An improved version of the Project 68-K cruisers. In total, it was planned to build 25 units, but 21 were laid down, 14 entered service. 7 unfinished ships of Project 68-bis-ZIF (“Shcherbakov”, “Admiral Kornilov”, “Kronstadt”, “Tallinn”, “Varyag”, “Kozma Minin” " and "Dmitry Donskoy"), instead of 37-mm guns, they were supposed to carry 6 more powerful 57-mm four-barrel automatic installations ZIF-68, have a total displacement of 16,780 tons, and a power of 110,000 hp. and a crew of 1224 people. "Admiral Nakhimov" was piloted for the first time in our fleet to receive the anti-ship missile system. "Dzerzhinsky" in 1957 -1958. rebuilt according to project 70-E, becoming the first cruiser equipped with an air defense system. "Zhdanov" and "Admiral Senyavin" in 1966 - 1972. converted into control cruisers (projects 68-U1 and 68-U2). On the "October Revolution", "Admiral Ushakov" and "Mikhail Kutuzov" anti-aircraft weapons were strengthened due to the additional installation of 8x2 30-mm AK-230 guns (Project 68-A). Currently, the only ship of the series is preserved - "Mikhail Kutuzov" (mothballed in Sevastopol).
Cruiser "SVERDLOV", 70s.
Cruiser "DZERZHINSKY", 60s.
Cruiser "Zhdanov", 1988
SVERDLOV (serial number 408). 3.1 2.1 947 was included in the lists of Navy ships and 1 5.1 0.1 949 was laid down at plant No. 1 89, launched on July 5, 1950, entered service on May 15, 1952 and August 31, 1952, raising the Navy flag, became part of the 4th Navy. 11 - 18.6.1 953 and 1 2 - 1 7.1 0.1 955 visited Portsmouth (Great Britain), 20 - 25.7.1956 visited Rotterdam (Holland), 5 - 9.1 0.1973 and 27.6 - 1.7 .1 975 - to Gdynia (Poland), 1 6 - 22.4.1974 - to Algeria, 21 - 26.6.1974 - to Cherbourg (France), 5 - 9.1 0.1 976 - to Rostock (GDR ) and 21 - 26.6.1 976 - in Bordeaux (France). From December 24, 1955 he was a member of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. In the period from December 24, 1960 to July 14, 1961 and from February 12, 1966 to April 29, 1966, it underwent a major overhaul in Leningrad, after which it was withdrawn from service, mothballed and put into storage, but 1 1.2.1972 was re-mothballed and put back into service, 7.2.1 977 was again put into overhaul, 1 4.2.1 978 was again mothballed and put in Liepaja for long-term storage, and on 30.5.1989 it was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with the transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, on 10/31/1989 it was disbanded and in 1990 sold to a private company in India for cutting into metal.
DZERZHINSKY (serial number 374). 3.1 2.1 947 was included in the lists of Navy ships and was laid down at plant No. 444 on December 21, 1948, launched on August 31, 1950, entered service on August 18, 1952 and on August 30, 1952, raising the Naval flag , became part of the Black Sea Fleet. In the period from October 15, 1957 to December 24, 1958, it was modernized and rebuilt at Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol according to project 70-E and on August 3, 1961 it was reclassified into a training KRL. 20 - 26.8.1964 paid a visit to Constanta (Romania), 10 - 1 4.7.1 967 - to Port Said (Egypt), 9 - 1 2.8.1 969 - to Varna (Bulgaria), 26 - 30.4.1971 - to Le Havre (France), 14-18.1 2.1971 - to Latakia (Syria), 30.6 - 4.7.1 977 - to Tunisia, 20 - 25.10.1978 - to Piraeus (Greece) and 16 - 20.1 1.1978 - to Istanbul (Turkey). 5 - 30.6.1 967 and 5 - 24.1 0.1 973, being in the war zone, carried out a combat mission to assist the armed forces of Egypt. 19.2.1980 was withdrawn from combat service, mothballed and put into storage in Sevastopol, and 1 2; 1 0.1 988 was disarmed, expelled from the Navy in connection with transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale and disbanded on 9.2.1988 .
ORDZHONIKIDZE (serial number 600). 3.1 2.1 947 was included in the lists of Navy ships and 1 9.1 0.1 949 was laid down at plant No. 1 94, launched 1 September 7, 1950, entered service 1 8.8.1 952 and 31.8.1 952, raising the Naval flag, he became part of the 4th Navy. 10 - 14.7.1954 visited Helsinki (Finland), 18 - 27.4.1 956 - to Portsmouth (Great Britain), 1 - 8.8.1 956 - to Copenhagen (Denmark) and 7 - 11.8.1958 again in Helsinki. From January 24, 201955 it was part of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and from February 1, 1961 it was part of the Black Sea Fleet. On 5/4/1962 he left Sevastopol for transfer to the Indonesian Navy and on 5/8/1962 he arrived in Surabaya, and on 24/1/1963 he was expelled from the USSR Navy and disbanded on 29/1/1963. Subsequently, under the name “Irian”, it was part of the Indonesian Navy, and in 1972 it was disarmed and sold by the Indonesian command for scrapping.
ZHDANOV, from February 21, 1989 - KRU-101 (serial number 419). 1.1 2.1 948 was included in the lists of Navy ships and on 11.2.1950 was laid down at plant No. 189, launched on 27.12.1950, entered service on 31.1 2.1 952 and 25.1.1 953, raising the Naval flag , became part of the 8th Navy. From December 24, 1955, it was part of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, and from February 31, 1970, it was part of the Red Black Sea Fleet. 12-1 8.9.1 957 and 1 2 - 1 7.5.1 975 paid visits to Split (Yugoslavia), 21.9 - 1.10.1 957 - to Latania (Syria), 3 - 7.7.1975. - to Toulon (France), 11 - 1 7.9.1 976 - to Messina (Italy), 1 0 - 1 4.1 0.1 983 - to Piraeus (Greece) and 10 - 14.4.1 984 - to Tripoli (Libya). 27.3.1 960 was withdrawn from service, mothballed and put into storage in Kronstadt, but 21.1 2.1 965 was re-mothballed and put back into service, modernized in 1971, rebuilt in Sevastopol at Sevmorzavod according to project 68- U1 and 27.1 On 2.1971, reclassified into KR Management. In the period from 7.2.1 977 to 3.8.1977 and from 12.9.1986 to 13.6.1988, it underwent a major overhaul at Sevmorzavod, after which it was put into reserve and laid up in Sevastopol, and On April 19, 1990, it was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with its transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale; on February 11, 1991, it was disbanded and in February 1992 it was sold to a private company in India for cutting into metal.
ALEXANDER NEVSKY (serial number 625). On December 1, 1948, she was included in the list of ships of the Navy and on May 30, 1950 she was laid down at plant No. 194, launched on June 7, 1951, entered service on December 31, 1952 and February 15, 1953, raising the Naval flag , became part of the Northern Fleet. 25.1 2.1 964 was withdrawn from service, mothballed and laid up in the Kola Bay near Murmansk, but on 12/15/1970 it was re-mothballed and put back into service, and on 5/30/1989 it was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with the transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale and disbanded on January 31, 1989.
ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV (serial number 375). On December 1, 1948, she was included in the list of Navy ships and on June 27, 1950, she was laid down at plant No. 444, launched on June 29, 1951, entered service on June 27, 1953 and 8.2.1, 953, raising the Military naval flag, became part of the Black Sea Fleet. 31.5 - 4.6.1 954 paid a visit to Durres (Albania). Since 1955, it was used for experimental purposes to test anti-ship missiles, and on July 28, 1960 it was disarmed, expelled from the Navy in connection with its transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, and in 1961 - 1962. at the Glavvtorchermet base in Sevastopol, it was cut into metal.
ADMIRAL USHAKOV (serial number 626). 9.1 1.1 950 was included in the lists of Navy ships and on 6.2.1951 was laid down at plant No. 194, launched on 29.6.1952, entered service on 8.9.1953 and 19.9.1953, raising the Naval flag, became part of the 8th Navy. From 24.1 2.1 955 it was part of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, on 3.11.1 956 it was transferred to the Northern Fleet, and on 5.1 0.1 963 it was part of the Black Sea Fleet. 1 6 - 21.4.1 954 paid a visit to Stockholm (Sweden), 6 - 1 2.3.1 973 - to Lataniya (Syria), 1 5 - 10.19.1973 - to Taranto, 19 - 22.10.1973 - to Messina (Italy) and 7 - 10.8.1981 - to Varna (Bulgaria). 1 8.2.1 964 was withdrawn from service, mothballed and put into storage in Sevastopol, but on 2/15/1971 it was reactivated and put back into service. In the period from June 27, 1971 to 1 6.1 2.1 971, it was modernized and rebuilt at Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol according to project 68-A. 28.2.1 983 was put into reserve for the second time and mothballed in Sevastopol, and 1 6.9.1 987 was disarmed, expelled from the Navy in connection with transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, and in 1992 sold to a private company in India for metal cutting.
ADMIRAL LAZAREV (serial number 626). 9.11.1 950 was included in the lists of Navy ships and 6.2.1952 was laid down at plant No. 194, launched 29.6.1 952, entered service 30.1 2.1953 and 1 8.2.1954, raising the Navy flag, became part of the 8th Navy. From 24.1 2.1955 it was part of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, 27.2.1 956 was transferred to the Northern Fleet, and 22.1 0.1 956 after moving in the summer - autumn of 1956 along the Northern Sea Route from Severomorsk to the Far East - to the Pacific Fleet. 26.3.1 963 was withdrawn from service, mothballed and laid up in Sovetskaya Gavan, but on 3/18/1972 it was reactivated and put back into service. In the period from September 18, 1980 to February 3, 1986, a major overhaul took place at Dalzavod in Vladivostok, and 1 October 2, 1986 was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, 11.2 .1 988 disbanded and in 1991 sold to a private company in India for cutting into metal.
ALEXANDER SUVOROV (serial number 436). 26.2.1951 was laid down at plant No. 1 89 and 31.8.1 951 was included in the lists of Navy ships, launched on 15.5.1952, entered service on 31.12.1953 and 18.2.1954, raising the Navy flag, became part of the 8th Navy. 12-17.10.1955 paid a visit to Portsmouth (Great Britain) and 26-31.5.1 981 - to Aden (South Yemen). From 24.1 2.1 955 it was part of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, on 27.2.1956 it was transferred to the Northern Fleet, and 22.1 0.1 956 after moving in the summer - autumn of 1956 along the Northern Sea Route from Severomorsk to the Far East - to the Pacific Fleet. On 12/1/1986 it was withdrawn from service, mothballed and put into storage, and on 12/15/1989 it was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, 1 9/4/1 990 was disbanded and in November 1991 sold to a private company in India for cutting into metal.
ADMIRAL SENYAVIN (serial number 437). On August 31, 1951, she was included in the list of Navy ships and on October 31, 1951, she was laid down at plant No. 189, launched on December 22, 1952, entered service on November 30, 1954, and on January 1, 1954, raising the Naval flag, became part of the 4th Navy. 24.2.1 955 was transferred to the Northern Fleet, and on September 7, 1955, after crossing the Northern Sea Route from Severomorsk to the Far East - to the Pacific Fleet. 17 - 21.11.1959 paid a visit to Surabaya (Indonesia), 14 - 1 9.1.1 973 - to Bombay (India), 1 5 - 20.3.1 973 - to Mogadishu (Somalia), 20 - 24.1 2.1 973 - in Port Louis (Mauritius) and 5 - 10.11.1 979 - in Haiphong (Vietnam). In the period from 31.1 2.1 966 to 24.7.1 972, it was modernized and rebuilt at Dalzavod in Vladivostok according to project 68-U2 and 1 3.3.1 973 was reclassified into the KR Directorate, and on 30.5.1989 it was disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with the transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, on December 15, 1989 it was disbanded and in 1992 sold to a private company in India for cutting into metal.
MOLOTOVSK, from August 3, 1957 - OCTOBER REVOLUTION (serial number 301). 7/15/1952 was laid down at plant No. 402 and 9/25/1953 was added to the list of Navy ships, launched 5/25/1954, entered service 11/30/1954 and 1/8/1/1954, raising the Naval flag , became part of the Northern Fleet. 3 - 7.8.1 956 and 30.8 - 3.9.1958 paid visits to Oslo (Norway), 8 - 12.8.1956 and 8 - 1 2.9.1958 - to Gothenburg (Sweden). 8 - 13.5.1 970 - to Cherbourg (France), 17 - 22.8.1971 - to Copenhagen (Denmark), 20 - 24.7.1978 and 27 - 30.6.1980 - to Gdynia (Poland) , 8 - 1 0.10.1978, 4 - 9.1 0.1 979 and 9 - 14.8.1982 - to Rostock (GDR). 1 6.1 2.1 960 was transferred to the KBF. 27.3.1 961 was withdrawn from service, mothballed and put into storage in Kronstadt, but 29.4.1 966 was reactivated and put back into service. In the period from 1 6.11.1 968 to 25.1 2.1 969, it was modernized and rebuilt at Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol according to project 68-A. 1 7 - 23.7.1 970 and 25.9 - 1.10.1 972, being in the war zone, carried out a combat mission to provide assistance to the armed forces of Syria, and 17.5 - 25.6, 5-9.7.1971 and 8 - 12.9.1972 - Egyptian armed forces. 1 6.9.1987 disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, 11.2.1 988 disbanded and in 1988 - 1990 cut into metal at the Glavvtorchermet base in Leningrad.
MIKHAIL KUTUZOV (serial number 385). On November 9, 1950, she was included in the list of Navy ships and on February 23, 1951, she was laid down at plant No. 444, launched on 29.1 1.1 951, entered service on 30.1 2.1 954 and 31.1.1 955, raising the Naval flag , became part of the Black Sea Fleet. 31.5 - 4.6.1956 and 30.8 - 3.9.1964 paid visits to Split (Yugoslavia), 5 - 10.6.1956 and 30.8 - 3.9.1957 - to Durres (Albania), and 2 - 13.8. 1964 - to Varna (Bulgaria). 1.6 - 31.6.1967 and 1.8 - 31.12.1968, being in the war zone, carried out a combat mission to assist the armed forces of Egypt, and 1.3 - 31.7.1 970 - the armed forces of Syria. In the period from 1.1 2.1 986 to 1989, it was modernized and rebuilt at Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol according to project 68-A, after which it was put into reserve, mothballed and laid up in Sevastopol.
