaction.

Reasoning in the most general way, we can abstract from the differences in external and internal stimulation and, to simplify our reasoning, begin to consider this process from the process of external, intercomponent interaction. In this case, the impulse received from one pole turns out to be the cause that removes the internal system of the second from a balanced state. To return the system to equilibrium, the second pole must react in a certain way to this influence. Balancing the internal system of a component is manifested in its response in the form of a reverse action. The nature of the reverse action (response) is determined, on the one hand, by the product of the internal process, on the other hand, it is also determined by the characteristics of the state of the other component, since equilibrium of the system can be achieved only if the relations between the components are balanced. Otherwise, the adjacent component, with its repeated influence, will constantly lead the component in question to restructuring (as is usually the case). The nature of the reverse action (response) is thus determined by the internal structure inherent in the component, which manifests itself externally depending on the type of influence that disrupted its internal structure.

If a component somehow comes to a balanced state, its response must ultimately be timed to the characteristics of the adjacent component, and its new structure must thereby reflect the properties of this component. This feature of interaction already contains a tendency towards inevitable development, since the equilibrium of the system never remains static, but is preserved only in constant dynamics.

Thus, the properties of components are a product of not only internal, but also external interaction. The external process, turning into a product, is, as it were, imprinted in the internal structure of the poles of interaction, which then manifests itself in new interactions to the extent that is caused by the nature of the external influence. In the course of development, the internal structure of the poles, as it were, absorbs the external structure of their connection, thereby preparing a qualitatively new stage of development, beginning with the transformation of the method of interaction.

From what was said earlier it follows that any individual act of interaction consists of at least three moments: external (if taken as the initial one), internal and again external. Usually the second moment (internal) by itself

represents a complex phenomenon. It is certainly fragmented into a long chain of mediating interactions, built on the same principle. These mediating connections are determined by other structural units, are characterized in ways different from the first and, therefore, are implemented in a different form. The same can be said in relation to external moments, since the concepts of external and internal are relative. Each final moment of external interaction is external in relation to the internal moment mediating it and internal - in relation to that broader sphere of interaction into which it is inevitably included and in relation to which it itself is one of the mediating links.

It follows from what has been said that interaction does not occur directly within one level - one form: it is mediated by transitions to other forms, so that only the totality of a number of qualitatively heterogeneous transformations finally gives an effect within one form. The functioning of interacting systems is associated with the reorganization of the structures of its components through differentiation and reintegration of their elements; in this case, the limits of preserving the structure of the system (the type of connection of its components) determine the segment occupied by a given form in the hierarchy of interactions. A change in the structure of a system is associated with a change in the type of connection of its components, with a transition to a new type of connection - with development.

Development is a way of existence of a system of interacting systems, associated with the restructuring of a specific system, with the formation of qualitatively new temporal and spatial structures.

Every higher (superstructural) form is formed in the depths of the lower (basal) form. The process of formation of a new form is associated with an inevitable constant deformation of the method of communication that arises as a result of the constant modification of the components of the system. As already stated, these changes may not only arise from external influences; their inevitability lies already in the very principle of interaction, in its inconsistency. The method of interaction, as is known, is not determined only by the function that is characteristic of any of the components; it is determined by the functions of the two components. The crossing of functions leads to its modification, as a result of which in the depths of the lower form a certain set of elements ("by-products" - for a given form of interaction - products) is gradually prepared, which under certain conditions is transformed into a qualitatively different structure, more appropriate to the new method of communication, becoming thereby becoming its adequate condition, revealing prospects for the deployment of a new stage of development. Apparently, at this moment a qualitative leap occurs - the transition from quantity to quality.

Having arisen on the basis of a lower form, the higher form does not break its connection with it. Throughout its existence, the higher retains its derivativeness from the lower. However, as it develops, the higher has a reverse influence on the lower, so that in a certain sense a number of products of the lower form of interaction can and must be considered as a consequence of interaction in the higher form. This means that the primacy of the lower form in relation to the higher is not absolute. The higher form, growing out of the lower, subjugates its predecessor, exerts an organizing influence on it and transforms it according to its own characteristics. Interact-

The action in the lower form, considered in the system of the higher form, turns out to be an internal interaction; it plays the role of an intermediate, mediating link.

The connection between the basal and superstructural structures is carried out through interaction products, each of which is like a node connecting two adjacent links.