DMITRY POZHARSKY (serial number 445). 31.8.1951 was included in the list of Navy ships and 31.2.1 952 was laid down at plant No. 189, launched on 25.6.1953, entered service on 31.12.1954 and 31.1.1955, raising the Naval flag , became part of the 4th Navy. 24.2.1 955 was transferred to the Northern Fleet, and on September 7, 1955, after crossing the Northern Sea Route from Severomorsk to the Far East - to the Pacific Fleet. 21 - 26.6.1956 paid a visit to Shanghai (China), 28 - 31.3.1 968 - to Madras and 3 - 6.4.1 968 - to Bombay (India), 1 7 - 24.4.1968. - in Mogadishu (Somalia), 11 - 1 9.5.1 968 - in Umm Qasr (Iraq), 25.5 - 2.6.1968 - in Karachi (Pakistan), 5 - 9.6.1 968 - in Bender -Abbas (Iran), in June 1968 - in Aden (South Yemen) and 6 - 11.7.1 968 - in Colombo (Sri Lanka). In the period from 25.4.1 969 to 23.1 0.1 970 and from 1.2.1 980 to 1.1.1 985, it underwent a major overhaul at Dalzavod in Vladivostok, was withdrawn from service on 30.1.1979, mothballed and put into storage in Vladivostok, and on March 5, 1987, disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with transfer to OFI for dismantling and sale, 1 9/6/1987 disbanded and in 1990 sold to a private company in India for metal cutting.
MURMANSK (serial number 302). 28.1.1 953 was laid down at plant No. 402 and on 9/25/1953 was included in the lists of Navy ships, launched on 4/24/1955, entered into service on 9/22/1955 and 10/6/1955, raising the Navy flag, became part of the Northern Fleet. 17 - 21.1 0.1 964 paid a visit to Trondheim (Norway) and 1 0 - 14.5.1978 to Bordeaux (France). 1.1 1.1970 - July 31, 1971, while in the war zone, carried out a combat mission to provide assistance to the armed forces of Egypt. In the period from 28.1.1 972 to 30.11.1 973, it underwent a major overhaul at Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol, was withdrawn from service on 12/1/1989, mothballed and put into storage in the Kola Bay, aZ.7.1 992. disarmed and expelled from the Navy in connection with transfer to the OFI for dismantling and sale, disbanded on December 31, 1992 and in 1994 sold to a private Indian company for cutting into metal.
SHCHERBAKOV (serial number 627). In June 1951 it was laid down at plant No. 194 and on 31.8.1 951 it was included in the lists of Navy ships, launched on 1 7.3.1 954, but on 2.9.1 959 it was removed from construction and expelled from the Navy due to with transfer to Glavvtorchermet for dismantling and cutting into metal.
ADMIRAL KORNILOV (serial number 395). 31.8.1 951 was included in the lists of ships of the Navy and on November 16, 1951 was laid down at plant No. 444, launched 1 7.3.1 954, but on September 2, 1959 it was removed from construction and expelled from the Navy due to the transfer "Glavvtorchermet" for dismantling and cutting into metal.
KRONSTADT (serial number 453). In April 1953, it was laid down at plant No. 189 and on September 25, 1953 it was included in the lists of Navy ships, launched on September 11, 1954, but on September 2, 1959 it was removed from construction and expelled from the Navy in connection with the transfer "Glavvtorchermet" for dismantling and cutting into metal.
TALLINN (serial number 454). On September 28, 1953, it was laid down at plant No. 1 89 and on August 25, 1953, it was added to the list of Navy ships, launched on May 28, 1955, but on September 2, 1959 it was removed from construction and expelled from the Navy in connection with the transfer to Glavvtorchermet » for dismantling and cutting into metal.
VARYAG (serial number 460). 5.2.1954 laid down at plant No. 189 and at the same time included in the lists of Navy ships, launched 5.6.1 956, but 2.9.1 959 removed from construction and expelled from the Navy in connection with the transfer to Glavvtorchermet for dismantling and metal cutting.
KOZMA MININ, from 25.9.1 953 - ARKHANGELSK (serial number 628/303). On August 31, 1951, she was added to the list of Navy ships and in June 1952 was laid down at plant No. 1 94, launched in the fall of 1953 and towed on pontoons along the White Sea-Baltic Canal to plant No. 402 for completion, but 2.9.1 959 g. was withdrawn from construction and expelled from the Navy in connection with the transfer to Glavvtorchermet for dismantling and cutting into metal.
DMITRY DONSKOY, from September 25, 1953 - VLADIVOSTOK (serial number 629/304). 31.8.1951 was included in the list of Navy ships and in April 1953 was laid down at plant No. 1 94, launched in the fall of 1953 and towed on pontoons along the White Sea-Baltic Canal to plant No. 402 for completion, but 2.9.1 959 g. was withdrawn from construction and expelled from the Navy in connection with the transfer to Glavvtorchermet for dismantling and cutting into metal.
Note: in addition to those indicated, factory No. 631 (plant No. 194) and No. 396 (plant No. 444) were planned for construction of the KRL, orders for which were canceled.
Displacement: full 16,300, standard 13,230 tons; length 210 m, width 22 m, draft 7.3 m. PTU power 2x68 500 hp; travel speed: maximum 33, economic 16 knots; economical cruising range is 9000 miles. Armament: 4x3 152 mm MK-5-bis, 6x2 100 mm SM-5-1 and 16x2 37 mm V-11 guns, 2x5 533 mm TA. Reservations: side 100, deck 50, towers 175, deckhouse 130 mm. Crew 1270 people. "DZERZHINSKY" (PROJECT 70-E) Displacement: full 16,800, standard 13,650 tons; power 2x55,000 hp Armament: 1x2 S-75 (Volkhov) air defense missile launchers, 3x3 152 mm MK-5-bis, 6x2 100 mm SM-5-1 and 16x2 37 mm V-11 guns. “ZHDANOV” and “ADMIRAL SENYAVIN” (PROJECT 68-U) Displacement: full 17,210, standard 13,900 tons; power 2x55,000 hp
Armament: 3x3 (on Adm. Senyavin 2x3) 152 mm MK-5-bis, 6x2 100 mm SM-5-1 and 16x2 37 mm V-11.4x2 (on Adm. Senyavin 8x2) 30 -mm AK-230 guns, 1x2 Osa air defense missile launchers.
MAIN CALIBER DIVISION (1 AD)
Project 68-bis ships of the Sverdlov type became the most numerous representatives of their class of Soviet construction.
Thanks to their successful design and mainly strong artillery armament, our last classic cruisers turned out to be real long-livers, being in demand during various years of confrontation at sea in all four fleets of the country.
These, of course, beautiful ships with raised flags of color have been an integral part of naval parades in Sevastopol and Leningrad, Baltiysk and Severomorsk, Kronstadt and Vladivostok for many decades, as well as at nameless anchorages at “points” on the shelves of the seas and oceans.
But parades and holidays were still the exception for these ships; service always remained the rule - the tense and difficult international situation obliged it to do so.
Putting into practice the winged Makarov principle - “At sea - at home, on the shore - as a guest,” the cruisers remained at sea for many months, returning to their bases only for inter-cruise repairs, replenishment of supplies and a short rest for the crew. Then everything was repeated all over again.
The sailors who served on the cruisers Project 68-bis were rightly proud of their ships, which could serve in all seas and oceans in the most difficult conditions. At the same time, cruisers often ensured the carrying of BS by other ships and vessels. They supplied their comrades with fuel, freshly baked bread and other products; submarine crews had the opportunity to rest briefly on their decks; if necessary, ship doctors provided medical assistance to sailors of other ships.
Before the replenishment of the Soviet fleets with new anti-submarine missile and aircraft-carrying ships, Project 68-bis cruisers were the most powerful surface ships of the USSR Navy.
Many of them served as flagships of divisions, squadrons, flotillas and fleets. Their weapons and technical equipment have been quite modern for almost 40 years. There are many reasons for this amazing longevity. First of all, these are artillery weapons, which are generally not inferior to the best world analogues.
The picture shows the cruiser "Sverdlov" from the early 60s
The main caliber artillery of the Project 68-bis ships, and, consequently, the Zhdanov cruiser, consisted of 12 152-mm B-38 guns with a barrel length of 57 calibers in 4 three-gun turrets MK-5-bis, located in the center plane the ship is linearly elevated, in two groups - two towers each in the bow and stern. The B-38 guns, designed by the design bureau of the Bolshevik plant in Leningrad in 1940, were produced intermittently from 1940-1955.
The main samples of the guns were tested even before the Great Patriotic War. The first modernized model of the MK-5-bis was manufactured at LMZ in May 1950. In total, 88 towers were produced and delivered at this plant from 1949 to 1955.
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The installations had their own radar rangefinder "Stag-B" (2nd and 3rd towers) and an AMO-3 optical sight. The towers could be controlled both from the inside (local control) and remotely - from the central artillery post using the D-2 remote control system.
The Stag-B radio rangefinder of the centimeter range was intended to control the fire of main and universal caliber artillery. It entered service in 1948. The detection range of a surface target (destroyer) during testing was 120 kbt, the precision tracking range was 100 kbt, the average distance measurement error was 15 m.
The main battery's ammunition included armor-piercing, semi-armor-piercing, high-explosive fragmentation, illumination and remote projectiles (a total of 2,130 projectiles and 2,250 charges in the magazines and 72 shells in the fenders of the first shots). Shells and charges were stored in specially equipped cellars at the rate of 570 charges for towers 1-3 and 540 for tower 4 on standard racks, with the exception of a small number placed in the fenders of the first shots. There were 18 shells each (72 in total).
Unloading and loading of racks was provided only manually in order to avoid spontaneous rolling of projectiles. Each shell magazine had three conveyors, two parallel to the DP and one across the DP, in the plane of the frame.
All charging magazines were located on the 2nd platform and were separated from the shell magazines, as well as from the turret compartments of the main battery towers. The charges were stored in fireproof asbestos cases, which were placed inside metal ones. The latter, in turn, were located on honeycomb-type racks located in the longitudinal and transverse directions. Unloading and supply of charges to electric elevators was provided only manually.
Ammunition (shells and charges) from the cellars was supplied using electric chain elevators to the reloading compartments, where they were reloaded into rotating elevators, which supplied the shells and charges directly to the fighting compartments of the turret. The rate of supply of ammunition was provided within 9 cycles per minute, manually - 3 cycles. Each shell magazine was equipped with an autonomous flooding system. Up to the level of the upper edge of the racks, it could be flooded with sea water using hydraulic ejectors with a capacity of 300 t.h. There was one ejector for each of the cellars. As an emergency method, natural flooding was provided through the bottom clinker of the charging cellar. True, in this case the whole process took 15-16 minutes, and the water in the cellar with shells could only reach the level of the existing waterline and only after the charging cellar had already been completely filled. Drainage of the cellars was provided by discharging water through launching flanges into the bilge compartments and then removing it overboard using drainage and drainage means.
In addition, each shell and charging magazine was equipped with an autonomous irrigation system with water supply from the fire main through group action valves. Irrigation was carried out with rosette drenchers installed under the ceiling for horizontal surfaces, and with blade drenchers for vertical surfaces in the aisles between the racks. The irrigation system could be activated manually - by turning on a tap from the cellars and from the lower deck. And automatically - when melting low-melting locks from a temperature increase above 72 degrees and remotely - from the PEZh by turning on the solenoid valve.
To control the fire of the main battery, the Molniya ATs-68-bis fire control system was used, consisting of two automatic firing machines with universal coordinate converters, two reserve automatic firing machines (RAS) and 4 turret automatic firing machines (BAS). Accordingly, it provided three firing schemes for main battery artillery - main, reserve and turret, depending on the circumstances of the battle, the nature of the target, or in case it was impossible to control fire in the main way.
In reserve mode, the Molniya ATs-68-bis control system was provided with data from two 8-meter DM-8-1 rangefinders and VMTs-5 central aiming sights (in two KDP2-8), two on-board VCU sighting devices (in the conning tower), sights MB-6 and 8-m rangefinder DM-8-2 (in the main battery towers), Stag-B radio rangefinders (2nd and 3rd main battery towers), "Zalp" or "Reef" radars, ultrasonic underwater surveillance and other technical means. Data on the elements of the movement of one's ship came from the same sources as with the main method of shooting.
The system ensured rapid target detection and determination of its movement elements using optical and radar means. Generation of central guidance data for firing at one or two targets and transmission of data for firing at coastal targets in the presence of visible landmarks. Combined - at four different targets, as well as independent shooting of towers at visible targets or lighting shells.
It was possible to fire the main battery using the curtain method and at aircraft, although in a rather original way - due to the lack of tables corresponding to the parameters of the movement of jet aircraft. The desire to use 152 mm guns in the air defense system was caused by the lack of guns in the 50s and 60s. Collective defense air defense systems and limited firing range of 100 mm artillery mounts.
Taking into account the experience of the Great Patriotic War, in those years artillery fire on aircraft with main battery guns was practiced and carried out on Project 68-bis cruisers. It was carried out at a “low altitude” using a table method using TS-50 artillery tables. For example, if the actual flight altitude of the aircraft was 7000 m, then it was halved - to 3500 m. If the aircraft's flight speed was 200 m.s., then it was “halved” to 100 m.s.
The tube (installation of the fuse - the detonation range of the projectile) was also “halved”. Thus, despite the lack of full-fledged anti-aircraft firing tables, it became possible to fire at air targets. This anti-aircraft fire was carried out by both the bow and stern echelons of the towers of the main battery division. The fire was controlled by the commander of the artillery fire control group of the main caliber battalion (GUAO DGK). He was at his CP (command post) - at the CAP (central artillery post). As is known, the firing range of the main battery was 168.8 cables (30.2 km), the weight of the projectile was about 55 kg. The explosion created a large damaging space.
The picture shows the cruiser "Zhdanov" on barrels, Tallinn raid 1957-1958. Photo of Captain 2nd Rank V. Smirnov.
After the Project 68-bis cruiser entered service, they spent a lot of time at sea on various exercises. As Mikhail Urvantsev, a sailor-artilleryman of the BC-2 1AD of the first crew of the light cruiser “Zhdanov,” recalls, “We were extremely rarely on the shore - we were always at sea! And shooting, continuous shooting! Our ship’s gunners improved their skills and quickly achieved good results.”
It is known that in the combat training system of the Soviet fleet, competitions were held for the prize of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in artillery training. Light cruisers from all four Soviet fleets took part in them. Competitions were held at the end of each academic year after the best ships were determined in the fleets. Leaders were allowed to engage in such shooting. A commission appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy determined the best among the best. The effectiveness of the use of the cruiser's artillery was assessed based on the results of a complex combat exercise performed against a certain tactical background. The ship recognized as the best was awarded the challenge prize of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
The first time the award took place was in 1953. True, at that time only four cruisers, Project 68-bis, were in service. In the Black Sea Fleet - "Dzerzhinsky", and in the Baltic - "Sverdlov", "Ordzhonikidze" and "Zhdanov".
So, according to Captain 1st Rank A. Podkolzin, the gunners of the cruiser “Ordzhonikidze” were the first to win this Prize. However, this may not be entirely accurate. We don’t have archival data yet, but we do have this photograph by Mikhail Urvantsev, in which the sailors of the 1st AD light cruiser “Zhdanov” with a cup! Photo from early 1954.
On January 13, 1956, when summing up the results of the past 1955, the commander of the Baltic Fleet awarded the cruiser Zhdanov the Cup for success in combat and political training - “For the successful completion of competitive artillery shooting.”
Took 2nd place based on the results of shooting for the prize of the Navy Civil Code.
At the end of 1958, the cruiser and gunners again became the best in the Baltic Fleet and again took 2nd place for the Navy Civil Code prize.
We managed to contact Captain 1st Rank Reserve Vladlen Vyacheslavovich Zamyshlyaev, who served on the cruiser for four years from 1954 to 1958. In particular, he recalls:
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“I received an appointment to the Zhdanov KRL in August 1954 after graduating from the higher special officer classes in Leningrad to the position of commander of the 3rd tower of the main caliber division, and in 1955 to the position of commander of this division.
The light cruiser "Zhdanov" (commander Capt. 1st Rank Tyunyaev, then Capt. 1st Rank Vasiliev, and since 1956 Capt. 1st Rank Gavrilov) was part of the cruiser division (commander Rear Admiral Yaroshevich) of the East Baltic Flotilla (commander Vice Admiral Abashvili ). The main base of the flotilla was Tallinn. Summer, based at the naval base of Tallinn and in the winter months with a transition to the ice-free naval base of Baltiysk, which was the main naval base of the division of ships of the Baltic Fleet.
The ship conducted combat training alone and together with other ships of the flotilla, including firing at sea, coastal and low-flying air targets, including the main caliber. The most interesting event during my period of service on the cruiser was the long-distance voyage that the cruiser carried out, accompanied by two destroyers of the Baltic Fleet, to the Mediterranean Sea, with the aim of paying a friendly visit to Yugoslavia (Split) and Syria (Latakia). In the spring of 1957, we were docked at the naval base in Kronstadt and headed to the naval base in Baltiysk, bypassing Tallinn, where our families remained. We loaded ourselves with everything we needed and set out to sea in July.
Through the Danish Straits they entered the North Sea, stayed in a roadstead near London and then, bypassing the English Channel, entered the Atlantic Ocean. We were caught in a good storm in the Bay of Biscay. The cruiser was tossed around on big waves like a boat. After passing through the Strait of Gibraltar, we finally entered the Mediterranean Sea. All our further movement in the Mediterranean Sea took place along the African coast. The 6th Squadron of the US Navy was moving parallel to our course, and American planes made regular overflights of our ships at low altitudes and served as a good target for training our anti-aircraft guns.
Then there was the port of Split in Yugoslavia (official visit) and the port of Latakia in Syria (unofficial visit). In October 1957 we returned to Tallinn. We completed the tasks assigned to our detachment of ships according to the command’s review as “good.”
The photographs show footage from a documentary film of the cruiser’s visit to the port of Latakia. The return of the cruiser “Zhdanov” after the BS October 1957
In June 1958, I said goodbye to the comrades with whom I served on the cruiser, in connection with my departure to the Naval Academy in Leningrad, a candidate for passing the entrance exams, as part of the group in which I was approved by the command of the DKBF.
V.V. Zamyshlyaev, April 18, 2011
ZAMYSHLYAEV VLADLEN VYACHESLAVOVYCHGenus. 5.VII.1928 in Odessa. He graduated from the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (1946), the main faculty of the Naval Order of Lenin Red Banner School named after. M. V. Frunze (1950), Higher Order of Lenin special classes of officers, Leningrad (1954), Naval Order of Lenin Academy with a specialty in “Naval Special Weapons and Control Systems” (1961). Captain 1st rank (1971). Tower commander of the DGK LC "Vyborg" (1950-1953). Commander of the turret of the DGK KRL "Zhdanov" (1954-1955). Commander of the DGK KRL "Zhdanov" (1955-1958). Military representative (1961-1963), senior. officer (1963-1969), head of the department group (1969-1970), deputy. head of department (1970-1976), head of department (1976-1978) URAV of the Navy. Dismissed to the reserve due to length of service (1978). Deputy Head of SKB - Chief Systems Designer, Deputy. Chief of the Security Service - chief designer of systems, chief specialist in automated control systems at NPO Astrophysics of the Ministry of General Engineering (1979-2000). Conducted fundamental research, development, production and testing of prototypes of special weapons. During his service in the Navy URAV, he took part in the creation of Navy missile weapons systems, from fundamental research, development, manufacturing and testing of prototypes to their launch into series and delivery of new missile weapons to the fleet. Order of the Badge of Honor. 13 medals. |
Let us add that the entire crew of the cruiser was awarded tokens “For the Long Voyage” for the successful completion of the assigned tasks of the long voyage in 1957, for high seamanship, discipline and organization.
Just a year earlier, the corresponding decision of the Ministry of Defense was issued to establish a badge “For a Long Voyage” to reward Navy personnel who participated in long-distance overseas campaigns.
The successes achieved in previous years were not destined to be continued and developed in the following 1959 by the crew of the cruiser “Zhdanov”, and, consequently, by the artillerymen of 1 AD.
Placement at the plant for routine repairs with the modernization of individual systems and equipment of the ship in plant No. 890 in Tallinn lasted until September of that year, then sea trials and finally docking in Kronstadt. The desire of the “Zhdanovites” to quickly go to sea to pass their course assignments was also spurred on by various kinds of “tales” about a new big long-distance voyage, almost to China. P
Therefore, the order of the Navy Civil Code dated December 9, 1959 No. 0549 on the decision to withdraw the cruiser “Zhdanov” to reserve, with a static conservation method, caused a depressing state among all sailors. Although it was already known then that, for example, 7 unfinished cruisers Project 68-bis were sent for dismantling. There was a reduction in the armed forces.
To date, the following names of division officers who served in the 50-60s have been identified.
On March 27, 1960, the Zhdanov KRL was withdrawn from service. Having handed over the ammunition, the ship moved to Liepaja. There, conservation was carried out at the shipbuilding and repair plant No. 29. Upon completion, he was redeployed to Baltiysk, where he joined the 35th brigade of reserve ships, and was stationed there with a reduced crew until 1965.
The reactivation and transition of the cruiser from Baltiysk to Sevastopol was described in detail by the foreman of the 1st AD "Zhdanov" I. Kargerman. ()
By the beginning of the 60s, the combat value of artillery and torpedo ships was already low. Therefore, the leadership of the fleets was looking for ways to effectively use them in the new realities of war at sea. It is believed that the idea of converting the KRL pr.68-bis into command ships (CU) arose after the appearance of similar command posts in the US Navy, converted incl. and from cruisers.
Soon, TsKB-17 completed the radical re-equipment of the KRL pr.68-bis into a control ship and presented the results at the end of 1962 to the USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal R.Ya. Malinovsky. It was planned to re-equip two KRLs each for the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet in a similar way. True, it was also said that these ships would be reserve command posts in case of failure of the coastal ones.
In March 1964, the Navy issued a technical specification for the modernization of the Admiral Senyavin (Pacific Fleet) according to Project 68U; the second cruiser to be converted was initially identified as the Dzerzhinsky (Black Sea Fleet), the technical specification for which appeared in the same year.
Technical project 68U “Buhta”, developed by TsKB-17 (chief designer K.I. Ivanov), was approved by the Navy in January 1965 with a recommendation for its use for the Dzerzhinsky missile launcher. In March, technical project 68U was approved by the Navy Civil Code with additions that provided for the dismantling of the 3rd main battery tower, provision of permanent basing on the ship of the KA-25 helicopter, installation of one Osa-M air defense system and the Cyclone navigation space complex. Later, air defense systems were strengthened by installing additional 30-mm AK-230 guns on board. Taking into account the comments, the technical design was adjusted, and in order to be able to meet the requirements of the Navy, both aft main battery towers were subject to dismantling.
Work on the Admiral Senyavin, delivered to the Dalzavod berth, was carried out in full accordance with the project.
The second ship to be converted into a control ship, instead of the Dzerzhinsky, due to better technical condition, was the Zhdanov KRL. Its repair and re-equipment began at Sevmorzavod in December 1965 after the cruiser was re-opened and put into operation, and moved from Baltiysk to Sevastopol.
True, due to the tough position of the Black Sea Fleet command, which opposed the dismantling of the aft group of main battery towers, we had to limit ourselves to a half-hearted solution - to remove only the 3rd tower. As a result, TsKB-17 had to develop another, shortened version of the conversion (for Zhdanov), designated 68U1. In turn, the previous project, according to which the Admiral Senyavin was modernized, became known as 68U2 (the numbers in the designations correspond to the number of main battery towers that were removed).
(The widely spread version that “Senyavin” lost two main battery towers by accident (Dalzavod workers allegedly hurried, dashingly dismantling both aft towers instead of one) does not find its documentary confirmation. - Author’s note.)
The work went on for quite a long time, with varying degrees of success, and came to an end in the second half of 1971. On the pages of the “Zhdanov” Forum, the commander of the 1st tower of the Main Command Stanislav Eduardovich Zmachinsky told how a new stage in the service of the control cruiser “Zhdanov” and in the 1st AD BC-2 began. It would be appropriate to partially publish it here.
The photographs show the cruiser “Zhdanov” Sevmorzavod 1968-1969, Navy Day Sevmorzavod 1971.
“I was appointed to the post of commander of the 1st main caliber tower in May 1971 from the post of commander of the EM battery “Resourceful,” where I performed my first combat service. This combat service, for the first time in the Black Sea Fleet, lasted 180 days.
I arrived at the cruiser parked at the Sevmorzavod wall in the afternoon. Something unimaginable was happening on the ship: it was full of workers everywhere, and everyone was busy with work. The personnel on the upper deck and in the corridors provided fire work, the points of which were countless. There was a roar and knocking all around. The situation was like in hell, the fool could understand that the final stage of repair was underway, it wasn’t even moving, it was flying!
I was met by the division commander, captain 3rd rank Georgy Petrovich Gelumbovsky, from a conversation with whom I learned a lot of new and interesting things, but not at all joyful for me. The division had 3 towers, personnel - for 3 towers. Instead of three full-time tower commanders, I am the only one. The division commander kindly but firmly explained to me that I would command “for now” all three towers and that I would have about a hundred people under my command. The “prospect” was not a pleasant one, especially since only the personnel of the first tower were on staff, and the rest were “directive”, i.e. The headquarters of the 30th DiPK (division of anti-submarine ships), by its directive, recruited staff positions on the ships of the division according to the number of combat numbers in the two main battery towers (gunners, acoustics, electricians, miners...), on which the l/s were listed. Naturally, I could not refuse. So there were three officers in the DGK: division commander, commander of the NSUAO, Lieutenant V.B. Kutin. and I.
I was faced with a lot of tasks. This includes the study of unfamiliar material, the combat and daily organization of the tower and the ship, control over industry representatives carrying out repairs not only in 1 BGK, but also in two more towers. Preparation and passing of tests for admission to independent performance of duties and duty and watchkeeping. Preparing the l/s tower.
At night I studied the structure of the ship - there was simply no other time. In total, I had three times more than a “normal” tower commander: 3 BGK, 3 cockpits, officer shower, 3 vent. Ventilation gates, 6 ammunition cellars. The tidy objects were especially killed only on the upper deck under my command, instead of the forecastle deck from the diameter along the p/b, there was the entire forecastle deck and the entire poop deck.
In short, I had three times more troubles than an “ordinary” Gruppenführer. I had no shortage of enthusiasm and desire to serve, and to serve exemplarily, at that happy time. My family lived in Leningrad, I went ashore extremely rarely, devoting myself entirely to service.
On the third day of my service on the cruiser, the first mate, captain 2nd rank Efremov, arrested me for three days for an unwashed bell on the forecastle. After lunch, during the small gathering, one could see a green, green bell hanging on the bow superstructure. Before lunch, the workers dismantled the scaffolding on the superstructure that hid the bell and it became accessible to the senior mate's eye.
“To the commander of the tidy, 3 days of arrest!” But I was a non-cowardly and arrogant lieutenant. Instead of “Yes!” answered the senior mate something like this: “While I was carrying out combat service tasks in the vastness of the World Ocean, you were growing greens in the factory, and now I have to steam in the cell for you.” The senior mate almost burst with anger, but realizing that in front of him was a lieutenant - not like that, he remained silent. He never touched me so roughly again.
The commander of the warhead-2, Captain 2nd Rank Chinyakov, was unique. He couldn’t speak in a normal tone at all—he was always yelling. I also had an episode with him. He emphasized his superiority by addressing all lieutenants, including me, as “lieutenant.” I quickly got tired of it. I had to convince him a couple of times that he should address himself as “Comrade Lieutenant.” Chinyakov listened and began to address himself as expected, according to the regulations. In fact, I remember his activities only by his shouting and chaotic behavior. He constantly inspired us: “If we move to the division, they won’t keep you there!” Everyone will be filmed quickly!” As a result, after the first review, the fleet headquarters removed Chinyakov and several senior officers from his post. A devastating order was issued from the Fleet Commander. In the order, the TsShP, whose commander was midshipman Daniil Romanenko and the BGK, were noted for the better. The naval newspaper immediately wrote about us.
The commander of the Civil Code division was Captain 3rd Rank Georgy Petrovich Gelumbovsky. He was a competent and experienced artilleryman, a man of enormous capacity for work, who did not give up in the face of emerging difficulties, and had his own approach to any crew member. The foreman of the supply team was the chief foreman of long-term service, Yuri Myslin, who had previously worked at an artillery plant and knew swearing very well. Part. The fact that the tower received an excellent rating at the Commander’s review is the merit of the personnel, who spared no effort, time, and showed true hard work and perseverance. More difficult tasks lay ahead - shooting the equipment after repairs, practicing course tasks, receiving ammunition, and performing firing exercises.