The process of interaction in any form results in two types of products, thus weaving an unbreakable chain of qualitatively heterogeneous connections; the formation of the product turns out to be dependent not only on this process, but also on the process occurring in the adjacent form of interaction (Fig. 3).

Events in higher forms of interaction are unthinkable if

the chain turns out to be “broken” in any of the underlying links - the work of the overlying link depends on the entire chain. But, as has already been said, the highest link, after its emergence, gradually takes a dominant place in the chain, organizing and directing all its work. Therefore, disturbances in the normal functioning of the chain in its highest link do not remain without consequences for the underlying links. The dependence of the higher and the lower turns out to be mutually reversible.

To differentiate qualitatively unique forms of interaction and establish their subordination, it is important to identify the necessary criteria. Two such criteria can be proposed: qualitative and quantitative.

If we consider any higher form of interaction in relation to the lower form, we will find that in all cases the higher is composed of elements of the lower, organized into a strictly defined system - structure. In fact, all the qualitative diversity of nature lies in the differences in the organization of the components of the system, in its structure.

Thus, the organization of the structure of the interacting system is a qualitative criterion for characterizing the form of interaction. Forms of interaction can also be distinguished by quantitative criteria. One of the expressions of the chain nature of the phenomena unfolding in each individual act of interaction is the presence of a “hidden period” separating the first and third moments of interaction.

Physics has long been dominated by the erroneous theory of “action at a distance,” which allows for the idea that bodies are capable of influencing each other at a distance, through empty space. According to this theory, these actions can be transmitted from body to body instantly. Further development of physics led to the abandonment of old views. It has been proven that any impact of one body on another is transmitted from point to point with a finite speed. A steel ball, falling on a tiled floor, seemingly instantly breaks away from it again and heads upward. However, the fall and rise are separated by a certain micro-interval of time, which is necessary for the restructuring of the internal structure of both the ball and the place of the floor with which it comes into contact. The jumping of the ball upward is the effect of such a restructuring of the structure of both components of the interacting system. It is also known that even the most sensitive galvanometer has a certain moment of inertia, i.e., in order for the device to react to the electric current sent to it, a certain period of time is required - a “latent period” of action. Similar phenomena are associated with all forms of inertia.

In physical forms of interaction, the “hidden period” is insignificant; it is expressed in micro-intervals of time. As the forms become more complex, combining intermediate stages, he

increases. So, for example, in physiological Phenomena the latent period of action is relatively easy to measure (it acquired the special name “latent period”), and in mental phenomena it is called a simple mental reaction, measured in time on the order of 100-200 milliseconds.

Under certain measurement conditions, the duration of the latent period of interaction can serve as a quantitative characteristic of its form 14 . Many of the relationships of interaction and development indicated in our diagram can be covered by the general principle of transforming the stages of development of a phenomenon into structural levels of its organization and functional stages of further developmental interactions.

We use this principle (let’s call it briefly EUS - stages - levels - steps) as the main “working principle”, implementing it throughout the entire study, thereby revealing and developing its content.

About the systems approach

In modern science, there is a tendency to combine all those studies in which the central concept is the system into the general class of “systems approach”, “systems research”.

Although the systems approach itself does not yet have clearly formulated general principles and its own identity, we all

14 The quantitative criterion is very promising. The latent period increases as the forms of interaction become more complex, and this is quite understandable, since each higher-level form is mediated by lower ones. Between these and others, naturally, there is a very general quantitative relationship, which can be expressed by a mathematical equation that includes a certain constant that characterizes the quantitative side of the transition from a lower form of interaction to a higher one. Operating with such an equation, it is possible to construct a model of the subordination of qualitatively unique forms of interaction, without knowing all of them in advance (such a model would resemble the periodic table at the time when it was just derived and had a lot of empty spaces, which were later filled with actually found elements) . Construction of a theoretical scale of interaction forms will facilitate the task of filling it with actually found forms of interaction. By experimentally determining the values ​​of the latent period of those and other forms of interaction (while observing the conditions that ensure unambiguous measurements and take into account the peculiarity of the transformation of the stages of development of a phenomenon into the structural levels of its organization), it will be possible to arrange these forms on a given scale according to their subordination.