Since the fall of 1971, the crew has been implementing them. The cruiser moved away from the wall of Sevmorzavod and was constantly based on barrels in the Northern Bay. Workers completing repairs were brought on board by factory boats. The organization of service on the ship was extremely poor.
We studied persistently, mastered all the intricacies of cruising service, and often went to sea. This began to happen especially quickly and intelligently with the arrival of a new first mate, Captain 2nd Rank Shakun Anatoly Moiseevich, on the cruiser. Shakun was a real sea wolf - knowing, it would seem, everything in the world, demanding to such an extent that many, not only sailors, walked around him on the other side.
On the other hand, he treated people as human beings. I remember this incident: the commander of the DUK battery, Lieutenant V.K. Kostin, was standing on the poop deck with a suitcase and a vacation ticket in his pocket. The first mate who appeared on the quarterdeck, having understood the situation, orders the command boat to be called to the right gangway, puts the lieutenant in it, gives a voyage to the Grafskaya pier and himself escorts the boat, standing on the upper platform of the ladder instead of the ship's duty officer. Having seen off the boat, with his unique smile he tells those present: “Vacation is a sacred thing.” Let the lieutenant take a walk!
We performed all shooting with ratings of at least “good”. Now I don’t remember exactly, but it didn’t seem to be “good” either. Well, okay, let's not brag. But for sure - not a single shooting was stopped. Much credit for this goes to the commander of the NSUAO DGK, senior lieutenant Valery Borisovich Kutin - his task was more difficult than ours, but what do we need - if only the shells would all fly out, but where would they land? That is, the fire manager is the division commander.
In the pictures are Senior Lieutenants E. Zmachinsky and V. Kutyin Navy Day 1972. senior mate captain 2nd rank An.M. Shakun and commander of the GUAO senior lieutenant V.B. Kutin Severomorsk 1972
At first, Lieutenant-Commanders Varyanitsa and Ivannikov came to us from another ship to conduct shooting on a business trip, then the commander of the 2nd BGK, Lieutenant-Commander Vladimir Chebotarev, and the commander of the 3rd BGK, Lieutenant-Commander Alexander Vasin, were seconded on a permanent basis. It became much easier to serve, especially since both were experienced artillerymen.”
During the academic year of combat training, the cruiser's main battery carried out at least five test firings at sea targets and three or four on the shore. The cruiser began caliber firing only after practicing combat organization in numerous combat exercises and performing a full range of caliber firing. Each test shooting was preceded by one preparatory shooting and one purely training - barrel shooting, which was carried out in test conditions, but with 50 percent of the ammunition.
They prepared for firing with the main caliber in advance. The lampshades were removed, the instruments were strengthened, the necks, hatches, manholes, and doors were battened down. Anything that could burst, fall off or fall from the shock of the salvos was removed whenever possible.
And still, after each shooting there were small losses of property. As the commander of the BC-5, Captain 2nd Rank Viktor Ivanovich Smirnov, recalled, when the cruiser fired all its turrets, the fire mains burst from the shocks.
By the time of the shooting, the main caliber turret's personnel of 30 people was reinforced by the so-called “incoming personnel.” The sailors of the supply service, boatswain's crew and other teams and services were included in the "coming" alert. As a result, the number of sailors on the tower reached 60 people. The “comers”, along with the main crew of the tower, participated in the complex organization of the uninterrupted supply of ammunition to the firing guns. Therefore, they always took part in all training of personnel of the main and universal caliber towers.
Fire at naval targets was carried out only with practical shells. The elevation angle of the guns usually did not exceed 18-20 degrees. If out of 72 shells two or three “pierced” the shield, this was a great joy for the warhead-2. The main method of shooting was a mixed method, when the distance was measured using a radar station, and the heading angle - optically. But shooting was also carried out optically, when the distance to the target was measured only with rangefinders.
Therefore, rangefinders, on whom the accuracy and success of all shooting depended, trained daily, “driving” their 8-meter rangefinders at various targets. Even when the cruiser was anchored or barreled in the bay, the rangefinders conducted training two to three times a day, working at different distances.
“As a rule, two or three months were enough for young sailors to get used to the intricacies of the BC-2 and their responsibilities,” recalls the former commander of the main caliber division, retired captain 2nd rank Valery Borisovich Kutyin, “in those years the BC-2 did not have any special problems with personnel training. Moreover, in the 70s of the last century, sailors served for three years and spent most of their service on a cruiser, so they knew and were able to do a lot. Hence the shooting results were high.”
The well-trained personnel of the BC-2 achieved coverage of the target from the third salvo. The naval target was represented by a large ship's BKSh shield measuring 65 by 13. It was towed at a speed of at least 14 knots. "Zhdanov", moving at a speed of 22-24 knots, fired at distances of 95-100 cables. All the main caliber turrets fired in turn, but each with only two barrels. It was forbidden to fire three-gun salvoes. A large number of main caliber guns were not fired for reasons of safety of communications.
Few people watched from the sidelines the firing of the main caliber of the cruiser Project 68-bis. Typically, firing was carried out by one cruiser; less often, one or two destroyers were assigned to it. None of the BC-2 officers can recall joint firing of at least two cruisers of this project.
Practical shells, falling into the sea, raised columns of water more than 20 meters high. These “splashes,” as the gunners called them, could be detected by rangefinders at distances of about 18 km, even if the shells flew over the ship’s towing shield. And its structure rose 12-15 meters from the water’s edge. The third salvo, as a rule, covered the target. The remaining shells fell in close proximity to the shield, “hitting” the target. Over the course of a year, the main caliber fired about 350 shells at sea targets.
“We usually fired at the shield at the combat training ground, located twenty kilometers north-west of Sevastopol,” recalled the commander of the warhead-2 “Zhdanov” in 1972-1981, captain 2nd rank Viktor Prokofievich Chegrinets, “usually with two barrels of one turret. The pace was maintained at a normal pace. The next salvo of the main caliber followed 12 seconds later. The firing distance at the ship's shield was set at 100-110 cables, which corresponded to the most effective use of artillery, given that the battle would be fought with an equal enemy.
The photographs show the GUAO commander, captain-lieutenant V. Kutin, during training and with his subordinates, 1974-1975.
Even with an incomplete salvo of turrets, the cruiser’s hull experienced heavy loads and shuddered. As a result of the shocks, a number of ship systems and equipment in the premises received minor damage, which was repaired after the firing was completed. According to the testimony of the commanders of the main caliber divisions, splashes from falls of 55 kg. shells were clearly readable on the screen of the Volley radar, because they reached a height of 20 meters.
The necessary adjustments were made to them, and almost always the third salvo was a kill. With the best shooting, up to 5 shells hit a shield 30 meters long and 8 meters high.
The cruiser completed three test firings per year. They were preceded by 3-4 preparatory firing, 2-3 firing was carried out along the shore (at Cape Chauda). If prize shooting was planned, then the ship was not allowed to participate in it without 4-5 training shootings.
During combat training, it was planned to fire with all available types of ammunition - armor-piercing, semi-armor-piercing, high-explosive fragmentation, illumination and practical shells. Moreover, with reduced combat (16 kg) and combat (24 kg) charges.
The crews of the towers and artillery fire control groups were trained every day so that the most important specialists did not lose practical skills, accuracy in combat work and the required automation. The precise aiming of the guns was verified by the stars.
The photographs show Viktor Kuznetsov with his post comrades, mid-70s.
In each turret crew, they were very scrupulously chosen - one horizontal gunner, three vertical gunners, and for each gun - a lock and a rammer. The result of the shooting depended entirely on the quality of their combat work. Each gunner had to be able to quickly and accurately set the barrel to the desired elevation angle or azimuth. The error was allowed at 4 thousandths of the distance.
In addition, for each trunk there was a stripper. After all, the charges were delivered by elevators dressed in cases. The undresser opened the case and handed the charge to the sender. If the projectile entered the barrel using an automatic electric hammer, then the charge (a cap with gunpowder) was added manually. This operation was entrusted to the dispatcher.
The locksmith had to close the lock, make sure it was ready for the salvo, and quickly insert the ignition tube. And the entire cycle of loading the gun and preparing for firing was repeated every 12 seconds - as required by the standards. Although in artillery practice it was rare that prolonged shots were fired, the high organization of the combat work of the BC-2 did not allow emergency incidents.
“The most interesting shooting in my artillery practice was along the coast in the area of Cape Chauda with adjustments by helicopter,” Viktor Prokofievich Chegrinets shared his impressions, “the cruiser fired high-explosive fragmentation shells, and I observed the picture of the damage to the object from above. After all, usually I was in the control room and saw only the target in the rangefinder or on the radar sweep. The fall of shells when firing at a sea target seems distant and flat. From a helicopter, a completely different picture emerges; here you, as a spotter, feel the entire battlefield, soar over it like a watchful eagle and, using a map, direct the striking power of the cruiser to the right place.”
In the picture are sailors-commanders of the 1st AD draft of 1971-1974.
Despite the fact that KRU "Zhdanov" on combat duty began to fulfill its new main duties as the command post of the 5th Mediterranean Squadron, the gunners still trained hard and honed their skills.
1 AD achieved new success in 1974, when, based on the results of shooting, it took 1st place in the Black Sea Fleet and 2nd place for the prize of the Navy Civil Code. The sailors-gunners can count towards night shooting in the Mediterranean Sea during the Ocean-75 exercises, as well as shooting during the 1976 BS.
Years passed, personnel changed, the cruiser again underwent another major overhaul and modernization. In the new campaign of 1981-1986, the ship “came to life” again after the factory years “without the sea”, and again reached a combat level. Soon one military service began to replace another, sometimes the gap between them was less than a month.
We will remember those years more than once. And, of course, that based on the results of the shooting in 1985, the Zhdanov control unit not only took the already quite familiar 1st place in the Black Sea Fleet, but also won the Prize of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy!
A participant in that shooting, commander of the warhead-1, captain 2nd rank in reserve, Rinat Sabirov, recalls.
“In 1985, the cruiser was approved to carry out artillery firing with the main caliber for the prize of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. The ship was commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Kudryavtsev V.Yu., the commander of the BC-2 was Captain 2nd Rank Victor Korolev. A competent artilleryman, an energetic and hardworking officer.
If memory serves, it was in April. We went out to carry out shooting. On board were a representative of the UBP of the main headquarters of the Navy, the Navy URAV, the 4th department of the Black Sea Fleet, the commander of the 150th OBRK, Captain 1st Rank Eremin, with the marching staff. The graphic plan for firing was approved by the Black Sea Fleet commander. The starting point for us to start maneuvering was assigned to the northern edge of the BP range No. 68, and for the tug with a shield - to the southern edge. Imagine our surprise when, abeam the lighthouse, the Chersonesos radiometrist of the Don radar reported: “I see a double target!”
It was a tug with a shield, which was moving towards our starting point. The brigade commander made a decision - we should immediately follow at full speed to the starting point of the tug. The decision was correct, since if we started to deal with the tug - what and how - we would definitely have failed the shooting. The latter had to drag himself to the 3.5 - 4 hour point. We shot excellently! When examining the shield, 5-6 hits were found. The shooting in other fleets was poor, and military discipline failed.
This is how we won the Navy Civil Code prize. The fire of the main battery towers was controlled by captain 3rd rank Sibirev Ilya, commander of the 1st AD. On behalf of the Black Sea Fleet commander, the following were rewarded for prize shooting: the commander of BC-2 - with binoculars, the commander of BC-1 - with a radio receiver, and the commander of 1 AD - with a watch. Later, the artillerymen of 1 AD were awarded the Cup, which was kept in a secret part of the cruiser for a year.
I am attaching a plan diagram of that shooting made from memory. Small addition. Before zeroing the reference point, the lubricant was burned, and before issuing target designation, the elements of target movement developed by the navigator, the BIP and the CAS were compared.”
In the picture is the commander of the 1st AD, captain 3rd rank Bortnik E.V. during the shooting.
| COMMANDERS OF THE MAIN CALIBER ART DIVISION (1 AD) IN THE 70-80S | |
| Captain 3rd Rank Georgy Petrovich Gelumbovsky Captain-Lieutenant Kutin Valery Borisovich Captain 3rd rank Bortnik Eduard Vasilievich Captain 2nd Rank Sibirev Ilya Valentinovich Captain 3rd Rank Doshchechnikov Mikhail Fedorovich |
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| COMMANDERS OF MAIN CALIBER TOWERS IN THE 70-80S | |
| Senior Lieutenant Zmachinsky Stanislav Eduardovich Captain-Lieutenant Chebotarev Vladimir Ivanovich Senior Lieutenant Vasin Alexander Ivanovich Captain-Lieutenant Bologurin Sergey Aleksandrovich Senior Lieutenant Selivanov Captain-Lieutenant Voevodkin Viktor Ivanovich Captain-Lieutenant Makhno Vadim Petrovich Senior Lieutenant Bogdanov Alexey Alekseevich |
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| COMMANDERS OF CONTROL GROUPS | |
| Senior Lieutenant Valery Borisovich Kutin Senior Lieutenant Zhilyaev Viktor Captain-Lieutenant Bondarenko Vladimir Ivanovich Captain-Lieutenant Bologurin Sergey Aleksandrovich |
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| DEPUTY COMMANDER 1 AD BY POLITICAL PART | |
| Captain-Lieutenant Tanasov Valery Borisovich Captain-Lieutenant Setmantsev Yuri Vasilievich Captain-Lieutenant Rudgensky Sergey Dmitrievich |
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In the picture - hp. 4 main battery towers with commander lieutenant commander V. Makhno and midshipman Martirosyan. Sailors and foremen - Bobrov, Solntsev, Pynzar, Kudretov, Romanchenko, Nusratov, Pedorchenko, Pavlov, Shamukhamedov, Sharafutdinov, Shvyrkin. Tishchenko and others 1982-1984
In the fall of 1986, the Zhdanov switchgear began another routine repair and some modernization of communications equipment, as it turned out - the last one. In the spring of 1988, it was completed with great effort. For the Navy DAY of that year, the veteran cruiser under the command of Captain 2nd Rank Adam Rimashevsky, having once again changed its appearance, looked like in its best years.
The command of the Black Sea Fleet, the 150th brigade of missile ships, prepared the Zhdanov primarily for the large exercises “Autumn-88”. The ship was supposed to participate in them both as a control ship and as a fire support ship for the planned large amphibious assault.
Captain 2nd Rank Rinat Nailovich Sabirov recalls: -
“The main task was an amphibious landing in the area of the village of Grigoryevka near Odessa. The actions of the ships and landing forces were observed by M.S. Gorbachev and his retinue. He specially built an observation post on the shore. KRU "Zhdanov" was part of the OKOP (detachment of fire support ships). By the way, we participated in the exercises without passing the K-2 task, since we had just passed K-1. There are no BP ranges in the landing area and it is very difficult to navigate. The place was simply chosen so that the actions of the participating forces could be observed from the shore. At the time of landing, they fired with the main and universal caliber, but with blanks. Our actions were highly appreciated."
Thanks to the memories, first of all, of the DUK artilleryman Valery Volkov, as well as the vertical gunner of the 1st AD Pavel Kuznetsov on the pages of the Zhdanovsky Forum, we were able to learn a lot about how the service on the cruiser took place over the past years, or rather the period 1988-1989. ().
In 1988, the cruiser “Zhdanov”, after leaving the factory, received a “rebirth”, which became its “death spurt,” writes Valery Volkov. Over the next year, he participated in all fleet exercises, shootings and parades... until the deployment to his brothers - "Dzerzhinsky", "Ushakov" and "Kutuzov" at the Trinity Pier.
The ship raised its last generation of sailors with souls devoted to it, and made them feel, at least a little, like those who bear the name of sailors who served on warships.
In September of that year, the KRU, as part of its 150th brigade, took part in the general naval exercise “Autumn-88”. We walked towards Odessa at night along the coast of the South Coast. The ship's task was to defeat coastal targets of a mock enemy, ensuring a successful landing. Later, there were many photo reports in newspapers that mentioned aviation, landing ships and others. At that time there was still something to show the Minister of Defense and gentlemen observers.
A more serious test for Zhdanov was the subsequent firing at the LA-17 target aircraft by the brigade's ships - the Slava RKR and the Skory BPK. At that time, serious daily training was underway at the BC-2 posts. A Mayak tape recorder was brought to my post, on which all audio commands during firing were to be recorded, new paper was loaded onto the line graphs of the fire control devices, communications with the towers were checked and double-checked, each post was ready for firing.
According to the plan, the ships walked on parallel courses, each ship had its own sector of fire. “Zhdanov” fired first, with all calibers on the starboard side. The brigade didn’t really rely on him, and according to the scenario “destroy the money of Soviet taxpayers” - i.e. the LA-17 target was supposed to be the ultra-modern, excellent missile cruiser “Slava” at that time.
Before the shooting, the ship's commander, Captain 2nd Rank A. Rimashevsky, during the formation, explained to the crew the task and the real state of affairs in simple words - "Either we, or us..."
The moment of shooting and the intensity of passions cannot be expressed in words. Before the first salvo, the cruiser froze for a moment, and then everything thundered, shook, pieces of paint fell off from the plating and ceiling... everything lasted less than a minute and, like the finale, the cry of the ship’s commander over the ship’s general broadcast - “EVERYTHING! IS!” “Scribe!” and in a normal voice - “Commanders of the warhead-2 arrive at the navigation bridge.”
Then graphs from the recorders and tapes from the tape recorder were collected for “debriefing” - after all, all divisions fired, but who shot down is not so important, the main thing is that we were able to! But “Slava” didn’t have to shoot then.”
“I remember these shootings,” continues Pavel Kuznetsov. I personally had a question about how we would shoot at the “plane”... And that’s how we shot. There are armor-piercing shells, there are high-explosive shells, and at that time we fired remote grenades. At the end of such a projectile there is a special rotating scale, where the gun commander set the delay, which was announced by the division commander. The rate of fire is combat, i.e. 12 seconds. The main caliber began to fire, since our guns could be at 30 km. The tension was strong. I lowered the barrel (11 tons) to the loading angle and it stopped... The wait seemed long. And suddenly I hear the division commander’s voice: “Delay...”
I grabbed the steering wheel even tighter, hoping that now the barrel would unlock and I would continue pointing. With my right ear I hear that the tray with the projectile has lowered, the mechanism has caught the projectile into the barrel. I allowed myself to look around - two undressers had already prepared a charge (32 kg in a bag).
As soon as the tray was free, the gun commander barked - “Charge!” Now everything depends on me and on the lock (while I’m moving the barrel to aim, he must have time to insert the “piston” into the firing mechanism and turn the lever “totsya”. As soon as I have aimed and he turned the lever, the firing circuit is closed, the volley button must press the division commander.
And away we go! The barrels banged at once, and then all over again in 12 seconds. We managed to shoot, in my opinion, 3 times, then the universal caliber started, and then 37-mm machine guns and AK-230. There was a pause. After a while I hear the sound of the armor being torn off, I turn my head and see the division commander, captain 3rd rank, Mikhail Doshchechnikov. He beamed and literally shouted, “Comrades! Congratulations - we shot it down, it was us! He repeated this again and “flew” into the second tower. And I breathed a sigh of relief.”
Around the end of 1986, the Project 68-bis cruisers were practically all laid up in all fleets. Later, by separate Orders of the Navy Civil Code, they began to be removed from the fleet and disarmed. The Black Sea Fleet did this with the cruisers Dzerzhinsky and Ushakov. True, they required repairs and had been under conservation for several years. However, even the cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov, which had just completed a major overhaul and modernization, on which tens of millions of rubles were spent, turned out to be a burden to the fleet and unnecessary to the country. Only the long-term struggle of the “Kutuzov veterans” for their cruiser saved it from disarmament and scrapping.
They treated Zhdanov differently. Again, despite any material costs for major repairs and putting it into operation, less than a year later it was removed to the same Trinity. At first, the ship was officially deprived of its name in favor of the “democratic demands of the public”... The cruiser was renamed KRU-101 by order of the Commander-in-Chief.
Further, in the spring of 1989, a tragic incident occurred with the BC-5 sailor Zavkiev in the 3rd cauldron. He died in hospital from burns from the exploding evaporator. Under the pretext of investigating this emergency, the ship was placed in Troitskaya, and then, they say, in “mothballing”... The ammunition was handed over.
A sharp reduction in personnel began. Actually, this is where the service history of both 1 AD BC-2 and the cruiser ends.
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On December 10, 1989, in accordance with the order of the USSR Ministry of Defense, due to its unsatisfactory technical condition and the impossibility of further use for its intended purpose, KRU-101 was excluded from the fleet's combat strength with subsequent delivery to the OFI for scrapping...
On October 24, 1990, the naval flag was lowered. The cruiser was disarmed. In this state, it stood for more than a year, waiting to be taken to India for dismantling for metal.
“On September 27, 1989, having said goodbye to Zhdanov,” writes Pavel Kuznetsov, “I went to finish my service on the BOD “Skory”. The last time I had a chance to see the cruiser was on May 27, 1991. While leaving on the train home, the stern of the ship flashed for a moment. The absence of wooden flooring, as well as 4 main battery turrets, and other weapons - everything spoke of its imminent “death”. It became sad. I was driving home and did not yet know that in a few months the country for which I served would disappear, that only memories would remain...
It’s good that our website exists, because here you can remember your youth, your probably best years of life, when you were part of something big and were needed in your place.”
The article uses some excerpts from the book “Cold War Cruisers” by V. Zablotsky and several photographs. The rest of the photos are from Captain 1st Rank An. Shakun, captain 2nd rank V. Smirnov, captain 2nd rank V. Kutyin, An. Lubyanov, as well as the “Zhdanovites” sailors - M. Urvantsev, V. Arapov (clipping from the newspaper “Flag of the Motherland”), N. Badashev, V. Vikarchuk, V. Bushuev (Kochetkova-Vodotyka), V. Volkov, S. Kitel, V. Kuznetsova, A. Kononchuk, I. Moroz, An. Nikiforova, An. Fedoseev, photo collectors - Balakin, Kostrichenko, Nakat and the Internet.
Prepared by V. Arapov, N. Kazakov, V. Patosin
Published by K. Trunov.
November 2011.
"House of Books" on Novy Arbat. I came here every time I came on vacation or a weekend break, and I don’t forget it even now after moving to the capital. One day, on one of the bookshelves, I saw and purchased a newly published photo album by Robert Diament, “The Northern Fleet in the Battles for the Motherland.” War photographs from the photo archive of Northern Fleet photojournalist R.L. Diament were presented here. I was especially impressed by the panoramic photographs taken in England on board the battleship Arkhangelsk during its acceptance, as well as during its passage across the Atlantic to the Kola Bay.
As a boy, I remembered the appearance of this huge ship in the Vaenga roadstead. The documentary photographs were collected and compiled into an album and subsequently published by Robert Diament’s son, Leonid Robertovich Diament. Upon closer examination of the album, I was saddened to see that the annotations of some photographs have significant inaccuracies, while others do not correspond to reality.
I called the album compiler. Leonid Robertovich took what was said very seriously, he was preparing a new album and kindly asked to watch it. The next day we met, to my surprise, he lived not far from me, on Arbat. His father's photographic archive is impressive; the outlines for the new album have been reviewed. Finally, Leonid Robertovich began to show various photos of naval officers whose names are unknown. Out of more than a dozen photographs, I recognized only one of them.
This was the commander of the cruiser "Murmansk" (Milwaukee) O.I. Rudakov. At the end of the forties, I accidentally found myself at a review of amateur sailors' artistic performances of the cruiser "Murmansk" in the House of Fleet Officers. Here I first saw, sitting in the front row, the commander of the cruiser O.I. Rudakov. A very tall, stately naval officer who involuntarily attracts attention. In 1949, the cruiser "Murmansk" under the command of captain first rank O.I. Rudakov was returned to the United States.
The participants of the passage said: “We arrived at night in the resort town of Luis de La Vere. Local newspapers wrote that our cruiser was brought from Russia, all dirty, rusty and the Russian sailors were all bearded... The newspapers rushed: in the morning the ship looked better than in 1944 year, when he was accepted, they scrubbed him and painted him. Well, there were no traces of unshaven sailors - the Red Navy knew how to “keep up the force.”
The military fate of O.I. Rudakov is extraordinary. In 1942, he served as a mate on the destroyer "Crushing". In November, during a severe storm, the stern part of the ship broke off and instantly sank. The "Crushing" became 26 meters shorter and drifted 400 miles from the Kola Bay for a whole day until it was discovered by the destroyers "Kuibyshev" and "Uritsky". The rescue of the ship's crew took place in unusually difficult conditions: hurricane winds, huge waves, and continuous snow charges.
The commander of the "Crushing" resigned from command, called in sick and was sent to the "Kuibyshev". The evacuation of sailors continued under the leadership of the assistant commander. 185 people were rescued, 14 people died during the rescue, but the destroyers were running out of fuel, so 15 people, led by senior lieutenants G.E. Lekarev and I.A. Vladimirov remained on the “Crushing”, hoping to keep it afloat until the minesweepers arrived, but their hopes were not justified, they died.
The case of the death of "Crushing" was considered by a military tribunal. Most senior officers were sent to penal battalions. Stripped of his military rank, O.I. Rudakov arrived in a penal company on the Rybachy Peninsula. He fought as a mortarman, was wounded, but continued to fire at the enemy. Rudakov's criminal record was cleared, and he fought as a commander of an anti-tank battery with the rank of private.
After another injury in 1944, he was restored to military rank and sent for further service in the Northern Fleet. Here, for a very short period of 1944 - 1945. There is a rapid rise of O.I. Rudakov through the ranks: assistant commander of the destroyer "Gromky", commander of the destroyer "Doblestny", senior assistant of the battleship "Arkhangelsk", commander of the cruiser "Murmansk".
Some explained such a rapid rise in the ranks of the former penalty man by the fact that, perhaps, Commander S.F. Over the past period, A.G. Golovko became aware of new facts and circumstances of the behavior of the personnel on the sinking ship, after which he began to feel guilty for such a fleeting trial of the command of the Crushing.
Soon, captain first rank Olympy Ivanovich Rudakov is transferred to the Baltic, where he receives the newest light cruiser Sverdlov. In 1953, our warship is planned to visit Portsmouth to participate in the international naval parade in honor of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II of England. This should be the first foreign post-war visit to a potential enemy state at the height of the Cold War.
There were many experienced commanders in the fleet at that time, but the leadership chose O.I. Rudakov. Before the start of the visit, he was called to Moscow. The commander of the Sverdlov is received by the Minister of Defense N.A. Bulganin and the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov. Both set the task for Rudakov - to be the best at the naval parade. It took three months to prepare the crew for this trip.
On the way to Portsmouth, the Sverdlov was caught in a severe storm. The start of the celebrations almost had to be postponed, because according to tradition, Russia should be the first to congratulate Her Majesty on the accession to the throne, but their ship was delayed. And when the organizers were almost desperate, a Russian cruiser appeared. Without slowing down, he flew into the Spitehide roadstead.
More than 200 ships of the British fleet and guests of the Queen gathered at the roadstead in anticipation of the parade. The cruiser had to maneuver difficultly in order to find its place, indicated by a signal buoy with the State Flag of the USSR. The cruiser commander rejected the pilot's help and steered the ship himself. At the entrance to the roadstead, salutes of nations rang out.
The cruiser headed towards the anchorage. The ship will be anchored using the fertoing method, which requires the highest professionalism from the boatswain's crew and pinpoint precision in controlling the huge ship of its commander. According to the then accepted standards for ships with a displacement of 12,000 - 16,000 tons (like the Sverdlov), setting up in 45 minutes is considered excellent.
The exchange of fireworks attracted the attention of everyone present at the roadstead to our ship. The Sverdlov entered the anchorage area, but the signal buoy was missing (later the ship's commander received an official apology for the absence of the signal buoy). The navigator quickly determined that there was no mistake, the cruiser left accurately.
The command sounds and the first anchor is released. All eyes turned to the cruiser, the observers started the stopwatches, and the time count began. The English liaison officer who arrived on the cruiser also started his stopwatch. The results of the fertoing staging of previously arrived ships are known: the American cruiser - 2 hours, the French - 4 hours, and the Swedish even more, we were simply tired of waiting for the completion of its staging.
"Sverdlov" anchored using the fertoing method in 12 minutes. Captain Rudakov was the only one who anchored without a pilot in three times less time than was allotted for a similar procedure in the British Navy and this caused a real sensation. The photo of the cruiser commander appeared on the covers of all British newspapers.