The concept of “latent period” is interesting in another respect. It can be assumed that the latent period expresses a natural unit of time characteristic of one or another form of interaction. Until now, units of time remained very conventional - they were measured against a special case - the period of revolution of the Earth around the main. Considering time as the procedural side of interaction, we will be able to approach an understanding of the structure of time, to some extent similar to the structure that is found in the study of space, mother.

We consider it necessary to indicate the relationship in which our scheme can be placed in relation to it.

To this end, among the many areas of systemic research, we will highlight two branches: concrete-synthetic, where the formal aspect is predominant, and abstract-analytical, where the substantive element predominates.

Note that these different branches are not mutually exclusive. Rather, these are complementary areas of research, between which strict interdependence must ultimately be established.

The concrete-synthetic branch is aimed at studying systems of specific things and phenomena; here, in a single formal plan, multiple connections are considered, each of which in terms of content can be carried out according to laws of different quality. It is known that some cybernetics, especially foreign ones, define a system as any complex of even the most heterogeneous elements, but interconnected into a single whole. Naturally, it is possible to comprehend the essence of the system only when the connections between its elements are revealed. But since in many cases the structures of devices that control systems cannot be precisely defined and are considered as a “black box,” it is impossible to describe connections taking into account the qualitative specifics of the laws underlying these connections. Cybernetics overcomes this difficulty by subordinating the study of a system to the clear task of controlling it, it studies the functions at the “outputs” of the system depending on its “inputs.” In this case, the apparatus of probability theory is widely used.

The concrete-synthetic branch in systems analysis consists of constructing abstract mathematical models of concrete things and phenomena, but not the laws to which the interactions of things are subject. As noted by St. Beer (1963), systems are a game of billiards, a car, economics, a language, a hearing aid, a quadratic equation, etc. The number of components of such systems can, in principle, be infinite.

To organize rational control of a specific system, it is necessary to find the necessary feedback, which for probabilistic systems is the only truly effective control mechanism. This does not require knowledge of qualitatively unique laws of interaction of things. Indeed, in nature, such feedbacks arise without knowledge of the laws corresponding to them, for example, the accumulation of carbon dioxide in the animal’s body increases the intensity of its respiration, etc. To be able to control complex systems that “cannot be described in detail... we must provide a control mechanism capable You-

raise functions that are not clear to us, although we ourselves build this mechanism” (St. Veer, 1963). In this sense, cybernetics imitates nature, in which “adjustments” are very widespread.

The possibility of this kind of imitation of nature is not, of course, a complete repetition of its blind actions. Cybernetics has powerful methods for such simulation, in particular mathematical methods that do not operate in terms of cause and effect, but use a functional description. This method to a certain extent overcomes the difficulties associated with the complexity of qualitative analysis of phenomena, but at the same time it is very reminiscent of a schoolchild’s attempts to solve arithmetic problems by “selection”, where many elegant nuances can also be found. Of course, it would be wrong, on the basis of such an analogy, to deny the successes achieved by cybernetics, and thereby its methods. However, on the other hand, it is equally wrong to consider cybernetic methods of studying systems as the only possible ones, excluding all other methods. The cybernetic method is only one of the possible ones.

Cybernetics studies control and communication systems. In its main focus, the cybernetic approach to the study of systems is a synthetic approach. Considering that the synthetic approach to things acquires full force only when it is based on the corresponding analysis of phenomena, the special importance of the analytical side of the study of systems should be emphasized.

The abstract-analytical branch is aimed at studying abstractly isolated interactions of individual properties of things and phenomena that are subject to qualitatively homogeneous laws l 5 in terms of content; here the researcher is not interested in specific things in themselves, but in those properties that arise as products of qualitatively unique interactions.

The identification of systems is based on an analysis of the hierarchy of forms of movement (interaction) of matter, methods of interaction, and structural levels of developing material realities.

Already because we do not possess absolute truth and cannot take into account the entire infinite number of influences that directly or indirectly experience any specific phenomena, it follows that any specific phenomenon, any specific system can appear under certain conditions in our consciousness as probabilistic.

15 The degree of differentiation of approaches in this case depends on the level of development of cognition; therefore, the second approach almost to a certain extent always includes elements of the first. At the same time, at the limit of their development, both approaches must merge.

At the same time, elements of determinism can be found in any of these systems. To do this, you need to abstract from the countless variety of properties inherent in specific systems that are included as constituent elements in these systems of interaction, and consider any one of these properties generated by the specific interaction of a given thing with some other thing. With this approach, it is not a system of things and not things as systems that are considered, but systems of interactions, each of which is determined by laws specific to it.