The next morning there is a naval parade. The Queen tours the formation of ships on the yacht "Surprise". The guest ship was obliged to salute the royal yacht with one salvo. But three salvos and a thunderous Hurray were heard from the Russian cruiser! ranks of sailors. Then all the ship commanders arrived at the battleship Avangard, where Elizabeth the Second arranged the awarding of anniversary medals.
At the stern of the battleship, the commanders lined up in order of seniority of military ranks. The American and French admirals stood first, followed by Captain First Rank Rudakov and the rest. Breaking etiquette, the queen first approached Olympius Ivanovich, congratulated him, presented him with a medal, and only then turned to the American and French admirals. Churchill was shocked.
Twenty Sverdlov officers, led by the commander, received an invitation to the Coronation Ball at the Royal Naval Barracks. At the very beginning of the celebration, Rudakov presented Elizabeth with the second gift from the Soviet government - an ermine mantle. After the presentation, one of the courtiers whispered in Olympia Ivanovich’s ear that the queen was inviting him to a waltz tour. Then she led the Soviet sailor to her sister.
Princess Margaret also waltzed with Rudakov. Next, again breaking all conceivable traditions, the queen offers an audience, but not with the “high” representative of Russia (there were two of them), but again with the commander, and they disappear into her office. This had such a stunning effect that even the imperturbable Prime Minister of England Winston Churchill threw up his hands and left the reception.
In that memorable year, Olympia Rudakov turned 39 years old. English newspapers wrote that the huge, handsome Russian man simply conquered Great Britain. According to our embassy in London, the week of the cruiser Sverdlov's stay in England played a greater role in winning the hearts of ordinary British people than years of painstaking diplomatic activity.
Rudakov returned from England to his homeland as a worldwide celebrity. Navy Commander N.G. Kuznetsov ordered the establishment of a special badge “For the campaign to England” with the silhouette of a cruiser.
Soon O.I. Rudakov received the rank of rear admiral, successfully graduated from the Navy Academy, and a little later became head of the academy department. Rear Admiral Olimpiy Ivanovich Rudakov served in this post until his last day.
For the prototype of the Red Navy man from the battleship "Marat", which among a dozen figures adorns the Ploshchad Revolyutsii metro station in Moscow, the famous sculptor Matvey Manizer chose a cadet of the naval school Olympia Rudakov. The artist had no idea that 15 years later his sitter would distinguish himself at the coronation of the British Queen, but even then he saw something in his personality that was known only to him.
Cruisers of project 68 bis: "Sverdlov" against the British tiger. Part 2.Beginning: Project 68-bis cruisers: the backbone of the post-war fleet. Part 1.
Having compared the Project 68K and 68-bis cruisers with pre-war foreign light cruisers and post-war American Worchesters, we have so far ignored such interesting post-war foreign ships as the Swedish light cruiser Tre Krunur, the Dutch De Zeven Provinsen, and, of course, the last British Tiger class gun cruisers. Today we will correct this misunderstanding by starting from the end of our list - the British Tiger-class cruisers.
It must be said that the British considerably delayed the procedure for creating their latest artillery cruisers. A total of eight Minotaur-class ships were ordered during the war, which were a slightly improved version of the Fiji light cruisers. The first three "Minotaur" were completed according to the original design, and the lead one was transferred to the Canadian Navy in 1944 under the name "Ontario", two more joined the lists of the Royal Navy. The construction of the remaining cruisers was frozen shortly after the war, and two ships that were in the early stages of construction were dismantled, so that by the end of the 40s the British had three unfinished light cruisers of this type afloat: Tiger, Defense and Blake "
The British, who fully realized the weakness of the anti-aircraft weapons of their own cruisers during the Second World War, nevertheless did not want to limit themselves to the creation of air defense cruisers with 127-133 mm caliber. Such ships, in their opinion, were too weak both for naval combat and for shelling the coast, and therefore it was decided to return to the development of a universal heavy artillery system. The first such attempt was made before the war, when creating light cruisers of the Linder type, but it was unsuccessful. It turned out that turret installations that retained manual operations during loading would not be able to provide an acceptable rate of fire, and the creation of fully automatic artillery systems capable of loading at any elevation angle was beyond the technical capabilities then available. During the war, the British made a second attempt.
In 1947, the British decided to complete the construction of cruisers with 9*152-mm universal guns and 40-mm Bofors in new installations, then the project was subject to changes many times and as a result, at the time of commissioning, the light cruiser "Tiger" had two 152-mm guns. mm with Mark XXVI installations, the drawing of which is given below:
Each of them had two fully automatic 152 mm/50 QF Mark N5 cannons, capable of a rate of fire (per barrel) of 15-20 rounds/min and a very high vertical and horizontal guidance speed, reaching up to 40 degrees/sec. In order to make the six-inch gun work at such speeds, it was necessary to significantly increase the mass of the turret installation - if the two-gun 152-mm Linder turrets weighed 92 tons (rotating part), then the two-gun universal Mark XXVI - 158.5 tons, despite the fact that Tower protection was provided by only 25-55 mm of armor. Since at a rate of fire of 15-20 rounds/min the gun barrels heated up extremely quickly, the British had to provide water cooling for the barrels.
Apparently, it was the British who managed to create the world’s first completely successful ship-based universal 152-mm installation, although there are references to some problems in its operation. However, it is common knowledge that versatility comes with compromises, and the 152 mm Mark N5 gun was no exception. In fact, the British were forced to reduce its ballistics to the American 152-mm Mark 16: with a projectile weight of 58.9-59.9 kg, it provided an initial speed of only 768 m/sec (Mark 16-59 kg and 762 m/sec, respectively). In essence, the British succeeded in what the Americans could not do with their Worchesters, but we must not forget that the British completed their development 11 years later.
The second anti-aircraft caliber of the British Tigers was represented by three two-gun 76-mm Mark 6 installations with very outstanding characteristics - its rate of fire was 90 shells weighing 6.8 kg with an initial speed of 1,036 m/sec per barrel, while the barrels also required water cooling. The firing range reached a record 17,830 m for 76-mm guns. The author of this article has no information about any problems with the operation of this artillery system, but it is somewhat surprising that it was not used on any other ships of the Royal Navy. Fire control was carried out by five directors with a Type 903 radar each, and any of them could target both surface and air targets. Moreover, each 152 mm or 76 mm installation had its own director.
As for protection, the light cruisers of the "Tiger" type corresponded to the same "Fiji" - 83-89 mm armored belt from the bow to the stern 152-mm turret, in the area of the engine rooms on top of the main one - another 51 mm armored belt, the thickness of the traverses , deck, barbettes - 51 mm, towers, as mentioned above - 25-51 mm. The cruiser had a standard displacement of 9,550 tons and an 80,000 hp power plant. and developed 31.5 knots.
Light cruiser "Tiger".
Comparing the Project 68-bis cruiser "Sverdlov" and the English "Tiger", we are forced to state that the armament of the British ship is much more modern than the Soviet one and belongs to the next generation of naval artillery and fire control systems. The combat rate of fire of the Soviet 152-mm B-38 cannon was 5 rounds/min (during training firing, volleys had to follow at twelve-second intervals), respectively, a Sverdlov-class cruiser could fire 60 shells from its 12 guns per minute. The British cruiser had only 4 barrels, but with a rate of fire of 15 rounds/min it could fire the same 60 shells in a minute. A little clarification needs to be given here - the maximum rate of fire of the British cannon was 20 rounds/min, but the fact is that the actual rate of fire is still below the limit values. So, for example, for the MK-5-bis turret installations of Soviet cruisers, the maximum rate of fire is 7.5 rounds/min, but in practical shooting it requires 1.5 times less, i.e. 5 rounds/min. Therefore, we can assume that the real rate of fire of British six-inch guns is still closer to 15, but not to the maximum 20 rounds per minute.
The domestic radar "Zalp" (two per Project 68-bis cruiser) and the main caliber fire control system "Molniya-ATs-68" ensured firing only at surface targets. True, it was assumed that the anti-aircraft fire of 152-mm artillery could be controlled using the Zenit-68-bis control system, designed to control 100-mm SM-5-1 installations, but this could not be achieved, which is why the anti-aircraft fire was fired at tables. At the same time, British directors with type 903 radars issued target designation for both surface and air targets, which, of course, made it possible to control anti-aircraft fire from British six-inch guns many times more effectively. This is not to mention the fact that the vertical guidance angles and speed of aiming at the target of the British installation were radically superior to those of the MK-5-bis: the Soviet turret installation had a maximum elevation angle of 45 degrees, and the English - 80 degrees, the speed of vertical and horizontal guidance MK-5-bis is only 13 degrees, the English one is up to 40 degrees.
And, nevertheless, in a duel situation “Sverdlov” versus “Tiger”, the chances of victory of the Soviet cruiser are much higher than those of the “Englishman”.
Of course, it is extremely impressive that the light cruiser Tiger, with only four main-caliber guns, is capable of providing the same firepower as the Sverdlov with its 12 guns. But this fact should not hide from us that in all other respects the British six-inch gun corresponds to the American 152-mm “old woman” Mark 16. This means that the Tiger’s capabilities are absolutely in no way superior to the 12 six-inch guns of the American Cleveland and are even inferior him in fire performance, because American guns were faster than Soviet B-38s. But, as we have already analyzed in previous articles, a dozen Soviet 152-mm B-38s gave Soviet cruisers significant advantages in range and armor penetration over both American and more powerful British 152-mm artillery systems. Neither the American cruisers nor the Tiger could conduct effective fire combat at a distance of 100-130 kbt, because the maximum firing range of their guns was 123-126 kbt, and the effective firing range was 25 percent lower (less than 100 kbt), since at close to the maximum distances the dispersion of projectiles is excessively large. At the same time, the Soviet B-38 with its record performance characteristics ensured reliable target destruction at distances of 117-130 kbt, which was confirmed by practical shooting. Accordingly, a Sverdlov-class cruiser can open fire significantly earlier than a British cruiser, and it is not a fact that it will even allow it to get closer to itself, since it is faster than the Tiger in speed, although only slightly. If the Tiger is lucky and is able to get close to the Soviet cruiser within the effective fire range of its guns, then the advantage still remains with the Sverdlov, since with equal fire performance of the ships, Soviet shells have a higher initial speed (950 m/sec versus 768 m/sec), and, accordingly, armor penetration. At the same time, the protection of the Soviet cruiser is significantly better: having an armored deck of the same thickness and an armored belt 12-20% thicker, the Sverdlov has much better protected artillery (175 mm forehead, 130 mm barbette versus 51 mm for the Tiger). , armored cabin, etc. More powerful guns with better protection and equal fire performance provide the Project 68-bis cruiser with an obvious advantage at medium combat distances. And, of course, not a completely “honest” argument - the standard displacement of the Sverdlov (13,230 tons) is 38.5% greater than that of the Tiger (9,550 tons), which is why the Project 68-bis cruiser has greater combat stability simply in due to the fact that it is larger.
Light cruiser "Sverdlov".
Thus, the Soviet cruiser is superior to the British cruiser in an artillery duel, despite the fact that the latter’s artillery weapons are much more modern. As for the air defense capabilities, it would seem that one should attest to the obvious and manifold superiority of the English cruiser, but... Not everything is so simple.
It is very interesting to compare the Soviet 100-mm installation SM-5-1 and the English 76-mm Mark 6. With the simplest arithmetic calculation, the picture turns out to be completely bleak for domestic cruisers. The British 76-mm “spark” is capable of sending 180 shells weighing 6.8 kg each (90 per barrel) to the target in a minute, i.e. 1224 kg/min. The Soviet SM-5-1, at the same time firing 30-36 rounds/min with 15.6 kg shells (15-18 per barrel) - only 468-561 kg. It turns out to be a complete apocalypse, one single 76-mm gun mount on a British cruiser fires almost as much metal per minute as three onboard SM-5-1s on a Soviet cruiser...
But bad luck, in the description of the 76-mm creation of the “gloomy British genius”, completely strange numbers are indicated - the ammunition load directly in the turret installation is only 68 shots, and the feed mechanisms with which each gun is equipped are capable of delivering only 25 (twenty-five) shells per minute. Thus, in the first minute of firing, a 76-mm “spark” will be able to fire not 180, but only 118 shells (68 rounds from the ammunition rack + another 50 raised by the reloading mechanisms). In the second and subsequent minutes of the battle, its rate of fire will not exceed 50 rounds/min (25 rounds per barrel). How so? What kind of terrible design mistake is this?
But can we blame British developers for their inability to add “2+2”? It’s unlikely - of course, in the 50s of the last century, British science and industry were no longer the first in the world, but still it’s still very far from the derogatory “A camel is a horse made in England.” The rate of fire of the English 76 mm Mark 6 is indeed 90 rounds/min per barrel. But this does not mean at all that it is capable of firing 90 shots from each barrel every minute - this will simply overheat it and become unusable. In the first minute, it will be able to fire 59 shells per barrel - in short bursts, with breaks. Every subsequent minute it will be able to fire short bursts with a total “capacity” of no more than 25 shells per barrel - obviously, to avoid overheating. This, of course, is nothing more than the author’s assumption, and the dear reader will decide for himself how true it can be. However, it should also be noted that the enchanting ballistics of the British gun were achieved, among other things, by very high pressure in the barrel bore - 3,547 kg per cm2. This is higher than that of the domestic 180-mm B-1-P gun - it had only 3,200 kg/cm2. Does anyone seriously expect that in the 50s it was possible to create an artillery system with such ballistics and the ability to conduct a long fire battle in long bursts with a rate of fire of 1.5 rounds/sec?