With the abstract-analytical approach, the system of interest to us is isolated by abstraction from the entire infinite series of real interactions. This selection involves determining the specificity and place of a given system in the hierarchy of forms of interaction and establishing the relationship of this form to the forms adjacent to it - higher and lower.

From the point of view of our task - the study of the psychology of creativity - the abstract-analytical approach is of much greater interest, and the methodological aspect of our scheme gravitates towards it.

At the same time, the abstract-analytical approach certainly presupposes the existence of ways to return to the concrete - the creation of an analytical-synthetic picture of the phenomena being studied. In this case, it should result in an analytical-synthetic approach. This is one of the most important requirements of Marxist-Leninist dialectics.

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The concept of creativity by Ya.A. Ponomareva

Prepared by: 3rd year student of group GG-109 Nevidnichy F.S.

Accepted by: Zobkov A.V.

Rostov-on-Don

Plan.

1. Introduction.

2. Psychological mechanisms of creativity.

3. Stages of the internal action plan.

4. The concept of a cognitive-psychological barrier.

5. Barriers in the system-dynamic model of activity.

6.Conclusion.

Introduction.

Since the late 50s, Ya.A. Ponomarev began to develop the concept of the psychological mechanism of creativity and its central link, which became the methodological basis of this work. Concept by Ya.A. Ponomarev’s theory is confirmed by experimental studies and is convenient for developing new directions in the study of the psychology of creativity on its basis. Ya.A. Ponomarev approaches the study of creativity from the perspective of an abstract-analytical strategy. Creation is defined by him in a broad sense as a developmental mechanism or interaction leading to development. The main components of the psychological model of creative activity from these positions are system And component, process And product. In this case, the basic principles implemented in this logical apparatus are as follows. The concept of a system selected for analysis is relative: any component of the system can be considered as a system of a lower structural level, and vice versa, the system itself is a component of a system of a higher level. Interaction is mediated by transitions to other forms. The interaction process is associated with the products of previous interactions; similarly, any interaction product is a consequence of both processes specific to a given system and processes characteristic of systems adjacent to a given one (upstream and downstream). Development is a way of existence of a system of interacting systems associated with the superstructure of qualitatively new temporal (procedural aspect) and spatial (product) structures.

Psychological mechanisms of creativity.

The mental system, says Ya.A. Ponomarev is constructed as a result of the interaction of components, which are the subject and the object. Any mental act can be considered from the point of view of the process as a temporary parameter and from the point of view of the result as a spatial characteristic in the relationship between subject and object. Subject in a psychological sense - “a living being capable of signal interaction with others.” Object they are “objects, phenomena, expressed in those properties with which a living being interacts as a subject.” The essence of mental interaction is the principle of signal communication. Considering the scheme of the cycle of specific interactions between a person and an object, Ponomarev identifies a complex of various types of changes in acts of interaction: these are changes (development) of a person, changes in the object and the process of interaction itself. With this interaction, changes occur in the content and form of the object, which are determined, on the one hand, by the nature of the object, and on the other, by the nature of the actions performed with the object. Human changes are also dual - here there are also transformations of content and form. Analyzing all types of changes, considering them independently of one another, Ponomarev comes to the identification of 4 processes belonging to 2 groups - the group of the subject and the group of the person:

a) the process of changing the content of the subject;

b) the process of changing the shape of an object;

c) the process of changing the content of a person;

d) the process of changing the shape of a person.

The fourth one is of greatest interest for psychological analysis - the formal process occurring in a person.

But development cannot be considered in isolation from interaction, since the concept of development itself is meaningful only when applied to the consideration of the entire system as a whole (subject - interaction - object). The task of psychological research is by no means limited to the study of processes occurring in an object and a person, taken in isolation from each other. In the process of interaction, a mutual transition between process and product occurs. The development of both subject and object is determined by their interaction.

Thinking determined by Ya.A. Ponomarev as a process of interaction between a cognizing subject and a cognizable object, the leading form of orientation of the subject in reality. It differs from cognition - the task that arises in the process of such interaction is creative due to the fact that the subject does not have ready-made means to solve it. In addition, a mental task is distinguished by the absence of a strict connection with any specific need, while a cognitive task is associated with a specific need - the acquisition of knowledge. Intelligence is considered as “an apparatus for specific orientation in time and space.” Action aimed at solving a problem or its individual link. The set of mental actions, each of which solves different parts of the overall problem, is mental activity.

When constructing a psychological model of creativity, special attention must be paid to two moments - the moment of achieving an intuitive solution, on the one hand, and the moment of its formalization, on the other. Ya.A. Ponomarev identified the conditions for the possibility of an intuitive solution, establishing the following important principles: 1) an intuitive solution is possible only if the key to it is already contained in unconscious experience; 2) such experience is ineffective if it is contained in the actions preceding the attempt to solve the problem;

3) unconscious experience is more effective, being formed against the background of the target search dominant, which arises as a result of preliminary attempts to solve the problem; 4) the effectiveness of unconscious experience increases when incorrect decision methods exhaust themselves, but the search dominant does not go out yet; 5) the influence of the unconscious part of the action is more effective, the less meaningful its conscious part is; 6) the complication of the situation of acquiring experience prevents the possibility of its subsequent use; 7) a similar complication of the task also has a negative effect; 8) the success of a decision also depends on the degree of automation of actions, during which the necessary unconscious experience is formed - the less automated the methods of action, the greater the likelihood of a solution; 9) finally, the probability of finding a solution is greater, the more general the final solution to a creative problem belongs to.

Considering this issue in relation to the barrier problem, we can say that the moment of intuitively finding a solution (according to Ponomarev) corresponds to the moment of overcoming the barrier. Therefore, it is important to analyze the conditions under which the likelihood of such overcoming is maximum.

A person’s actions when solving a particular problem can take place in externally or internally. External plan corresponds to the level of elementary interaction between the subject and the object. Unmediated by the inner plane, it is the only genetically original plane. The emerging system of primary models of reality reflects the interaction of the subject with the object and acts as perception itself. The main feature of the external plan is following the immediate objective situation; actions are not justified.

Internal action plan(VPD) is a subjective model of human phylo- and ontogenesis, in a narrower sense - a subjective model of specifically human, social in nature, interaction of a person with the environment - with other people, products of labor, phenomena of social life, objects and phenomena of everything accessible to a given person nature in general. As a result of this interaction, differentiation of primary models occurs and a system of secondary (designated) models is formed. The basal component of any designated model is the primary model. VPD is inextricably linked with the external, it arises on the basis of the external, functions and is realized through the external plane. As it develops, the internal plan rebuilds the external one.

Stages of the internal action plan.

Experimental studies by Ya.A. Ponomarev allowed him to identify five stages of development of VPD:

First stage . The initial level from which the development of HPA is considered. At this stage, the child is not yet able to act “in his mind”, to subordinate his actions to a verbally posed task. The solution comes only on the external plane. There is a VPD, but the structure of activity in it is not differentiated. The process (method) and the result of one’s own action are not dismembered (fused). Activity is directly determined by practical needs; goals are aimed at transforming the subject situation. Evaluation of actions is completely subjective, emotions act as feedback.

Second phase . Problem solving also occurs only externally by manipulating things. Internally, ready-made solutions are reproduced. There is an awareness of the products of objective actions in the process of their verbalization. The structure of actions in the internal plane begins to differentiate - the products of actions are translated into it, but the processes (methods) in the internal plane are not yet represented. At this stage, the child is able to verbally reproduce the ready-made solution given to him externally. The child's intellect, having become verbal, remains practical. Manipulation of objects and things occurs without a meaningful plan. There is no correlation between the particular and general goals; the general goal is “pushed out.” The assessment is emotional, although external verbal instructions begin to influence both the choice of goal and the control of actions, their regulation and evaluation.

Third stage . The solution to the problem occurs by manipulating the representations of objects.

The product and the process of action are dissected, the methods of action are revealed, and their “verification” becomes possible. The actions themselves on the internal plane are similar to the actions on the external plane. At this stage, a new type of activity is being formed, the motivation for which is the need to solve theoretical problems. The ability to self-command develops, the subordination of a particular goal to a general one occurs. The possibilities of stimulation increase significantly - cognitive needs and goal-setting appear. Control of actions is still carried out mainly by things, and emotions dominate in the assessment of the results of actions.