However, regardless of the reasons (the danger of overheating or the impenetrable alternative talent of the installation’s designers), we can only state that the actual rate of fire of the British Mark 6 is significantly lower than the arithmetic calculation based on the passport rate of fire. This means that in 5 minutes of fire combat, the Soviet SM-5-1, firing 15 rounds per minute per barrel (nothing prevents it from firing for a long time with such intensity), is capable of firing 150 shells weighing 15.6 kg or 2340 kg. A three-inch “Englishwoman” will fire 318 shells weighing 6.8 kg or 2162.4 kg in the same 5 minutes. In other words, the fire performance of the Soviet and British installations is quite comparable, with a slight advantage of the Soviet SM-5-1. But the Soviet "weaving" hits much further - its projectile flies at 24,200 m, the English one - 17,830 m. The Soviet installation is stabilized, but how things went with this issue for the British twin is unknown. The “Englishwoman” had shells with radio fuses, but by the time the “Tiger” entered service, the SM-5-1 also had them. And in the end, we come to the conclusion that, despite all its advancedness and automaticity, the British 76-mm Mark 6 was still inferior in combat capabilities to the single Soviet SM-5-1. It remains only to remember that the Sverdlov-class cruisers had six SM-5-1s, and the British Tigers had only three... It is possible, of course, that individual SLA directors for each British installation provided better guidance than two SPN- 500, which controlled the firing of Soviet “hundreds”, alas, the author of this article does not have information to compare the domestic and British fire control systems. However, I would like to remind dear lovers of Western technology that the artillery armament of British surface ships turned out to be almost useless against attacks by Argentine aircraft (even primitive light attack aircraft) - and during the Falklands conflict, the British “barrels” were controlled by much more advanced radars and fire control systems, than what was on the Tiger.
It is interesting, by the way, that the masses of Mark 6 and SM-5-1 differ slightly - 37.7 tons of Mark 6 versus 45.8 tons of SM-5-1, i.e. in terms of weights and space occupied, they are comparable, although it can be assumed that the “English” requires less calculation.
So, we have come to the conclusion that the air defense capabilities of the 152-mm artillery of the light cruiser "Tiger" are many times superior to those of the main caliber of Project 68-bis ships, but at the same time, the 76-mm British "second caliber" is very inferior to the Soviet "hundredths" " Sverdlov" both in quality and quantity. How can we compare the overall air defense capabilities of these ships?
We can propose a rather primitive method - based on fire performance. We have already calculated this for a five-minute battle for the 76 mm British and 100 mm Soviet installations. The English 152-mm two-gun turret is capable of firing 30 anti-aircraft shells weighing 59.9 kg each in a minute, i.e. 1,797 kg per minute or 8,985 kg in 5 minutes, respectively, two such towers will release 17,970 kg in the same time. Let's add to this the mass of shells of three 76-mm "sparks" - 6,487.2 kg and we get that within 5 minutes of intense battle the light cruiser "Tiger" is capable of firing 24,457.2 kg of anti-aircraft shells. Six SM-5-1 Soviet "Sverdlov" have a lower fire performance - together they will release 14,040 kg of metal. One can, of course, argue that the author compares the capabilities of ships when firing on both sides, but in the event of repelling an attack from one side, the British cruiser will have an overwhelming advantage, and this is true: two 76-mm installations and 2 152-mm turrets for 5 minutes will release 22.3 tons of metal, and three Soviet SM-5-1 - only a little more than 7 tons. However, it should be remembered that the same Americans, both then and much later, sought to organize air attacks from different directions, like the famous “star” raids of the Japanese in World War II, and it would still be more logical to consider just this (rather than a “single-breasted”) form of air attack .
And we shouldn’t forget this: in terms of range, the Soviet “weaving” SM-5-1 is ahead of not only 76 mm, but also 152 mm British gun mounts. The flight time at medium distances of 100 mm shells is lower (since the initial speed is higher), and accordingly it is possible to adjust fire faster. But even before enemy aircraft enter the SM-5-1’s kill zone, they will be fired upon by the main caliber of the Sverdlov - exercise practice shows that Soviet 152-mm cannons managed to fire 2-3 salvos at targets like LA-17R, having speeds from 750 to 900 km/h. And in addition, the Soviet cruiser also has 32 barrels of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, which, although old, are still quite lethal for an enemy aircraft approaching firing range - the English Tiger has nothing like that.
All of the above, of course, does not provide the Soviet cruiser with superiority or at least equality in air defense capabilities, but you need to understand that although the British Tiger has an advantage in this parameter, it is not absolute. In terms of air defense, the British light cruiser is superior to Project 68-bis ships - perhaps by tens of percent, but by no means by orders of magnitude.
In general, we can say that the light cruisers Sverdlov and Tiger are comparable in their capabilities, with a slight advantage of the Soviet ship. The Sverdlov is larger and has greater combat stability, it is better armored, slightly faster and has an advantage in range (up to 9 thousand nautical miles versus 6.7 thousand). Its capabilities in artillery combat against a surface enemy are higher, but against an air enemy - lower than those of the British cruiser. Accordingly, it can be stated that through the use of more modern (in fact, we can talk about the next generation) artillery and fire control systems, the British were able to make a cruiser comparable to the Sverdlov in a significantly smaller displacement - yet the Tiger is almost 40% smaller.
But was it worth it? In retrospect, one can say - no, it was not worth it. After all, what actually happened? After the war, both the USSR and Great Britain felt the need for modern artillery cruisers. But the USSR, taking proven technology, by 1955 completed 5 ships of Project 68K, laid down and delivered 14 68-bis cruisers to the fleet, thereby creating the basis of the surface fleet and the “personnel forge” of the ocean-going Navy of the future. At the same time, the USSR did not try to introduce universal six-inch “superguns”, but developed fundamentally new naval weapons.
What did the British do? Having spent time and money on developing universal large-caliber artillery systems, they finally commissioned three Tiger-class cruisers - in 1959, 1960 and 1961, respectively. They truly became the pinnacle of artillery, but at the same time they did not have any tangible superiority over the previously built Sverdlovs. And most importantly, they were not its analogues. The lead cruiser of Project 68-bis entered service in 1952, 7 years before the lead Tiger. And some 3 years after the Tiger entered service, the US and USSR fleets were replenished with the missile cruisers Albany and Grozny - and now they have much more reason to be considered the same age as the British cruiser than the Sverdlov "
Perhaps, if the British had devoted less time and money to their purely artillery Tigers, then their County-class guided missile cruisers (later reclassified as destroyers) would not have looked so inferior compared to the first Soviet and American missile cruisers. However, this is a completely different story...
Unfortunately, there is almost no information about Swedish and Dutch cruisers either in domestic sources or on the Russian-language Internet, and the available data is very contradictory. For example, the Swedish “Tre Krunur” - with a standard displacement of 7,400 tons, it is assigned armor weighing 2,100 tons, i.e. 28% of standard displacement! No foreign light cruiser had a similar ratio - the armor weight of the Italian Giuseppe Garibaldi was 2131 tons, the Soviet Chapaevs - 2339 tons, but they were much larger than the Swedish ship. At the same time, information about the armor scheme is very fragmentary: it is stated that the ship had an internal armored belt 70-80 mm thick, and at the same time two flat armored decks, each 30 mm thick, adjacent to the lower and upper edges of the armored belt. But how can this be? After all, engine and boiler rooms are not rubber - light cruisers, or any other ships, never had a flat armored deck along the lower edge of the armor belt. The armored deck either lay on the upper edge or had bevels to provide sufficient space between the armored deck and the bottom in the area of the boiler rooms and engine rooms. Russian-language sources claim that in addition to the indicated 30 mm armored decks:
“There was additional armor 20-50 mm thick above vital places”
Usually this refers to boiler rooms and engine rooms, as well as areas of artillery magazines, but the fact is that speculating on the technical characteristics of warships is a very dangerous business. We have already considered a case where, on the basis of incorrect and incomplete information, a statement was made that the American Cleveland was 1.5 times more armored than the Soviet cruisers 68 bis, while in fact its protection was weaker than that of the Sverdlov. Let us still assume that we are talking about the protection of boiler rooms, engine rooms and areas of the main caliber towers, but then one would expect an indication of the total thickness of the armored decks at the level of 80 - 110 mm, while sources report only 30 + 30 mm!
What confuses matters even more is the statement about the similarity of the armor schemes of the Tre Krunur and the Italian light cruiser Giuseppe Garibaldi. The latter had two spaced armor belts - the side was protected by 30 mm armor, followed by a second armor belt 100 mm thick. What’s interesting is that the armored belt was curved, i.e. its upper and lower edges were connected to the upper and lower edges of the 30 mm outer armor belt, forming a semicircle. At the level of the upper edge of the armored belts, a 40 mm armored deck was applied, and above the armored belt, the side was protected by 20 mm armored plates. Thus, contrary to claims of similarity, according to descriptions from Russian-language sources, the Garibaldi reservation scheme has nothing in common with Tre Krunur. The situation is even more confused by the drawings of the Swedish cruiser - almost all of them clearly show the external armored belt, while from the description it follows that the belt of the Tre Krunur is internal, and therefore should not be visible in any way in the drawing.
Here we can assume banal translation errors: if we assume that the “two 30-mm armored decks” of the Swedish cruiser are actually an external 30 mm armored belt (which we see in the pictures), to which the main, internal, 70-80 mm thick adjoins lower and upper edges (similar to the Garibaldi), then the armor protection scheme of the Tre Krunur really becomes similar to the Italian cruiser. In this case, “additional armor” with a thickness of 20-50 mm is also understandable - this is an armored deck, differentiated by the importance of protection areas. The Tre Krunur towers had mediocre protection - a 127 mm frontal plate, a 50 mm roof and 30 mm walls (175, 65 and 75 mm, respectively, for Soviet cruisers), but sources say nothing about barbettes, although it is doubtful that the Swedes would they were forgotten. If we assume that the barbettes had a thickness comparable to the frontal plate, then their mass was rather considerable; in addition, sources note the presence of a thick (20 mm) upper deck, which, strictly speaking, was not armor, since it was made of shipbuilding steel, but still could provide some additional protection. And if we assume that Tre Krunur had barbettes at the level of Garibaldi, i.e. about 100 mm, vertical armor 100-110 mm (30+70 or 30+80 mm, but actually even more, since the second armored belt was curved and its reduced thickness was greater) and 40-70 mm armored deck (where, in addition to the actual armor also counted 20 mm of shipbuilding steel, which is incorrect, but some countries did so) - then the total mass of armor may reach the required 2100 tons.
In terms of armament, the ships are almost identical: as the main caliber, the De Zeven Provincen has eight 152 mm/53 guns of the 1942 model produced by Bofors, against seven absolutely the same guns on the Tre Krunur. The De Zeven Provinsen guns were housed in four two-gun turrets - exact copies of those that adorned the stern of the Swedish cruiser. The only difference is that “De Zeven Provincen” had a pair of two-gun turrets in the nose, and “Tre Krunur” had one three-gun turret. The number of anti-aircraft guns is also comparable: - 4 * 2 - 57 mm and 8 * 1 - 40 mm Bofors from De Zeven Provincen versus 10 * 2-40 mm and 7 * 1-40 mm Bofors at Tre Krunur.
But the armor of the De Zeven Provinsen is noticeably weaker than that of the Swedish ship - the external armor belt is 100 mm thick, decreasing to 75 mm at the ends, the deck is only 20-25 mm. Power plant of a Dutch cruiser with 5,000 hp. weaker than Swedish. But at the same time, “De Zeven Provinsen” is much larger than “Tre Krunur” - it has 9,529 tons of standard displacement versus 7,400 tons of the “Swede”!
It is possible that Tre Krunur became a victim of the inflated ambitions of the admirals - the shipbuilders were somehow able to cram the sailors’ “wants” into a very small displacement, but this certainly affected the efficiency of the ship. Attempts of this kind have existed at all times of military shipbuilding, but they almost never became successful. It is also possible that the Swedish cruiser had more modest performance characteristics, distorted in the Western press, as happened with the American light cruiser Cleveland. In any case, comparing “Tre Krunur” with “Sverdlov” based on tabular performance characteristics will not be correct.
As for De Zeven Provincen, comparison is extremely difficult due to the almost complete lack of information on its main caliber: 152 mm/53 guns from the Bofors company. Various sources indicate the rate of fire is either 10-15 or 15 rounds/min, but the latter figure is highly doubtful. While the British, when creating a 152-mm gun with a similar rate of fire for the Tiger, were forced to use water-cooled barrels, we do not see anything like that on the cruisers of Sweden and the Netherlands.
Stern turrets of the Tre Krunur-class light cruiser.
English-language sources are also not encouraging - for example, the famous electronic encyclopedia NavWeaps claims that the rate of fire of this gun depended on the type of projectile - 10 rounds per minute for armor-piercing (AP) and 15 for anti-aircraft (AA). Everything would be fine, but in the ammunition section the encyclopedia indicates the presence of only high-explosive fragmentation (NOT) shells!
Nothing is clear about the horizontal and vertical aiming speeds of the 152 mm turrets, without which it is impossible to assess the guns’ ability to fire at air targets. It is alleged that the guns had fully mechanized loading at any elevation angle, but at the same time the mass of the De Zeven Provincen turret is much lighter than that of the light cruiser Tiger - 115 tons versus 158.5 tons, but the British created their turret at 12 years later. Universal two-gun 152-mm turrets for Worchester-class cruisers, which entered service a year later than Tre Krunur, weighed over 200 tons, were supposed to provide 12 rounds per minute, but were technically unreliable.
The 152-mm De Zeven Provincen guns fired a 45.8 kg projectile, accelerating it to an initial speed of 900 m/sec. In terms of its ballistic qualities, the brainchild of the Bofors company was inferior to the Soviet B-38, which imparted a 55 kg projectile with a speed of 950 m/sec, but still surpassed the British six-inch Tiger in range and was capable of throwing a projectile at 140 kbt. Accordingly, the effective fire range of the Dutch cruiser was approximately 107 kbt, and this is already closer to the capabilities of the Sverdlov’s main battery. If “De Zeven Provinsen” was indeed capable of developing a rate of fire of 10 rounds per minute per barrel in combat conditions, then it had greater fire performance compared to the Soviet cruiser - 80 rounds per minute versus 60 for the Sverdlov. But still, the Project 68-bis cruiser had an advantage in range and in the power of the projectile: the 25 mm armored deck of the De Zeven Provincen could not resist a 55 kg Soviet projectile at distances of 100-130 kbt, but the 50 mm deck armor of the Sverdlov struck a light Dutch shell would most likely have been repelled. In addition, we know that the control system of the Soviet ship ensured effective firing of the main caliber at long distances, but we know nothing about the fire control devices and the De Zeven Provincen radar, which could have been far from being so advanced.