Fourth stage . Just like at the previous stage, the solution to the problem is found by manipulating the representations of objects, but when the problem is repeated, the path once found already forms the basis of a plan of repeated actions that strictly correspond to the requirements of the problem. The problem is solved according to a plan based on the previous solution to the practical problem. A solution plan is constructed by transforming a practical problem into a theoretical one. Factors that stimulate activity include, along with practical and theoretical tasks, but only those that are directly related to the solution of a practical problem and that represent a direct reflection on these tasks. The ability for self-command is clearly expressed. Control and evaluation of actions become largely logical.

Fifth stage . The trends that emerged in the previous stages are reaching their full development. The ability to self-command is formed. Actions are systematic, subject to a strict plan, and correlated with the task. Monitoring activities and assessing their results become purely logical.

The uniqueness of this stage is that the construction of a plan is preceded by an analysis of the task’s own structure. Immediate attachment to a practical solution is overcome.

In a situation of a non-creative task, the intellect implements ready-made logical programs. In a situation of a creative task, the failure of the chosen program (“collapse of logical programs”) returns the solver to the previous structural levels of the organization of intelligence. The further course of the solution is characterized by a gradual rise from level to level, and accordingly there is a change in the types of behavior characteristic of each stage of development. Thus, the structural levels of the organization of intelligence now act as stages in solving a creative problem. Complexity of the problem Ya.A. Ponomarev associates with "the magnitude of the amplitude of changes in dominant levels, that is, with the number of structural levels of organization of the psychological mechanism of creativity that are involved in the decision process as the dominant levels of organization of this process".

Ponomarev also developed a model demonstrating the principle of interpenetration of the spheres of logical and intuitive, the outer edges of which are represented as abstract limits. From below, such a limit is intuitive thinking (actions are built primarily on the external plane), from above - logical thinking (actions according to a strict internal plan).

The central link of the psychological mechanism of creative activity includes the following phases: 1) logical analysis of the problem, application of existing knowledge, the highest level dominates. This phase ends with the collapse of the planned programs and the emergence of a search dominant; 2) intuitive solution - satisfying the need for novelty, the lower level dominates; 3) verbalization of an intuitive decision, acquisition of new knowledge, the middle level dominates; 4) formalization of new knowledge - the formation of a logical solution, the highest level dominates.

Thus, Y.A. Ponomarev, carefully analyzing the creative process, identifies levels of development of internal actions from the lowest (purely intuitive) to the highest (logical). In the concept of Ya.A. Ponomarev's cognitive-psychological barrier is not considered. The first phase ends with the “collapse of logical programs,” which, in our opinion, corresponds to the moment the barrier appears. Known (or obvious) methods of intellectual action turn out to be ineffective, while at the same time the barrier prevents the discovery of another way. The moment of overcoming the barrier that we have especially highlighted, in our opinion, corresponds to the second phase of the central link of the psychological mechanism of creative activity - the phase of the intuitive decision. Since the lower level (intuitive) dominates at this phase, it is difficult for the subject to consciously record and describe this moment.

The concept of cognitive-psychological barrier.

Academician B.M. Kedrov, developing a model of the cognitive-psychological “mechanism” of scientific discovery, introduced the concept of a “barrier” (cognitive-psychological barrier - PPB). This barrier at the first stage of its emergence and functioning plays a positive role: it helps to more fully exhaust the possibilities of the achieved level of knowledge and prevents a too hasty transition to a higher level, since this transition, being unprepared, cannot provide real knowledge of the subject being studied (whether this concerns the discovery of a new law of nature or the creation of a new theory). The scientist’s thought lingers at a given level and the “barrier” prevents it from making a “leap” to a higher level. B.M. Kedrov likened the action of this “mechanism” to blinkers that are put on a horse’s eyes so that it does not notice what is happening on the sides, but sees only one road lying in front of it; it can also be compared to moving on rails, along a strictly defined, pre-laid road rut. It should be noted that this comparison is very successful - the movement of a person’s thoughts also occurs, as a rule, along fairly familiar, well-established paths; we automatically carry out the algorithms embedded in us (upbringing, education, previous experience). Habitual thoughts and actions in familiar situations allow a person not to waste effort on solving already solved problems, on “reinventing the wheel.” This restraining barrier, arising automatically (without consciousness control), does not cease to operate even after its positive role has been exhausted (for example, in a situation requiring a radically new approach, a revision of previous views). When the achieved level of cognition has already exhausted itself, the mechanism of action of the PPB prevents the transition of a person’s thought to a higher level. In order for the transition to the next stage to happen, it is necessary to overcome this barrier; the scientist’s thought must “jump over” the barrier, get off the rut. Analyzing the train of thought of a scientist making a scientific discovery or developing a new theory, Kedrov comes to the conclusion that the essence of the process of scientific creativity lies in the ascent from recording individual facts (E) to identifying their features and breaking them down into certain groups (O) and then from the features O to universality (B) (the discovery of a new law of nature). Briefly, this process (the logical aspect of scientific discovery) is expressed by the following formula:

The action of the PPB can be indicated in this model by a vertical line depicting an obstacle that arises on the path of transition from specificity to universality:

E => O => | IN

A scientific discovery, when mature, consists of overcoming a "barrier", which can be illustrated by the following diagram:

The cognitive-psychological barrier arises not only at the highest levels of human intelligence, such as scientific creativity and the creation of new theories. A similar phenomenon is also found at relatively low levels of mental activity. In this case, Kedrov notes, processes occurring at lower elementary levels can serve models for more complex processes, such as the creative activity of scientists and making scientific discoveries. Agreeing with this statement, we would also like to note that the study of the action of the PPB and its overcoming using the example of problems of different complexity and “barrier strength”, which was one of the tasks of our experimental research, is of particular interest, since it allows us to clearly highlight the main points of the solution process creative task. At the same time, we can classify these tasks in a certain way and trace how barriers of one type or another are overcome. The tasks that were used in our study are in one way or another based on the action of a “barrier”. Important, in our opinion, is the question of how a person’s non-intellectual qualities influence his ability to overcome barriers of various levels. This issue remains insufficiently studied, which is why we pay special attention to it in our work.

What helps a person overcome this “barrier”, get off the usual rut of thought? B.M. Kedrov uses the concept of a “springboard” here, calling it a hint, a leading question (in the case of elementary “barrier” problems in experiments) or some random analogy (for example, the chemist Kekule recalled that he solved the problem of elucidating the ring structure of benzene by observing from the roof of a London omnibus, how monkeys sitting in a cage grappled with each other). The history of scientific discoveries knows many such examples when an association that arose by chance prompts a scientist to solve a complex scientific problem. A random association plays the role of a “hint”, a “springboard”, helping the scientist’s thought to make a leap to a new level, to overcome the “barrier”.

Analyzing in more detail the mechanism of occurrence of the desired association, B.M. Kedrov uses the concept of intuition, understanding it as an illogical form of human mental activity, or extraconscious (subconscious) activity of the human intellect. A person acting intuitively cannot explain himself why he acts this way. Intuition does its work as if directly, without intermediate steps that could be logically analyzed and algorithmized.

Initially, a person’s thought works only in one direction; the barrier does not allow him, while remaining within this direction, to come to a decision. At a certain moment, suddenly and completely accidentally, another direction of thought arises, caused by some extraneous events. This new direction intersects with the one in which the scientist’s thought has hitherto worked. At the moment of this overlap, intuition is triggered: it suggests that the key to the solution can be found precisely in this randomly emerging direction. The second chain of events plays the role of a “springboard” for the first, indicating the path to overcome the “barrier” that stands in the way of a solution.

B.M. Kedrov especially emphasizes the following points regarding the work of intuition in scientific or inventive creativity.

1. The previous long and painstaking work of the scientist, the preparatory work of thought, is necessary for the random association to work precisely in the direction of solving this problem.

2. Intuition, how form of direct inference due to its peculiarity, does not allow explain their work, since the necessary links in the logical chain are missing.

3. The result of the work of intuition is the finding of a certain solution, but at the same time the work of intuition partially or completely escapes the attention or memory of the person himself, especially in the case when the external impetus for the emergence of the association was insignificant, not bright. Only the process of “insight” and its result are preserved in a person’s consciousness. In a long chain of events associated with the search, creative activity of a person, the work of intuition represents only one short moment; outside of this chain, intuition seems completely inexplicable and incomprehensible. Therefore, when studying the work of human creative thought, even using the example of elementary tasks, we must consider this process, not forgetting the interconnection and interdependence of each of its elements.

B.M. Kedrov, having introduced the concept of a cognitive-psychological barrier, did not make the subject of special consideration the issue of varying degrees of complexity of barriers, the specifics of overcoming a barrier in elementary and complex creative tasks. In my opinion, these issues deserve special attention and research.

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