As for anti-aircraft fire, with a maximum nominal rate of fire of 15 rounds/min, eight main-caliber De Zeven Provincen guns fired almost 5.5 tons of shells per minute. Six SM-5-1 Soviet cruisers (also taken to a maximum of 18 rounds per minute per barrel) - only 3.37 tons. This is a significant advantage, and it became overwhelming in the event of firing at a single air target (Sverdlov could not, unlike from "De Zeven Provincen", fire with all installations on one side). But it should be borne in mind that, unlike the guns of the Dutch ship, the domestic SM-5-1 were stabilized, and this provided them with better accuracy. In addition, shells with radio fuses came into service with Soviet installations (although, apparently, this happened in the mid or late 50s), but the author of this article does not have information that Swedish or Dutch cruisers had such shells . If we assume that De Zeven Provincen did not have shells with radio fuses, then the advantage in air defense goes to the Soviet cruiser. In addition, the above figures do not take into account the even modest, but still existing capabilities of firing the main caliber of the Sverdlov at an air target. And most importantly, as in the case of the main caliber, we do not have information about the quality of the anti-aircraft fire control devices of the Dutch and Swedish cruisers.
As for the effectiveness of anti-aircraft guns, the Soviet cruiser is undoubtedly the leader in the number of barrels, but the effectiveness of the 57-mm Bofors guns should be significantly higher than the domestic 37-mm B-11 gun. However, in order to be equal in capabilities with the Soviet ship, one 57-mm “sparka” should be equivalent to three B-11 installations, which is somewhat doubtful.
In general, it can be stated that De Zeven Provincen is inferior to the Soviet Project 68-bis cruiser in artillery combat, but is significantly superior (in the presence of shells with radio fuses) in terms of air defense. However, this conclusion is correct only if the main caliber of the Dutch cruiser fully corresponds to the characteristics given to it by Russian-language sources, if the cruiser’s control system and radar are not inferior to the Soviet ones, if the main caliber was equipped with shells with a radio fuse... Despite the fact that the above assumptions are very doubtful . But even in the most favorable version for De Zeven Provincen, in terms of the totality of its combat qualities it does not have superiority over the Soviet cruiser of Project 68 bis.
This article was supposed to complete the cycle about the artillery cruisers of the Soviet fleet, but the comparison of ships of the Sverdlov type with foreign cruisers unexpectedly dragged on, and there was no more room left to describe the tasks of artillery cruisers in the post-war USSR Navy.
The artillery cruiser of the 68 bis Sverdlov project is one of the first post-war projects. His birth was preceded by a lot of work that lasted almost 15 years. The fact is that a light one, according to the then classification of ships, was chosen as the prototype ship for the cruisers of this series. Navy Navy, cruiser Project 68-k Chapaev, in turn created on the basis of the Project 68 ship developed before the Great Patriotic War.
For the first time on this project, Soviet shipbuilders managed to implement the idea of creating a “fully welded hull” from low-alloy steel, which, according to calculations, not only increased the manufacturability of the construction, but also reduced economic costs.
To protect the vital parts of the ship in battle from enemy artillery, traditional general and local armor was used: anti-missile armor - citadel, main caliber turrets, conning tower; anti-fragmentation and anti-bullet - combat posts of the upper deck and superstructures. Mainly homogeneous armor was used, the bulk of the armor was the mass of the “armor citadel”, structurally formed from deck (armor - lower deck), side and beam armor. The thickness of the armor used in this design was: side - 100 mm, bow beam - 120 mm, stern - 100 mm, lower deck - 50 mm.
Structural underwater protection from the effects of enemy torpedo and mine weapons included a double hull bottom (length up to 154 m), a system of side compartments (for storing liquid cargo) and longitudinal bulkheads, as well as 23 main waterproof autonomous hull compartments formed by transverse sealed bulkheads. The mixed system of hull framing - mainly longitudinal - in the middle part and transverse - in its bow and stern ends also played a significant role in the general and local strength of the ship.
The location of the service and living quarters was practically no different from that adopted on the cruisers of the 68-k Chapaev Ave.
A feature of the cruisers of the 68-bis Sverdlov project was also the presence of special artillery radar stations in addition to optical means of aiming guns at the target. Thus, in addition to two KDP-8 command and rangefinder posts and DM-8-2 turret artillery rangefinders, these ships used Radar Radar station"Reef" and radar "Zalp", and on the II and III towers of the MK-5-bis their own radio range finders are mounted.
The effective combat use of main caliber artillery was ensured by the new system of fire control devices "Molniya ATs-68-bis A".
The ship's universal caliber, represented by two on-board batteries (each of three installations), was equipped with two SPN-500 stabilized aiming posts attached to them (providing firing at air targets in conditions of the ship's pitching) and two battery-by-battery optical rangefinders ZDMS-4. In addition, the Anchor radar was used to control the fire of 100-mm universal artillery.
B-11 anti-aircraft guns were installed on superstructures, at the bow and stern corners relative to the center plane of the ship. Like the SM-5-1-bis installations, the V-11 assault rifles were interfaced with the Zenit-68-bis fire control system.
The ships of the "68-bis Sverdlov" type were also equipped with navigation and radio equipment and communications equipment that were modern at that time.
By the mid-50s, out of the planned 25 units of Project 68-bis Sverdlov, the fleet was replenished with only 14 cruisers of this project, which became the main ships in the core of the surface forces after the decommissioning of Petropavlovsk-class battleships Navy Navy.
Most of the cruisers "68 bis Sverdlov" were named either in honor of outstanding military figures of Russia, or famous party leaders, or after the names of cities.
The scientific and technological revolution in military affairs, which began in Navy Navy from the mid-fifties, it soon demanded strengthening of the anti-aircraft firepower of cruisers of the 68 bis Sverdlov class. Some of the previous anti-aircraft systems were replaced, first with V-11 assault rifles, and then additionally new 30 mm caliber shipborne MZA systems were installed. The ships were re-equipped and equipped with more modern radar and radio equipment. All this on some cruisers of the 68-bis Sverdlov type was carried out according to Project 68-a.
Sverdlov 1952 /1990The construction of the cruiser under serial number O-408 was carried out at the Baltic Shipyard named after S. Ordzhonikidze (at that time - plant No. 189 of the People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry). It was launched on July 5, 1950. After completion afloat, the ship passed factory and state tests, and from November 29, 1951 to January 16, 1952. in the area of the Osmusaar-Pakri islands, in sea conditions of 4-7 points - seaworthy. On May 15, 1952, the State Acceptance Commission for Ships signed an act on its inclusion in the Navy.
Dzerzhinsky1952 /1988Ordzhonikidze1952 /1972In February 1960, Nikita Khrushchev arrived in Indonesia. During the visit, an agreement was signed on the supply of ships, aircraft, helicopters, tanks and other weapons. Undoubtedly, the most expensive object among them was the cruiser of the 68 bis Sverdlov project. Until this day, the USSR had not transferred ships of such displacement to other fleets.
The light cruiser Ordzhonikidze from the Baltic Fleet was selected for transfer (“object 055”). On January 11, 1961, a special decree was issued according to which Central Clinical Hospital Central Design Bureau-17 began developing a project for “tropicalization” of the ship. Major modernization work was planned for the following climatic requirements: air temperature +40 degrees. C, humidity 95 percent, water temperature +30 degrees. C. The work proceeded on a grand scale, but representatives of the Indonesian team who arrived in Baltiysk Navy Navy They hinted that they would not give money for such large-scale work. The requirements were lowered, and everything was done only by replacing diesel generators with more powerful ones (for installing additional fans, mostly individual ones).
On February 14, 1961, "Ordzhonikidze" arrived in Sevastopol and entered the plant, and on April 5, 1962, it began sea trials. By that time the officers from Navy Naval forces Indonesia had already been formed and was on the ship. By the way, the mechanic of the cruiser Yatidzhan subsequently “grew up” to the head of the technical department Navy Naval forces Indonesia. Most sailors also received leadership positions.
On August 5, 1962, the cruiser "Ordzhonikidze" arrived in Surabaya and after the transfer ceremony and renaming "Irian" on January 24, 1963, it was expelled from the composition Navy Navy THE USSR.
Without previously having their own fleet, the Indonesians had to master expensive ships and fairly complex equipment through trial and error. In November 1962, during the ascent from a hydraulic shock, the diesel engines of one of the submarines failed, one of the destroyers broke its stern, and three of the six boilers on the cruiser stopped working. The condition of the fleet was affected by high temperature and humidity, as well as the aggressiveness of sea water, and the equipment was not properly maintained.
By 1964, the cruiser had practically lost its combat capability. That is why the decision was made to send Irian for repairs to the USSR, to Vladivostok. In March 1964, the cruiser arrived at Dalzavod. Both sailors and ship repairmen were struck by the neglect of the ship and the huge number of small jobs that are usually carried out by the crew. Nevertheless, all points noted in the repair contract were completed. In August of the same year, accompanied by our destroyer Irian, he left for Surabaya.
And already in 1965, well-known events took place, as a result of which the “father of creation” Suharto came to power. His attitude towards the fleet was completely different from that of the previous government. The cruiser was stationed in the Surabaya roadstead and over time turned into a floating prison for opponents of the new regime.
In 1970, the abandoned and forgotten Irian washed up on a sandbank. The hull filled with water. No one carried out rescue operations. And, according to Western sources, in 1972 the flagship of the Indonesian Navy Naval forces began to be dismantled for scrap metal.
Zhdanov 1952 /1992Laid down on February 11, 1950, launched on December 27, 1950, and entered into service on December 31, 1952. (military unit 63834) Received the name in honor of An.A. Zhdanov, a prominent Soviet party and government figure.
01/25/1953 - the naval flag of the USSR was raised, became part of the 8th Navy Navy.
03/27/1960 - withdrawn from combat service, mothballed and put into storage in Kronstadt.
In 1965, the cruiser was reactivated and put back into service. Then he makes the transition to Sevastopol. At the end of this year it was delivered to the Sevmorzavod berth for repairs and re-equipment. Joined the KChF.
During 1966-1970, it was converted according to project 68U1 into a control ship.
In 1971, mooring and factory sea trials were carried out in May-September, and state tests were carried out in October-November. The acceptance certificate was signed on November 27, and at the end of the year it was reclassified into a control cruiser (KRU). The ship was intended to control fleet forces with the placement of a formation commander and headquarters. Equipped with means for collecting information and processing it, as well as the latest means of communication, including satellite. Thus, in 1971, the first combat space navigation and communications system “Cyclone” entered service. It included three hardware complexes: “Tsunami-AM” on artificial Earth satellites, “Tsunami-BM” (P-790) on ships and “Tsunami-VM” on coastal facilities. Accordingly, the Zhdanov switchgear received the Tsunami-BM equipment.
1977-1978. On February 7, the switchgear was delivered to Sevmorzavod for major repairs. During which the modernization of communications took place. So, new space communications antennas were installed on the aft machine platform. In 1976, the equipment of the USSR Ministry of Defense's unified space communications system "Crystal", which included the ship's equipment "Crystal-K", was put into service. This is what is installed on the cruiser. Then docking. By the end of the year, the cruiser entered service.
1986-1988. In September, the ship arrives at Sevmorzavod for the last major overhaul and modernization. Two years later, in the same September, he took part in the Black Sea Fleet exercises "Autumn88".
1989 Placed in reserve and laid up in Sevastopol in Trinity Bay. In February, the name “Zhdanov” was removed. No new one was assigned, it was listed as “KRU 101”.
1990 On April 19 the flag was lowered Navy Navy, then the disarmament of the cruiser began, exclusion from the navy and transfer to the Stock Property Department for dismantling and sale.
1992 The cruiser was sold for scrap to a private company in India.
Alexander Nevsky1952 /1989Admiral Nakhimov1953 /1962Admiral Ushakov1953 /1992Admiral Lazarev1953 /1991Alexander Suvorov1953 /1991Admiral Senyavin1954 /1992On June 13, 1978, the artillery cruiser of the Pacific Fleet "Admiral Senyavin" carried out practical artillery firing with its main caliber. When the electrical signal was given to fire the ninth salvo, the right gun of turret No. 1 did not fire. Another shell was sent to the loaded gun by mistake. As a result, the charge in the gun chamber ignited. The escaping jet of gases ignited the charges prepared for firing, and a fire broke out in the turret, quickly spreading to the upper reloading compartment. When the armored door was removed, there were no survivors in the tower. All thirty-seven people - the crews of the combat and reloading compartments, as well as those present at the shooting - were killed."
Molotovsk 1954 /1988 Mikhail Kutuzov1954 /1989The cruiser "Mikhail Kutuzov" was laid down on February 22, 1951 at a shipyard in Nikolaev. On August 9, 1954, the Naval flag of the USSR was raised on the cruiser. On January 31, 1955, by order of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the cruiser was assigned to the Black Sea Fleet squadron.
The cruiser became an advanced ship in combat training. In 1956, 1958, 1963 he won challenge prizes of the USSR Navy. For five years in a row from 1965 to 1970 - a prize from the commander of the KChF for artillery training. Repeatedly, the cruiser's crew achieved the title of the best surface ship of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1957, the cruiser cruised around Europe and participated, along with ships of the Northern and Baltic fleets, in a parade on the Neva in Leningrad. In full accordance with the then ocean doctrine, in 1964, the first of the KChF ships entered combat service in the Mediterranean Sea. Seven trips to combat service. More than 200 thousand miles traveled and seven excellent ratings for this difficult service.
Over the past years, for many generations of military sailors, the cruiser has become a real school of combat training, military skill, and a school of life. For their great contribution to the combat readiness of the fleet, more than 700 military personnel of the ship were awarded orders and medals. The cruiser gave a start in life to 17 admirals and 73 captains of 1st rank.
In addition to combat training and military service far from the homeland, the cruiser systematically carried out government tasks: diplomatic missions, friendship visits and foreign campaigns, receptions of heads of foreign states and governments, major foreign military leaders, as well as cosmonauts, scientists and cultural figures. Currently, the cruiser is in reserve, category 3, 1st stage. Armament and equipment were mothballed in 1987 using dynamic drainage. The ship has undergone four ongoing repairs, one medium repair and modernization of equipment and weapons. The last docking was in November 1985-2001. Physical Field Test - April 1986. All equipment of the cruiser is in service.
In 1994, veterans of the cruiser took the initiative to preserve the only and last Navy Navy The Russian artillery cruiser as a historical center of a wide profile - as a center of military-historical, patriotic, veteran and excursion-tourist work.
Directive of the General Staff Navy Navy dated December 26, 1996 No. 730/1/2273 provides for the use of the cruiser as a ship-based center for military-patriotic education and the history of the Russian Navy. Due to the lack of funds, leave it in safekeeping as part of the Black Sea Fleet at the main fleet base in the city of Sevastopol.
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